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PREFACE
During the period when the eighteenth century was
merging into the nineteenth, William Paley was regarded as
the outstanding apologist of the Christian religion in England.
So conclusive was his work considered to be that one reviewer
could write the following:
We regard Dr. Paley's writings on the
"Evidences of Christianity" as of so
signally decisive a character that we
could be content to let them stand as
the essence, and the close of the great
argument, on the part of its believers;
and should feel no despondency or cha¬
grin, if we could be prophetically cer¬
tain that such an efficient Christian rea-
soner would never henceforward arise. *
The above was written in the year 1809. Since then
Paley has been largely forgotten. The average student knows
about him only this: that he was called "Pigeon" Paley and that
he used some sort of analogy about a watch. To the writer it
appeared that a rediscovery of Paley might offer to the modern
reader some values that were greatly admired in the eighteenth
century.
1 Eclectic Review. Vol. V, part 1, p. 1.
ii.
Even Paley's arch-foe, Professor Adam Sedgwick, ad¬
mitted that "Paley did more for revealed truth than any writer of
his country."*
Paley is best known as an apologist of the Christian re¬
ligion; however, he was also highly honored in his day as a moralist.
The historian, W.E.H. Lecky, commenting on Paley's Moral and
Political Philosophy, writes:
It has been, I think, the fortune of this work to
be of late years very unduly depreciated, partly
because in consequence of the singular charm
and lucidity of its style, it has been so widely
read, studied, and criticized that all its weak
points have been fully disclosed and partly be¬
cause the particular type of its utilitarian theory
of ethics which it teaches has been generally
abandoned. It is, however, both in form and
substance one of the masterpieces of the eight¬
eenth century. ^
W. R. Soriey has observed that "probably no English
writer has ever excelled Paley in the power of marshalling argu-
3
ment or in clearness of reasoning." Ueberweg refers to the al¬
most undisputed sway which was held by Paiey's Moral Philosophy
for nearly fifty years.'* This work was for many years the text
*
A Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cam¬
bridge, p. 56.
2
A History of England in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. V,
p. 171.
*2
A History of English Philosophy, p. 201.
4 History of Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 391.
iii.
book at Cambridge University. Twenty-one editions were printed,
and it was translated into German by Garve in 1787. At the Uni¬
versity of Cambridge the public examination in the senate house
for the B.A. degree was based on one of the four Gospels or the
Acts of the Apostles in the original Greek, Paley's Evidences of
Christianity, one of the Greek and one of the Latin Classics. *
Leslie Stephen offers it as his opinion that Paley is unsurpassed
2
as a writer of text books. When Cardinal Manning was over
seventy, he wrote concerning his youthful study of Paley's Evi¬
dences, "I took in the whole argument and I thank God nothing has
3
ever shaken it."
Several instances of Paley's repute as a moralist in his
own generation appear on the pages of history. For example, when
Lord Erskine was pleading before Lord Ellenborough and a special
jury in the Court of Kings Bench,December the twenty-third, 1803,
he stated:
* The Works of William Paley, D.D. (Edmund Paley,
editor), Vol. I, p. CLXXI.
^
Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XLIIX, p. 105.
3
Strachey, Lytton, Emminent Victorians, p. 6.
iv.
That he should advise every one wishing
to become wiser and better to read a work
lately published by Dr. Paley, in which the
elegant writer, and excellent man, made
the whole creation raise one general j
chorus to the God of Heaven and earth.
While asserting the claims of the Roman Catholics
of Ireland to a full and complete toleration, Mr. Fox referred
several times to Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy and
stated that Paley's authority:
Would have great weight, not only in the
House, but with all thinking men in the
country, whose opinions no man who valued
genius, no man who valued learning, no
man who valued moderation could hear with¬
out deference and respect.^
The works of Paley were important enough to attract
the attention of King George III. A letter written to Paley from
a friend describes the King's concern over having lost his copy
of Paley and his determination to send for another immediately.




Meadley, G. W. Memoirs of William Paley, P.P.,
p. 208.
2
Ibid. , pp. 250, 251.
^
Paley, Edmund. The Life of Dr. Paley, pp. CCLVIII,
CCLIX.
V*
The period in which Paley wrote is more noted for
its moral philosophy than for its religion. Paley's importance
in this field is reflected in the fact that he was the leading ex¬
ponent of the ethical theory known as Theological Utilitarianism.
This theory sets forth much that was typical in eighteenth century
English ethics. Not only did this theory make a strong contribu¬
tion to the moral and religious philosophy of the eighteenth cen¬
tury but the writer believes that it is still at work in a vast seg¬
ment of American Christianity today. It is the purpose of this
thesis first to discover the source of Paley's ethics. An attempt
will then be made to isolate Paley's philosophy from the general
stream of eighteenth century thought in order that his own unique
contribution might be determined. Following this an exposttion of
Paley's ethical system will be given and the final chapter will be
devoted to a critical evaluation of his ethics.
In the biographical section of the thesis a brief sketch
of Paley's life along with those incidents in his life that are ger¬
mane to his ethics will be offered.
It will be observed also that in spite of the fact that
ettiics anc* political philosophy were often combined in Paley's
day, it does not lie within the scope of this thesis to treat his
views on politics except as they affect his ethics.
vl.
In common with his generation, Paley shared an
aversion to metaphysics. He views ethics primarily as an
actual working force in life. Little attention, therefore, will
be given to metaphysics in this thesis.
It is generally acknowledged that eighteenth century
English thought was very largely free from continental influences.
Sidgwick reminds us that: 'for the century and a half that inter¬
venes between Hobbes and Bentham the development of English
ethics proceeds without receiving any material influence from
foreign sources."* This result in English thought appears only
in the field of ethics. Descartes had been much studied in
England by students of physics and psychology. His metaphysi¬
cal system was the most important antecedent of Locke's. How¬
ever, Descartes hardly touched ethics proper. It should be re¬
membered also that Clarke's controversy with Spinoza and Leib¬
nitz was purely in the realm of metaphysics and will not be
mentioned here.
American spelling is used throughout the work except
when an author's own words are quoted.
Sidgwick, Henry. Outlines of the History of Ethics
for English Readers, p. XXIII.
vii.
Words of warmest appreciation are due and grate¬
fully given to Professor W. S. Tindal of the Department of
Ethics in New College and Professor John Macmurray of the
Department of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh
for their invaluable assistance to the writer; to President E. D.
Head and to my colleagues of the Faculty of Southwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary, who have cooperated in granting me a
leave of absence from my teaching responsibilities that I might
pursue this study.
CHAPTER I
BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM PALE Y
William Paley was born at Peterborough in Yorkshire,
England, in July of 1743. He was the descendent of a long line of
sturdy North country yeomen. Kis father, William Paley, was
0 ' 4 —
believed to be one of the oldest incumbents on one and the same
vicarage in the diocese and perhaps in England, having served
for fifty-six years as vicar of Helpstone. He was chiefly known,
however, as a school-master, teaching until he was eighty-three
years of age, and was considered a very good classical scholar.
The senior Paley was appointed Headmaster of Giggleswick School
to which he moved his family in 1745.
As young Paley grew up, he was educated under his
father's care. He manifested something of his ambition as well
as his quickness of wit in his childhood when on being scolded by
his mother, who finished with "God give thee grace," he replied,
"Ay, mother, Grace o' God and Grace o' Canterbury will do for
„1me."
*
Paley, Edmund. Life of Dr. Paley, p. XXVI.
In November, 1758, Paley was admitted as a sizar
of Christ's College at Cambridge, In 1759, at the age of six¬
teen years, he became a resident member of Christ's College
On the evening after taking leave of his son, the elder Paley
remarked to a pupil, "My son is now gone to college,-—he'll
turn out a great man—very great indeed,—I'm certain of it,
for he has by far the clearest head I ever met with in my life.'
Because of his vast knowledge of mathematics,
young Paley was excused from attending the lectures of the
tutor in mathematics. At Christ's College he attended Mr.
Backhouse's lectures in logic, metaphysics and moral philo¬
sophy, in which the doctrines of Locke, Clarke and Hutcheson
were principally discussed.
While conversing with a friend at Cambridge on
the early part of his academical life, Paley related the fol¬
lowing:
I spent the first two years of my under-
graduateship happily, but unprofitably. I
was constantly in society, where we were
not immoral, but idle and rather expensive
*
Meadley, George W. Memoirs of William Paley,
p. 9
- 3 -
At the commencement of my third year,
however, after having left the usual party
at rather a late hour in the evening, I was
awakened at five in the morning by one of
my companions, who stood at my bedside and
said, 'Paley, I have been thinking what a
d d fool you are. I could do nothing
probably were I to try, and can afford the
life I lead: you could do everything, and
cannot afford it. I have had no sleep during
the entire night on account of these reflec¬
tions, and am now come solemnly to inform
you that if you persist in your indolence, I
must renounce your society.' I was so
struck, Dr. Paley continued, with the visit
and the visitor, that I lay in bed a great part
of the day and formed my plan. I ordered
my bed-maker to prepare my fire every
evening, in order that it might be lighted
by myself. I arose at five; read during the
whole of the day, except during such hours as
Chapel and hall required, allotting to each
portion of time its peculiar branch of study;
and just before the closing of the gates (nine
o'clock) I went to a neighbouring coffee¬
house, where I constantly regaled upon a
mutton chop and a dose of milk punch. And
thus on taking my bachelor's degree I became
a senior wrangler. *
Paley became senior wrangler in the year 1763. In preparing
him for this honor his course of reading was sketched out for
him by Mr. Thorp, fellow of Peterhouse, the senior wrangler
in 1758; Mr. Wilson, a bachelor of the same College; and Dr.
Paley, William. The Works of William Paley, D.D.
p. XXIII.
- 4 -
Waring, fellow of Magdalen College and Lucasian professor of
mathematics. Besides metaphysics, morals, the four branches
of natural philosophy and Newton's Principia, the course extended
to the most abstruse parts of algebra and fluxions.
Paley's mind was so formed that in his reading he
could rapidly select the kernel and throw away the husk. "In
the estimation of Dr. Waring and Mr. Thorp, he was superior,
not only to every man of his year, but even to several of his
,, 1examiners."
On June 24th, 1766, Mr. Paley was elected a fellow
on the foundation of Christ's College, and at the ensuing com¬
mencement completed his degree of Master of Arts.
In the University Mr. Paley was held in high esteem
as a lecturer. His method was to open the period by questioning
some of his pupils on every point of the preceding lecture. After
such preliminaries he would proceed to discuss some subject in
Locke or Clarke, or in moral philosophy, revealing by his man¬




At the beginning of the students' first year Paley
gave his lectures on Locke which included a brief sketch of
logic and the rules to be observed in disputation using
Locke's Essay on Human Understanding as a text book.
This would be followed by discussions of Clarke
On the Being and Attributes of God. Paley's method was
first to present Clarke's argument, then to correct his errors
and finally to enforce his argument by more conclusive reason¬
ing of his own. These lectures anticipated much of what after¬
wards was advanced in his Natural Theology on the wisdom,
power and goodness of the Deity and were concluded with a
summary of all the arguments that can be urged on the pro¬
bability of a future state from the light of nature alone.
For the students' third year Paley Offered his
moral lectures which were later expanded into his Moral arid
Political Philosophy.
He lectured to all the undergraduates on the Greek
New Testament. His method was to explain Scripture by Scrip¬
ture. His model seems to have been Locke On the Reasonableness
of Christianity and On the Epistles.
- 6 -
The chief points insisted upon by Mr. Paley
to his pupils were that they should listen to
God, and not to man; that they should free
themselves, as much as possible, from all
prejudices of birth, education and country;
and that they should not call any one their
master in religion, but Christ.
His Greek New Testament from which he lectured,
was filled with critical and explanatory notes. These explana¬
tions apparently came from Bowyer's Conjectures on the New
Testament. The notes are consistent with the design which ap¬
pears on the first page of his lecture book which is as follows:
"Points to be explained—Heb. phraseology—ways of reasoning—
accomodation of prophecies—proverbs—explanation of customs."
To his pupils who had taken their first degree, Paley
offered a course of lectures in divinity which contained the sub¬
stance of what he afterwards gave to the world in his Evidences
on Christianity, and the germ of the still greater argument on the
same subject, developed in his Horae Paulinae,
For supplementary reading in this course he suggested
Collyer's Sacred Interpreter, especially the former part of the
second volume; Harwood's Introduction, volume I; the Dissertations
1
Universal Magazine, Nov., 1805, N.S. Vol. IV,
p. 416.
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prefixed to Mackknight's Harmony; Godwin's Jewish Antiquities,
or rather Jenning's Lectures upon the work; and Law's Reflec¬
tions on the Life and Character of Christ.
For commentaries he suggested that students supply
themselves with Hammond by Le Clerc; Lightfoot's Works upon
the Respective Gospels, especially his Horae Hebraicae; Bowyer's
Conjectures on the New Testament; Jebb's, or any other Harmony;
Wetstein's edition of the Greek Testament, 12 mo. , 1711; Park-
hurst's Lexicon and Clarke's Paraphrase. Benson's History of
the Christian Religion, Schmidius' Concordance for the New Testa¬
ment and Trommius' for the Septuagint, the folio edition of Wetstein
for quotation from profane authors, the English Concordance of
Cruden, Conant's Sermons, Limbarch's De Religione Christiana,
Enfield's Preachers' Directory, Rutherford's Institutes of Natural
Law, Doddridge's Family Expositor and Search's Light of Nature
Pursued.
Paley possessed very little physical vigor. On being
told of the death of a school fellow, he said he did not much won¬
der, for he was the only boy in the school he ever did or ever
could thrash.
- 8 -
Yet for all his lack of physical stamina, Paley v/as
possessed of a strong personality which made him a delightful
member of many circles*
He was the incarnation of strong common
sense, full of genial good humour, and
always disposed to take life pleasantly.
As a Lawyer, the profession for which he
thought himself suited, he would probably
have rivalled the younger Lav/, who became
Lord Ellenborough. He had no romance,
poetic sensibility or enthusiasm but was
thoroughly genial and manly. He was a
very affectionate father and husband and
fond, like Sydney Smith, ox gaining know¬
ledge from every one who would talk to him.
The phrases about his conscience—he said
on one occasion that he couldn't afford to
keep a conscience*—and others, often
quoted to prove his cynicism, seem rather
to show the humorists tendency to claim
motives lower than the true ones.^
He was utterly frank and free from deceit. When
asked on one occasion why he quit his position at Dalston, he
answered:
Why, Sir, I had two or three reasons for tak¬
ing Stanwix in exchange; first, it saved me
double housekeeping, as Stanwix was within a
twenty minutes walk of my house in Carlisle;
p. 511.
Universal Magazine, December, 1805, N.S. vol. iv,
2
Stephen, Leslie. Dictionary of National Biography,
Vol. XLIII, p. 105.
- 9 -
secondly, it was fifty pounds a year more
in value; and thirdly, I began to find my
stock of sermons coming over again too
fast. *
Remarks like the above may have been responsible
for the charges that were brought against Paley's character.
One writer contrasts Paley's character with such Puritan di¬
vines as Baxter, Howe, and Philip Henry, observing that he
fails to find in Paley their deep devotion to Christ, their zeal
for the promotion of Christianity, and their indifference to emol-
2
uments. Paley's love for the theater and games was well known.
His critics held that it was not becoming to a Christian pastor to
be pushing into theaters and whist parties, insisting that it was
an unpardonable inconsistency to be so convinced of the truth of
Christianity and yet to share so little of the spirit of its Founder.
It is true that if a man looks for something of the char¬
acteristics of the Apostles in Paley, he will be disappointed and
must be content to find a good respectable man of the world. Yet
it should not be forgotten that he was enough of a crusader to
sacrifice his chance of an ecclesiastical promotion by crusading
1
The Works of William Paley, P.P., p. XVIII.
2
Clarkson, Thomas. History of the Abolition, Vol. I,
p. 465.
- 10
for religious liberty , and that he was a strong leader against
2
slavery. It is also true that one of Paley's greatest sermons
was written as an appeal to clergymen to care for their reputa¬
tion, to strengthen their character and deepen their own devotional
lives. This sermon was preached before the University of Cam¬
bridge in completion of his exercises for his Doctor's Degree.
The charge that Paley was too much interested in
material emoluments is diminished in the face of the fact that
when he was provided with one of the best parsonage houses in
the kingdom, he granted his parishioners a lease of the titles
that were rightfully his for his life. In his Moral Philosophy
he had represented titles as injurious to cultivation and im¬
provement; and he now acted, as far as circumstances would
3
permit, in conformity to his opinions. As the produce of the
land was considerably augmented in price soon after this period,
1
Paley, William. Sermons on Public Occasions,
p. 603.
2





and the value of the landed property in general was tremendously
advanced, Dr. Paley's tenants became very prosperous. Their
prosperity was a source of abiding satisfaction to Dr. Paley, nor
did he give evidence of disappointment over the opportunities of
gain which he had given away.
In one of his jovial moods Paley once said that "a man
1
who is not sometimes a fool, is always one." This sentiment
was probably taken from Locke who was of the opinion that in order
to employ one part of life in serious and important occupations, it
is necessary to spend another in mere amusements. Paley's very
careless manner of dress gave rise to a proverbial remark, long
traditional in the College, "You may be a sloven, but don't think
you are a Paley."
Paley did not pursue either mathematical or metaphysi¬
cal learning any farther than suited his office of tutor for he viewed
these subjects as being of value only insofar as they opened and
prepared the mind for more useful studies.
1
Meadley, G. W. Memoirs of William Paley, P.P.,
p. 12.
- 12 -
His love for disputation caused him on several occa¬
sions to choose a less favored side that he might make it appear
more favorable. He often succeeded in showing his love for an
independent way of thinking.
In 1765, Paley received the Bachelor's prize, which
was given annually at Cambridge for the best essay in Latin prose.
His essay was on the subject, "Utrium civitati perniciosior sit
Epicuri an Zenonis philosophia" in which he championed the cause
of the Epicureans against the Stoics. Desiring in this essay to ex¬
pose what he considered as hypocrisy in Stoicism he called them
"those Pharisees in Philosophy." He accounted for the popularity
of Zeno by contending that he was a politician who preached the all-
sufficiency of virtue to complete human happiness which, according
to Paley, had always been a note that ministered to the pride of men.
He speaks against Zeno's condemnation of public worship, condemns
his cynical language, and his promiscuous concubinage.
He contends that Epicurus gave sanction to no vicious
indulgence, while the disciples of Zeno, though affecting an eleva¬
tion of virtue inconsistent with human nature, too often, in their
practice, descended to the most flagrant of crimes.
-13 -
His independence of thought is seen as he argues
against Zeno's lofty ideais and contends that;
There is not perhaps a more effectual way
of injuring the cause of virtue than by strain¬
ing its duties too high. The bulk of mankind
will easily persuade them selves that virtue,
this ideal virtue, was never designed for or¬
dinary practice, but to be confined to a few
more elevated natures and subiimer views. l
Paley devoted much more of his essay to exposing the
errors of Stoicism than he did to expounding the virtues of Epicurus
It cannot, therefore, as some have contended, be conclusively
argued that Paley was greatly influenced by the ethics of Epicurus.
At the end of his essay Paley added a note declaring:
The intent of this inquiry is not so much to
defend the principles of either sect, as to
prove the insufficiency of both. For neither
the welfare offiie public is promoted, nor the
happiness of the individual secured by either.
Their apprehensions of the nature of God,
and of the ends of virtue, are both erroneous,
and their errors are both attended with perni¬
cious consequences. Zeno fell into the most
fantastic superstitions, which whilst Epicurus
corrected he well nigh endangered religion.
The virtue of the one was visionary and ideal,
that of the other sordid and selfish. It was
reserved for one greater than Zeno to exalt
Paley, Edmund. The Life of Dr. paley, p. XLVIII.
- 14 -
the dignity of virtue with its utility, and by super¬
inducing a future state to support the paradox of
the Stoic on Epicurean principles. *
Concerning Paley's mind it is said, "He never forgot
the use of his understanding, nor was solicitous to show what he
knew more than what he thought. He never reasoned from memory
2
or spoke from quotation."
In his moral philosophy he brings his argument to the
level of common sense. He grasps his subject and turns it in
every way, in order to bring it into more ordinary use and appli¬
cation. He doe3 not examine any doubts, encounter any errors or
discuss any obscurities, save those which he had himself found
actually to exist. Among those doubts, errors and obscurities he
labored until he was able to bring his subject into focus for the
most ordinary reader.
He was not a deep classical scholar yet his love for
the classics is revealed in the fact that in a time when he could
have had no other purpose for such books save his own amuse¬
ment, Horace, Virgil and Cicero were even to the latest of his
life his table books.
1
Ibid. , p. XLVII.
2
Edinburgh Review, No. 70, P. CXXXI.
- 15 -
In 1771, Mr. Paley was appointed one of the White¬
hall preachers. In the register of the Royal Chapel there his
name appears first April 21, 1771. In his preaching Paley
was all solemnity and earnestness. He carried all his powers
of intellect and all his heart into the pulpit. He entered imme¬
diately into the very heart of his subject with such facility, and
such powers of enlarging upon it that "he made his hearers ac¬
quainted with more in a short time than might have been given
to them on ordinary occasions by a hundred sermons."'
His hearers soon forgot his awkwardness as they
became absorbed in the matter of his sermon. He was capable
of carrying the attention of the hearer from himself to his mes¬
sage. He was a friend of short sermons and once said to a
friend, "Let one impression be but made, and send it home with








He rarely appealed to the emotions of his congrega¬
tion for he felt that whatever merely moved the emotions was
as perishable as the emotions. On the other hand, he felt that
whatever made an impression on the understanding, or wrought
conviction by the force of reason, would be more enduring. He
observed "that it is one thing to edify (the common people) in
Christian knowledge, and another to gratify their taste for ve¬
hement, impassioned oratory." *
He observes that to deal too strongly with the emo¬
tions is to place Christianity on wrong foundations, citing the
fact that Quakers and Moravians refer you for the proof of Chris¬
tianity to the motion and witness of the Spirit in your own breast.
He contends that a man who hears this, and can feel no such
motion, has no alternative save to turn infidel.
Counseling preachers on avoiding party transactions
and political disputes, he asserts that "The Christian preacher
2
has no other province than that of religion and morality."
Paley, Edmund. The Life of Dr. Paley, p. LXXXIX.
2
Meadley, G. W. Memoirs of William Paley, D.D.
p. 157. ~ " "
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In his care to avoid the moving of man's feelings it
has been observed that his sermons are more like moral essays.
However true this charge may be, it was not according to his de¬
sire, for in 1790, not long after the publication of his Moral Philo¬
sophy, he preached a sermon on the importance of preaching the
necessity of faith. In this sermon he deplored the fact that:
We are setting up a kind of philosophical
morality, detached from religion, and inde¬
pendent of its influence, which may be culti¬
vated, it is said, as well without Christianity
as with it, and which, if cultivated, renders
religion and religious institutions superfluous.
A mode of thought so contrary to truth, and so
derogatory from the value of revelation, cannot
escape the vigilance of the Christian ministry.
We are entitled to ask upon what foundation this
morality rests. If it refers to the divine will,
(and without that, where will it find its sanc¬
tions, or how support its authority?) there can¬
not be a conduct of the understanding more irra¬
tional than to appeal to those intimations of the
Deity's character, which the light and order of
nature afford as to the rule and measure of our
duty, yet to disregard and affect to overlook the
declarations of His pleasure which Christianity
communicates. It is impossible to distinguish be¬
tween the authority of natural and revealed reli¬
gion. We are bound to receive the precepts of
revelation for the same reason that we comply
with the dictates of nature. He who despises a
command which proceeds from His Maker, no
matter by what means or through what medium,
instead of advancing, as he pretends to do, the
dominion of reason, and the authority of natural
religion disobeys the final injunction of both.
*
Paley's Sermons, Vol. VI, Charge vii, pp. 50-51.
- 18 -
In his homiletical method, rather than preparing a
sermon for a text, he frequently chose his text after he had
completed his sermon for it was his habit to consider primar¬
ily, in his sermons, the needs of his congregation rather than
the exegesis of a passage of Scripture. In the making of ser¬
mons Paley's models were Sherlock, Clarke and Hoadley. He
follows these men not only in the rationality of their style and
sentiment and their freedom from any improper display of
learning or feeling, but also in the choice and treatment of
many of their subjects.
In the autumn of 1775, Paiey met Miss Jane Hewitt.
In the following spring they were married in the Church of St.
Mary's in Carlisle, where his friend, Mr. Law, performed the
ceremony. Mrs. Paiey was of a quiet, retiring disposition.
Being inactive from ill health she readily joined in Mr. Paley's
desire to become a country clergyman. After a long illness
Mrs. Paiey died in May, 1791. Their family, consisting of
four sons and four daughters, were cared for during this per¬
iod, with tenderness by Mr. Paiey.
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On December 2, 1776, Paley was inducted into the
vicarage of Dalston in Cumberland. On June 17, 1780, he ac¬
cepted the fourth prebendal stall in the cathedral church of
Carlisle, thus becoming the coadjutor of a very warm personal
friend, Mr. Law. When Mr. Law was promoted to an Irish
Bishopric, Mr. Paley received an appointment as archdeacon
of Carlisle in which he was installed on August 5, 1782.
When Dr. Beadon was promoted to the see of Glou¬
cester, the mastership of Jesus College, Cambridge was offered
by Dr. Yorke, the Bishop of Ely, to Mr. Paley. Fixed as he then
was in a certain line of engagements and unwilling at the time to
enter into a different society, he declined the offer. In his View of
the Evidences of Christianity, Paley offers in his dedication to the
Bishop of Ely his genuine gratitude for the kind and disinterested
offer of the mastership of Jesus College.
On August 5, 1782, he was installed as Archdeacon
of Carlisle. When in 1792, Mr. Paley was being considered for
promotion to the vacant deanery of Carlisle, several things stood
in the way of such promotion: namely, his attack on the economic
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system which deprives the many for the sake of the few,* his
2
liberal construction of the oath of allegiance to the King, his
assertion that government may be too secure,'* his judicious
4
limitation of the duty of civil obedience, his argument that the
5
obligation of subjects and sovereigns is reciprocal, his enlightened
views of religious establishments and toleration, and his just and
striking remark, that the divine right of Kings is like the divine
right of Constables:
The divine right of Kings is, like the divine
right of Constables,—the law of the land,
or even actual and quiet possession of their
office;-—a right ratified, we humbly presume,
by the divine approbation, so long as obedience
to their authority appears to be necessary or
conducive to the common welfare.
These views were much too bold to be honored by the predominant
party of his day.
1 Vloral and Political Philosophy, Bk. Ill, Ch. 1, pp.
68, 69.
Z
Ibid. . Bk. Ill, Ch. 18, p. 129.
3
Ibid., Bk. VI, Ch. 11, p. 315.
4 Ibid., Bk. Ill, Part 1, Ch. 3, p. 316.
^ Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. III., Ch. 3, p. 323.
6
Ibid., Bk. VI, Ch. 4, p. 337.
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On January 24, 1795, Mr. Paley was installed as
sub^dean in the Cathedral Church of Lincoln. From here he
proceeded to Cambridge to take his degree of Doctor of Divinity.
Inasmuch as he had received his Master of Arts degree twelve
years earlier, he was permitted to forego the Bachelor of Divi¬
nity degree and the only exercise required of him by the laws of
the University, were a Concio ad Clerum and an English ser¬
mon. In February, he preached his Clerum and before leaving
Cambridge a letter from Dr. Barrington, Bishop of Durham,
arrived, offering him the rectory of Bishop—Y/earmouth, a
position valued at one thousand, two hundred pounds a year,
where he was inducted by Mr. Farrer, the rector of Sunder¬
land, on March 13. Paley was highly pleased with his new posi¬
tion for among other advantages it afforded one of the best par¬
sonages in the kingdom.
In June, Paley returned to Cambridge and completed
his Doctors degree. Returning to Bishop—Wearmouth, he re¬
sided there until his death in 1805.
Paley's work as a moralist was not confined to the
writing of books for the University. In periods of economic
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and political crisis while alarmists were circulating declamatory-
nonsense, Paley often came forth with calm and reasonable expos¬
tulations which served as oil on troubled waters.
In the period of political ferment, which led to the in¬
terference of Great Britain in the war of the French Revolution,
he published a short tract entitled, Reasons for Contentment, ad¬
dressed to the laboring classes. He also published, as a separate
Essay, the chapter on the British Constitution from his Principles
of Moral and Political Philosophy.
His Reasons for Contentment, which was a copy of a
sermon, the original of which is marked as having been preached
at Dalston in 1790, and on which Paley wrote with his own hand
"the best thing I ever wrote", was designed to remind the lower
classes in Britain of the advantages which were theirs and to in¬
dicate the impossibility of any change conducive to their real
happiness which might arise from political convulsions;
The change and the only change, he ob¬
serves, to be desired is that gradual and
progressive improvement in our circum¬
stances, which is the natural result of
successful industry, when each year is
something better than the last. This may
be looked forward to, and is practicable by
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great numbers, and in a state of public
order and quiet; it is absolutely impossi¬
ble in any other. *
In his prefatory advertisement to his Essay on the
British Constitution, Paley lists the motives which prompted
his republishing of this work. He calls attention to the unrest
among the people as they were re-examining the constitution
of their government brought about by the recent revolution in
France and by the fact that some recent writers had attempted
to excite the passions of the people. He reminds his readers
that the body of the British people were satisfied with their
condition, intent upon their various employments, and tast¬
ing the sweets of industry and order, in the increased and in¬
creasing gains of almost every occupation; a state of the
country, which he deemed a strong security for its internal
peace.
The view which he championed was unpopular
among those who were stirred for the first time in their lives
to give thought to politics, but among those who had long pon¬
dered the problem it was well received.
1
The Works of William Paley, D.D., p. 571.
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Paley not only urged the contentment of the masses
but he reminded those in more elevated stations of their respon¬
sibilities. In a sermon dedicated to the Bishop of Durham* he
vehemently attacked the idea so familiar to the higher ranks from
their infancy, that they are placed above work. He called it a
pernicious maxim , the direct tendency of which is to produce
idleness in one portion of Mankind, and envy in the other: as¬
serting, on the contrary, that "every man has his work", he
powerfully emphasizes the peculiar obligations which belong to
wealth and station.
Paley is considered as one of the most important
writers by whom the public interest has been aroused in
2
the favor of the abolishment of slavery. In 1788, he wrote
a letter to the committee for effecting the abolition of their
slave trade commending and offering his services to
them.
*
Paley, William. Sermons and Tracts, p. 127-
151.
2
Clarkson, Thomas. History of the Abolition,
Vol. 1, p. 465.
Before this, he had exposed the cruelty and injus¬
tice of slavery and the futility of any attempt to justify it on
the basis of the silence of the Christian Scriptures.* He
pointed out that the slave trade served to increase hostilities
among the Africans and to promote mutual wars among the
tribes in order that the victor might sell his captives to the
British. He held that slavery was incompatible with the natural
rights of man and contrary to the principles of religion and
morality. His utilitarianism stands out in his argument that
inasmuch as Africa abounds in many valuable and rich produc¬
tions such as cotton, indigo and sugar cane, that Britain and
other nations could carry on a much more profitable trade
with her in these items than in the trade of slaves.
He answered those who defended slavery on the grounds
that slavery existed in Africa before the English or any other Euro¬
pean nation visited that part of the world to purchase slaves by
contending that it would be just as reasonable to argue that the
practice of scalping should be continued in America since it was
the practice among the Indians long before the British made settle¬
ments in America.
*
Moral and Political Philosophy, Book III, *art 11, Ch.
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In the year 1792, the residents of Carlisle met for
the purpose of petitioning Parliament for the abolition of the
slave trade. Mr. Paley had been made acquainted with the
cruelties involved in this pernicious traffic by a relation who
had made a fortune in the West Indies as a planter. He now
found that neither his humanitarian feelings nor his common
sense of morality would allow him to remain silent on the sub¬
ject.
In April, 1789, the newspapers carried a short
treatise by Mr. Paley entitled "Arguments against the unjust
pretensions of slave dealers and holders, to be indemnified by
pecuniary allowances, at the public expense, in case the slave
trade should be abolished," which had been sent to the committee
on abolishing slavery. This was designed to reach them for use
in the first great discussion in the House of Commons on the
abolition of the slave trade.
The resolutions drawn up at Carlisle became the basis
of the petition afterwards presented to the House of Commons,
which presented a clear and comprehensive view of the leading
arguments which eventually led to the abolition of slavery.
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It is much to Mr. Paley's honor that he suggested a
plan for promoting the civilization of Africa, and for making
some restitution to that devastated continent, for the malicious
injustice and oppression which it had so long suffered. His pro¬
position was that from the United States of America several little
colonies of free negroes should be exported and allowed to settle
in different parts of Africa that they might serve as patterns of a
more civilized life to the natives in these localities.
Mr. Paley was an ardent crusader against the intemper¬
ance of his day. Believing that habits of intemperance were en¬
couraged by the unnecessary accumulation of taverns, public houses
and dram-shops, he attempted to diminish the magnitude of the evil
by advocating a greater discrimination in his own community in grant¬
ing licenses. On one occasion while serving as a magistrate he ad¬
dressed the Grand Jury on this subject. Failing to receive the
support of the other justices, his efforts were ineffectual.
One of the chief works of Paley was The Principles of
Moral and Political Philosophy which appeared in 1785, and subse¬
quently through twenty-one editions. Much of the material for this
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work was borrowed from numerous sources. He acknowledges
this in his preface. Especially does he own his indebtedness
to Abraham Tucker for The Light of Nature Pursued. Concern¬
ing Tucker he writes:
I have found in this writer more origi¬
nal thinking and observation upon the
subject that he has in hand, than in
any other, not to say, than in all
others put together. *
In the Moral and Political Philosophy, Paley adopted
the plan which he had used in his lectures at Cambridge and en¬
larged it to its present form. Inasmuch as this work is to fur¬
nish the primary source of this thesis, further discussion of it
will be postponed until Chapter III.
In 1790, he published the most original of his works,
I-Iorae Paulinae. This is a treatment of the truth of the Scriptural
History of St. Paul evinced by a comparison of the Epistles which
bear his name with the Acts of the Apostles and with one another.
A sixth edition of this work appeared in 1809. A German transla¬
tion was published in 1797.
1
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,
pp. XVI, XVII.
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The most popular of his works was A View of the
Evidences of Christianity, which appeared in 1794. A fifteenth
edition of this work appeared in 1811. This work is a compen¬
dium of a whole library of argument produced by the orthodox
opponents of the deists during the eighteenth century. This
work was translated into German under the following title, W.
Paley's Uebersicht und Prufung der Beweise und Zeugnisse fur
das Christenthum, nach der dritten Englischen Aufgabe. 2 Bande,
gr. 8 vo. Leipzig, 1797.
Meadley speaks of Paley's Natural Theology which was
published in 1802, as "altogether the very best manual of Theism
hitherto produced."* This work is an admirable account of the
aposteriori argument for the existence of God. A twentieth edition
appeared in 1320, An Italian translation appeared in 1808, and a
Spanish in 1825.
In addition to the above, fifteen other items were pub¬
lished from Paley's pen to which references shall be made further
on. Notes from his lectures are now in the British Museum.
*
kflem°irs William Paley, P.P., p. 209.
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CHAPTER II
THE THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
ENVIRONMENT OF WILLIAM PALEY
William Paley belongs to the school of moral philo¬
sophy now designated as Theological Utilitarianism. The term,
theological, denotes the fact that above all he was an apologist
of the Christian religion and cannot be understood apart from a
knowledge of the religious tradition in which he stood and of the
religious conditions to which he addressed himself.
The religious life of eighteenth century England re¬
presented a reaction from the convulsion under the Puritans
during the seventeenth century. "The immediate effect of the
reign of the Puritans was to bring all religion for a season into
1
contempt." This frenzy was soon exhausted, but the evil con¬
tinued in extreme reactions that were equally devastating.
The reaction against Puritanism issued in the result
described by Bishop Butler in the preface to his Analogy in which
he remarked that it had come to be taken for granted, in the England
1
The Quarterly Review, "The Works and Character of
W;illiam Paley, " Volume XXXVIII. July and October, 1828, p. 305.
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of his day, ' that Christianity is not so much a subject for inquiry,
but that it is now at length, discovered to be fictitious."* In 1751,
Butler declared the deplorable distinction of the age to be "an
avowed scorn of religion in some and a growing disregard of it in
2
the generality." This state of dormancy in the Christian reli¬
gion was not merely the by-product of sheer religious exhaustion
after the theological excitements of the seventeenth century, but
was in a large measure due to the combined influence of rational¬
ism, naturalism and scepticism. The Deists, notably John Toland,
who in 1696, published Christianity Not Mysterious; Anthony Collins,
who in 1712 published his Discourse of Freethlnking; and Matthew
Tindal, who came forth in 1730, with Christianity as Old as Creation,
were seeking to rationalize Christianity and rid it of what they called
its priestly accretions. These men sought to liberate the mind of
man by destroying the shackles of superstition which had long held
it in bondage. They contended that true religion is no more than
the republication of the simple truths in the religion of nature, the
1
Butler, Joseph. Analogy of Religion, Advertisement




principles of which had been set forth in Lord Herbert of
Cherbury's De Veritate. Even Christianity was no more
than the republication of the religion of nature. A later
Deist, Thomas Morgan, went so far as to declare that Christ
himself was no more than a prophet.
The rise of such independent theology had been
made possible by the Reformation, however, it should not
be forgotten that this rationalistic emphasis was as much
a break with Protestantism as with Catholicism and involved
the rejection of Protestant and Catholic principles alike. * In
this period there were those who contended that all positive
religion is a trick to deceive the credulous vulgar. Man's
reason had been silenced for a time by a tempest of ungov-
erned zeal led by the Puritans, and, as a reaction against
this extravagance, reason was declared to be the sole goddess
of this nether world. Thus a religion of nature
*
McGiffert, A. C. Protestant Thought Before Kant,
p. 187.
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not wholly unlike the Stoicism of the Roman Empire came to
the front.
In addition to this emphasis on reason there was the
strong emphasis on natural theology. Francis Bacon had divided
theology into two branches-—the natural and the revealed,* but
now natural theology was declared to be quite adequate for man's
religious life. Bacon's insistence that natural theology was suf¬
ficient to convince atheism but not to inform religion was laid
aside, for the eighteenth century found that nature's lantern
gave sufficient light even on the things of God. Consequently,
God was brought within easy grasp of all, and man was elevated
to a position hitherto unthinkable. Doctrines of the depravity of
human nature and the utter helplessness of man were vehemently
denounced and it was now discovered that man had been mistaken
in thinking himself depraved. Moreover, man now found that he
had native powers that liberated him from a passive dependence
on God's grace, for now his own prudence could serve as his
deity.
1
Bacon, Francis. The Philosophical Works of
Francis Bacon, "The Advancement of Learning" edited by John
M. Robertson, p. 89.
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With the exaltation of human nature, the nature and
office of the Redeemer were brought low. The frantic voices of
the Puritans that had sung hosannas for Christ's second and im¬
mediate coming to reign with his saints upon earth and to bind
the great dragon were heard no more. It was decided that
even Arlus might not have been wrong in his less elevated
views of the Messiah's person, and that those who had declared
Him to be only a great and good man, who testified to the truth
of his mission and the sincerity of his doctrine by the sacrifice
of his life, were to be given an audience.
All emphasis on the supernatural in religion was sup¬
pressed. The miracles were regarded as such stumbling blocks
to the wise that some were traced to purely natural causes, some
were regarded as allegorical, and some were placed in the cate¬
gory with the spurious miracles which imposters had passed off
on succeeding generations. Instead of stressing man's need of
salvation, the language of the ethical Seneca was made to super¬
sede that of the evangelical Paul and the emphasis was:
"For modes of faith let graceless zealots fight
His can't be wrong whose life is in the right."
.
Quoted in Quarterly Review, Volume XXXVIII,
July and October, 1828, p. 307.
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Not only was there the naturalism of the Deists,
but the scepticism of David Hume and Edward Gibbon had also
contributed to the religious decline of Paley's day. These men
stand at the dawning of historic criticism. Hume had attempted
to destroy the foundation on which the deistic argument for mono¬
theism and for the existence of a simple, primitive, rational re¬
ligion of nature had rested by arguing that history shows that
polytheism preceded monotheism in the evolution of religion. *
He ruled out the cause and effect argument for the existence of
God by contending that human perception can penetrate only far
enough to conclude that certain experiences are associated and
that we are net warranted to conclude that there is a causal re¬
lation between them. If, therefore, the cause-effect relation is
not a valid idea, the argument for a God based thereon is un-
2
founded. By his denial of the reality of substance Hume left
no real permanent being behind personal experience. Thus, he
3
contended, that there is no philosophical basis for immortality.
The Natural History of Religion, Section I, p. 254.
2
The Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I, part iii.
Section vi, p. 43.
3
Ibid, Bk. I, part iv, Sect, iv, p. 81ff.
- 36 -
The most devastating phase of Hume's work, so far as current
Christianity was concerned, was his criticism of miracles,
which in the eighteenth century were regarded as Christianity's
main line of defense. His twofold argument was that experience
is the source of all knowledge. In our experience we are more
strongly impressed with the uniformity of nature than we are with
the infallibility of human testimony. Thus, we may conclude that
it was more likely that those who reported the miracles of the New
Testament were deceived than that the uniform course of nature
1
had been interrupted. Hume further argued that even if we
granted that testimony may prove that unusual events have oc¬
curred, we could not prove that these unusual events established
anything unless we could further prove that these miracles were
wrought by divine power for that special purpose.2 Now, Paley's
case for Christianity was dependent throughout on the evidential
value of miracles. Hume's argument, however, influenced sub¬
sequent theology far more than Paley's. It is insisted today that
the revelation which Christianity possesses is adequate to carry
1
Cairns, D. S. The Faith that Rebels, p. 23.
2
Hume, David. Enquiry Concerning Human Under¬
standing. Sect. X.
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the accounts of miracles and has no need of miracle stories
viewed as appendages for the support of the Gospel. * The
kind of faith demanded by the Christian religion is now inter¬
preted as one that supports the miracles of the Gospel rather
than being supported by them.
At the hands of rationalism, naturalism and scepti¬
cism, eighteenth century Christianity lost the extravagant fana¬
ticism of a former century and gave way to a host of reasoning
unbelievers.
Paley described the efforts against Christianity in
his day as follows:
Infidelity is served up in every shape that is
likely to allure, surprise, or beguile the
imagination; in a fable, a tale, a novel, a
poem; in interspersed and broken hints; re¬
mote and oblique surmises; in books of
travels, of philosophy, of natural history;
in a word, in any form rather than the
right one, that of a professed and regular
disquisition. And because the coarse buf¬
foonery, and broad laugh, of the old and
rude adversaries of the Christian faith,
would offend the taste, perhaps, rather
than the virtue, of this cultivated age, a
graver irony, a more skilful and delicate
*
Cairns, D. S. The Faith that Rebels, p. 67.
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banter, is substituted in their place. An eloquent
historian besides his more direct and therefore,
fairer, attacks upon the credibility of the Evangelic
story, has contrived to weave into his narration one
continued sneer upon the cause of Christianity, and
upon the writings and characters of its ancient
patrons. The knowledge which this author possesses
of the frame and conduct of the human mind, must
have led him to observe, that such attacks do their
execution without inquiry. Who can refute a sneer?
Who can compute the number, much less one by one,
scrutinize the justice of those disparaging insinua¬
tions, which crowd the pages of this elaborate his¬
tory? What reader suspends his curiosity, or calls
off his attention from the principal narrative, to ex¬
amine references, to search into the foundation, or to
weigh the reason, propriety, and force of every tran¬
sient sarcasm, and sly allusion, by which the Chris¬
tian testimony is depreciated and traduced: and by
which, nevertheless, he may find his faith afterwards
unsettled and perplexed?
But the enemies of Christianity have pursued her with
poisoned arrows. Obscenity itself is made the ve¬
hicle of infidelity. The awful doctrines, if we be not
permitted to call them the sacred truths of our reli¬
gion, together with all the adjnncts and appendages
of its worship and external profession, have been
sometimes impudently profaned by an unnatural
conjunction with impure and lascivious images. The
fondness for ridicule is almost universal . And ridi¬
cule to many minds is never so irresistable, as when
seasoned with obscenity, and employed upon religion.
But in proportion as these noxious principles take hold
of the imagination; they infatuate the judgment; for
trains of ludicrous and unchaste associations adhering to
every sentiment and mention of religion, render the mind
indisposed to receive either conviction from its
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evidence, or impressions from its authority.
And this effect being exerted upon the sensi¬
tive part of our frame, is altogether independ¬
ent of argument, proof, or reason; is as for¬
midable to a true religion, as to a false one;
to a well grounded faith, as to a chimerical
mythology, or fabulous tradition. *
These were the trends in the religion of eighteenth cen¬
tury England until William Law in 1732, wrote his reply to Matthew
Tindal in The Case for Reason. Law argued that "Reason not merely
does not find truth in religion, it is the cause of all the disorders of
our passions, the corruptions of our hearts." God is above the power
of man to comprehend. "His own will is wisdom, and wisdom is His
will." More than any other writer, William Law was responsible
for the religious awakening that took place in the latter part of the
eighteenth century. Law aroused Dr. Johnson to "thinking in ear¬
nest on religion." He also exerted profound influence on John Wes¬
ley, who was to play so large a part in bringing England back to God.
II
The return to religious faith in England, however, was
not achieved entirely by revivalists and religious enthusiasts. There
were also devout men who worked behind the scenes, and with their
pens provided food for the thoughtful people who demanded a reason¬
able apologetic for their Christian faith. Such a man was William
Paley, who came forth to present the case for Christianity in the
* The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 302.
- 40 -
language of the common man by rationalizing the orthodox Chris¬
tianity of his day. His strategy was far different from Law's.
He took his place in the stream of rationalism and proceeded to
formulate his argument against Deism in his most popular work.,
The Evidences of Christianity. Philosophically he might be char¬
acterized by Pfleiderer's term as a'tational supernaturalist." By
this is meant that he combined a faith in a revealed religion with
the empirical philosophy of Locke.
Paley's religious philosophy is very close to the com¬
mon tradition of his day. The three characteristic words of the
eighteenth century were nature, reason and law. A very common
phrase in the literature of that day was "a law of reason and Nature."
Butler could even say that "Christianity is the promulgation of the
Law of Nature."* This is very close to a statement of Cicero's in
which he declared that "Zeno thinks natural law to be divine." The
conception that the law of nature is a synonym for reality, then, goes
back to Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, and from the days of Zeno
the term law has been one of the most important concepts in philo¬
sophy. Before the nineteenth century, the term, law, was closely
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related to reason and nature. Prior to the nineteenth century
if a student were asked to give a law of nature, he might have
given "Thou shalt not kill" * or "Be sure your sins will find you
2
out." Between Zeno's time and the eighteenth century the dis¬
covery that anything was orderly meant that it was controlled by
reason. The fact of order was the proof that nature was con¬
trolled by reason. It is a very curious thing indeed that by the
twentieth century, philosophers felt that the presence of order
in the universe argued for the absence of reason. Nature had
become, by then, a self-running machine.
Paiey belonged to the period when the hand of God
was seen manifestly at work in every part of the world. His
doctrine of God reflects the strong influence of Samuel Clarke
and John Locke upon him. He used Clarke's The Being and
Attributes of God and Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity
as textbooks at Cambridge. These works along with Derham's






The Credibility of the Gospel History formed the basis for his
two books on Natural Theology and the Evidences of Christianity.
Paley undertakes to prove the existence of God by the
following analogy: From a watch, he reasons tuat we infer a
maker. * Suppose, said he, that in crossing a heath I should
stumble upon a stone and were asked how it came to be there
I might possibly answer that for anything I knew to the contrary,
it had lain there forever. But suppose I should come upon a
watch lying upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the
watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly be able to
give the same answer which I had given before for this reason,
namely, that, when I examine the watch, I perceive that its
several parts are framed and put together for a purpose and
cannot avoid the inference that the watch must nave had a maker.
Paley then applies the analogy to our world and infers from it an
almighty Creator.^" Paley did not see what Kant later pointed
out about the cosmological argument, namely, that while we may
* This analogy had previously been used by Abraham
Tucker. For an interesting history of this analogy see The Dic-
tionary of National Biography, Vol. XLIII, p. 105; also Leslie
Stephen's History of English Thought, Vol. I, p. 409.
2 Natural Theology, p. 9.
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infer from the world a Creator as great as the world, we are
not justified in going beyond that to infer a Being who is greater
than the world. In other words, Paley was justified in inferring
from the presence of a watch the existence at some time of one
capable of making a watch, but he could not infer from the pre¬
sence of the watch alone the existence of one who is capable of
making something greater than the watch.
J. S. Mill has this very meaningful evaluation of
Paley's argument:
A very little consideration, however, suffices
to show that though (the argument from design)
has some force, its force is very generally
overrated. Paley's illustration of a watch puts
the case much too strongly. If I found a watch
on an apparently desolate island, I should indeed
infer that it had been left by a human being; but
the inference would not be from marks of design,
but because I already knew from direct experience
that watches are made by men. I should draw the
inference no less confidently from a footprint, or
from any relic however insignificant which exper¬
ience has taught me to attribute to man: as geo¬
logists infer the past existence of animals from
coprolites, though no one sees marks of design
in a coprolite. *
1
Three Essays on Religion (1674), p. 168.
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Paley's type of reasoning in theology has very largely
vanished, and it is not necessary to give a thorough examination
of it here. Suffice it to say that Pascal long ago saw that the meta¬
physical proofs of God's existence are so involved that they make very
little impression and offer too little striking force to be of use to
most people. In fact for those capable of understanding them, they
are of use only for the moment when the argument is taking place.
After the argument, uncertainty returns, for one then begins to
fear that he was mistaken about or deceived by it. ^
Paley continues his argument from design by saying
that from the wonderful adaptation of the human body, the eye, the
hand, the muscles, we infer an almighty Designer. He, like Locke,
declared, "The works of Nature everywhere sufficiently evidence a
Deity."1' Following St. Thomas Aquinas, Paley took the statement
of St. Paul to the effect that "ever since the creation of the world,
His (God's) unseen attributes, his eternal power and divinity, have
3
been plainly seen in the things he has made," to be the argument
Pensees, Paragraph 175.
2
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Under¬




from design. What St. Paul really said was not that the works of
God's hands prove His existence but that they reveal the kind of
God t at He is. *
It is interesting to remember that what Paley was say¬
ing in England about God, Holbach was saying in France about "Mat¬
ter" or "Nature." The prime-mover for Holbach was not God but
matter. Movement is a necessary attribute of matter, so why
2
should we seek for a 'motor' outside Nature? Paley was clinging
to the Newtonian concept of the world while Holbach was insisting that
to seek some supernatural first cause is the last infirmity of a noble
mind. For him, even the immortal Newton was rather childish in
his cosmology. Either Paley did not have the mental acumen to deal
with such criticism or he was unaware of it. Neither did he take into
account Berkeley's denial of the reality of matter which destroyed the
whole concept of the world as a huge mechanism, a magnified watch.
For Paley the world was not a constant divine spiritual activity im¬
pressing human minds only with itself. On the contrary, he believed
that the world was real in itself. Therefore, for Paiey the study of
nature was the true 'preparative to Divinity.' In fact, his Natural
Theology is more like a textbook in biology than a treatment of
Baillie, John. Our Knowledge of God, p. 126.
2
Systeme de la Nature, Vol. II, p. i 85.
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theology. Paley's profound love for nature led him in the direc¬
tion of the emphasis found in Wordsworth. Mr. Aldous Huxley
has said that "for the good Wordsworthian, a walk in the country
is the equivalent of going to Church, a tour through Westmoreland
1
is as good as a pilgrimage to Jerusalem."
All things in Paley's world were bright and beautiful.
Even pain was not the product of contrivance. He reasoned that
teeth were designed for chewing, not for aching, and that even
2
their aching has a benevolent purpose. Misery is seen as con¬
tributing to man's life upon the earth as God would have it, for:
A state totally incapable of misery, could not
be a state of probation. . . .Nor would the
purposes of trial be sufficiently provided for
by a state in which happiness anc^ misery re¬
gularly followed virtue and vice.
Paley disagreed with Thomas Burnet who viewed the world as a
4
mighty ruin. Burnet had gone even beyond Pascal, who had
given a large place to the doctrine of the fall of man in his
theology by contending that while being of itself incomprehensible,
1
Essay on Wrordsworth in the Tropics.
2
Natural Theology, p. 384
3
Paley's Sermons, Vol. V, Sermon V, p. 32.
4
Sacred Theory of the Earth. (1684 ed.),p. 129.
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the fall was the only starting point from which man's wretched¬
ness could be made comprehensible. * To this Burnet added
that the fall accounts for the chaotic conditions of the world of
nature. He found that "disproportioned sin had jarred against
Nature's chime." Therefore, for him the world may provide
evidence of God's anger but not of His original intention.
Burnet was obsessed with the imperfections of the
earth. If we are to describe the earth as it really is, said he,
we would find that:
Though it be handsome and regular enough to
the eye in certain parts of it, single tracts
and regions; yet if we consider the whole sur¬
face of it, or the whole Exterior Region, 'tis
as a broken and confused heap of bodies,
plac'd in no order to one another, nor with
any correspondency or regularity of parts:
and such a body as the Moon appears to us,
when 'tis looked upon with a good glass,
rude and ragged. They are both in my judg¬
ment the image or picture of a great Ruine,
and have the true aspect of a World lying in
its rubbish.^
*
Pensees, The Provincial Letters, translated by
W. F. Trotter and Thomas McCrie, Section vii. Fragment 441,
p. 147.
1 believe these numbers correspond in every case
with the numbers assigned in the definitive French edition of
the Oeuvres, edited by Leon Brunschvicg .
2
Sacred Theory of the Earth, (1684 ed.), p. 125.
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Paley, on the other hand, naively overlooks the im¬
perfections of earth and in a cheerful spirit beholds no cataclysm
which has shattered the world-wide Eden. Others like Voltaire
may send his hero about the world to spy out its morbid anatomy
with a fiendish satisfaction but Paley was a man who could pour
forth his blithe spirit in such language as this:
It is a happy world after all; the air, the earth,
the water, teem with delighted existence. In a
spring noon; or a summer's evening, on which¬
ever side I turn my eyes, myriads of happy
beings crowd upon my view. The insect youth
are on the wing. Swarms of newborn flies are
trying their pinions in the air. Their sportive
motions, their wanton mazes, their gratuitous
activity, their continual change of place without
use or purpose testify their joy, and the exulta- ^
tion they feel in their lately discovered faculties.
For Paley even physical pain could contribute to man's
blessedness. Moreover, it is well for us to remember that he
was tortured with pain at the time of his writing yet he wrote of
pain that it is seldom both violent and long continued. Even its
pauses and intermissions become positive pleasures. "It has a
power of shedding a satisfaction over intervals of ease, which I
believe few enjoyments exceed." He examines the records of the
Natural Theology, p. 376.
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hospital in his community and finds 6,420 admitted but he does
not sicken at that, for he finds the dead to be 234, the cured,
5,476. His eye settles on the last and he is content. Even a
storm purifies the air, and it is better that a few should die
therein than that all should perish.* Like Mandeville, Paley
makes even evil play its role; however, he did not go so far as
to say with him that the refinery needs the raw material of evil
nor to say that, public benefits exist not in spite of but because
of the private vices of men. Mandeville had virtually thanked
God for making sin so advantageous. Paley prefers to believe
with John Ray, the founder of modern botany and zoology, and
the most distinguished of the physico-theologians, that God has
a purpose in these seeming imperfections. Ray believed that
the lower ranks in the scale of being were made for the manifes-
2
tation of God's Infinite Power and Wisdom. Nature is to be re¬
garded not as a bst paradise but as the finished and unimprovable
product of divine wisdom, omnipotence, and benevolence.
Paley was also indebted for his cosmology to William
Derham from whom he draws information about the adaptability of
Natural Theology, p. 309.
2
Wisdom of God in the Creation (1701 ed.) p. 48.
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the human frame to life on earth. * He virtually accepts Derham's
cosmology in toto. Derharn reasons that the globe is "a work too
2
grand for anything less than a God to make."
Let us cast our eyes here and there, let us
ransack all the Globe, let us with the great¬
est accuracy inspect every part thereof,
search out the inmost secrets of any of the
Creatures; let us examine them all with our
guages, measure them with our nicest rules,
pry into them with our microscopes, and most
exquisite instruments, still we find them to
bear testimony to their infinite Workman;
and that they exceed all humane skill so far,
as that the most exquisite copies and imitations
of the best artists, are no other than rude bung¬
ling pieces to them.®
Derharr , however, is somewhat aware of the imper¬
fections of the earth, for he contends that even if the globe were
such a "rude, confused, inconvenient mass as he (Burnet) pretends,
yet it is well enough for a sinful world.'He regards poisonous
and noxious creatures as "Rods and scourges to chastise us" or as
"means to excite wisdom, care and industry."®
^










It remained for David Hume to bring the most damag¬
ing evidence against this cosmological argument for God's exis¬
tence. This lie did by his statement that it is the very point in
question whether you can infer that because a certain effect fol¬
lows a certain antecedent that such antecedent is the cause of
such effect. All that we are warranted in believing is that there
is a certain observable pattern which has prevailed according to
our limited observation. If, then, we cannot be certain about
tais cause-effect relationship, how can our proof of God from
such an argument be valid?
Yet Hume held that a refined and philosophical fcieism
may be rationally arrived at but not through the cause-effect ar¬
gument. * He aims this direct barrage at Paley's argument.
Even at this day, and in Europe, ask any of
t »e vulgar why he believes in an omnipotent
creator of the world; be will never mention the
beauty of final causes, of which, he is wholly
ignorant: He will not hold out his hand, and
bid you contemplate tne suppleness and variety
of joints in his fingers, tneir bending all one
way, the counterpoise which they receive
1
Hume Selections, Edited by Charles W. Hendel, Jr.
"The Natural History of Religion", Introduction, pp. 253, 254.
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from the thumb, the softness and fleshy
parts of the Inside of his hand, with all the
other circumstances, which render that mem¬
ber fit for the use to which it was destined.
To these he has been long accustomed; and he
beholds them with listlessness and unconcern.
He will tell you of the sudden and unexpected
death of such a one; the fall and bruise of
such another. The excessive draught of the
season. The cold and rains of another.
These he ascribes to the immediate opera¬
tion of providence; and such events, as with
good reasoners, are the chief difficulties in
admitting a supreme intelligence, are with
him the sole arguments for it. *
Paley's answer to this was really not an answer, it
was simply a rigid declaration of the principle in question. He
writes:
There cannot be design without a designer;
contrivance without a contriver; order with¬
out choice; arrangement without anything
capable of arranging; subserviency and re¬
lation to a purpose, without that which could
intend a purpose; means suitable to an end,
and executing their office, in accomplishing
that end, without the end ever having been
contemplated or the means accomodated to it.
Ibid, Section VI, pp. 269, 270.
^ Natural Theology, p. 57.
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Now, it should be pointed out that Paley's argument
differs greatly from the teleological argument of the Aristotelian
type. Aristotle held that the natural order with which man is so
integrally bound up, fulfills an end of absolute and intrinsic worth.
On the other hand, Paley's argument is essentially anthropomor¬
phic, resting upon an alleged analogy between natural existences
and the artificial products of man's handicraft. He contended
that man can gain a sufficient basis for the conception of God as
an ordering intelligence in our knowledge of the self and of its re¬
lation to the products which it consciously designs. But, as Pro¬
fessor Norman Kemp Smith suggests:
Before this argument could be taken as esta¬
blishing the existence of the God of religion,
it had of course to be supplemented by other
types of argument. These, however, are sup¬
plementary to the argument from design; and
their introduction is a virtual admission of its
limited scope. *
In Paley's doctrine of man he places him in this 'best
.V
of all possible worlds' and gives him rights and capacities beyond
Smith, Norman Kemp. Hume's Dialogues Concern¬
ing Natural Religion, p. 29.
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the wildest dreams of the reformers. To such reformers as Calvin
and Zwingli, man was a creature utterly subjected to the sover¬
eignty of God, possessing, because of the fall, no rights of his own.1
But the Newtonian world of Paley seemed to work as perfectly as if
there had been no fall. Even man is no longer vile but exactly as he
should be. For Paley, man is a rational being who may demand con¬
sideration and fair treatment from God. God's only concern is man's
happiness. In fact, all that is necessary to ascertain God's will is
simply to ask the question, what will contribute the most pleasure to
2
the most people?
In common with his generation, Paley had endorsed
Locke's conception that morality is the prime content of religion.
The task of the preacher was no longer to foster a gloomy convic¬
tion of sin, nor even an enthusiastic yearning for salvation but
simply to point his hearers to a sober understanding of the wisdom
of God in creation, and to lead them to bask in the sunlight of God's
wondrous benevolence.
McGiffert, A. C. Protestant Thought Before Kant,
p. 188.
2
Paley, William. Moral and Political Philosophy,
pp. 45-46.
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In viewing his doctrine of revelation, we are to re¬
member that Paley was a devout exponent of the authority of the
written revelation of God in the Bible. He held, however, that
this revelation is not adequate for man's moral life. A Therefore
revelation must be joined with the law of expediency and in the
final analysis they are found to be in perfect agreement.
Wherever the Bible clearly speaks, Paley held that
its authority is absolutely binding. He did not, therefore, com¬
pletely reduce revelation to the level of nature. Joseph Butler,
in seeking to point out that the acceptance of the revelation of
nature is fraught with the same difficulties as the acceptance of
the revelation in the Scriptures, succeeded only in reducing the
revelation of the Scriptures to the level of the revelation of nature.
Butler takes his thesis from Origen, who contended that "he who
believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him who is the
Author of Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of diffi—
2culties in it as are found in the Constitution of Nature." The
Paiey, William, vloral and Political Philosophy,
p. 4.
2
Butler, Joseph. Analogy of Religion. Part II, Gh.
VIII, p. 276. =
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distinctive feature in Butler's apologetic is that instead of follow¬
ing the manner of the physico-theologians by saying that all things
are bright and beautiful and that the gocxl God made them all, he
chooses to show that nature is just as baffling and mysterious as
the Scriptures. From this he infers that they both originated in
the same mind. Since Nature is just as full of defects as the
Scriptures, Butler sees no reason why the Deists who accept
Nature as divine could not also accept the Scriptures as divine. *
This, however, reduces the revelation of the Scriptures to such
a level that one feels that in his effort to defend this revelation,
Butler has virtually obliterated its meaning. In fact, if there is
no more clarity or certainty in Revelation than in Nature, we
might well conclude that Revelation is a part of Nature. It is to
Paley's credit that so far as his theory is concerned he insisted
upon the transcendent quality of the Scriptural revelation.
Paley followed Locke in holding that "faith is assent
2
to revelation." He also held with Abraham Tucker that belief
without proof is superstition, and thus sought to establish a
1
Butler, Joseph. Analogy of Religion, Part II, Ch.
VIII, p. 276.
2
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Under¬
standing, p. 343.
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rational basis for his faith. The Deists contended that the evidence
for religion was clear without resorting to philosophical proofs.
They were just as strongly opposed to philosophical speculation as
they were to the idea of Revelation. Paley excludes the element of
venture from faith and leaves it as the acceptance of a rational pro¬
position, an interpretation which even put aside the wager argument
advanced by Bishop Wilkins. The Bishop contended that we should
live as though there were a God for even if it should later be dis¬
covered that we were deceived, the benefits of virtuous living would
still be ours, while if God does exist, we shall have from his hand
an everlasting reward. This argument goes back to Blaise Pascal,
and, at this point, it is interesting to observe how radically differ¬
ent from Pascal is Paley's interpretation of Christian faith. For
Pascal, faith is different from proving, for proving is human, and
faith is the gift of God. The just man shall live by faith. It is this
faith which God himself gives in the heart that makes us to say not
"I know" but "I believe."* This is what Pascal calls "the knowledge
of the heart." Faith for Pascal was not the committal of the intel¬
lect to a proposition but the surrender of the whole self, including
*
Pensees > The Provincial Letters, translated by W . F.
Trotter and Thomas M'Crie, Section IV, Fragment 248, p. 88.
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the intellect, to God. For him, Christian faith included the re¬
sponse of love. "We love him because he first loved us."* As
Locke later insisted, Pascal said that Christianity is not contrary
to reason. The apologists first task is to make people want Chris¬
tianity to be true, then he must show them that it is true. The
natural situation of man is one in which God is already dimly
sensed. He makes God say to man, "Console thyself. Thou
2
wouldst not be seeking me if thou hadst not found me."
Pascal was reaching out to an understanding of a
faith which is an outgoing of the whole man to God. For him
there could not be a real and fundamental conflict between reason
and faith. He speaks of the two excesses in theology as excluding
3
reason and admitting only reason. Faith says indeed what the
senses do not say but what it says is not contrary to the senses.
4
It is beyond sense but not against sense. To show that religion
is not at all contrary to reason, he abandoned the metaphysical




Pensees, The Provincial Letters, translated by W.F.
Trotter and Thomas M'Crie, Section VII, Fragment 552, p. 177.
^ ibid., Section IV, Fragment 253, p. 90.
^ Ibid., Section IV, Fragment 265, p. 93.
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historical proofs. He begins with man's wretchedness and infers
from his awareness of his wretchedness, his greatness. This
wretchedness commingled with his greatness can only be accounted
for by the fall of man from his original state of perfection. The
fall itself is incomprehensible but without it, all things else about
man, writes Pascal, are incomprehensible.
Out of this, Pascal reasons that man has need of a re¬
ligion that can explain his condition and at the same time redeem
him. This he finds in the historical religion of Jesus Christ.
Paley's approach, as already stated, was radically
different from this. He held before man certain external proofs
in the form of the miracles of the Bible and declared that the ac¬
ceptance of the truth of the revelation in the Bible, by virtue of
the fact that its truth is attested by miracles, is Christian faith. *
He thus left out the idea of communion with and committal to a
personal God revealed in Christ which is so prevalent in Pascal.
Pascal held that a full knowledge of God is conditioned on the ven¬
ture of faith and that God has so ordained that certainty and
*
Sermons on Several Subjects, Sermon XV, p. 661.
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assurance in spiritual matters must be reserved only for those
who search for him with their whole heart. Pascal uses the
term "heart" in the Biblical sense of the whole personality and
was thus much closer to the Hebraic psychology than was Paley.
Tillotson, who became Archbishop of Canterbury in
1691 .held that faith was not a special faculty and that there is
no distinction between reason and faith. Above all else, Chris¬
tianity must be reasonable. He believed in a supernatural re¬
velation and yet it is to our reasons that this revelation must
commend itself. * One of the tenets of the broad Church of
Paley's day was that reason is the only faculty by which true
religion is recognizable. Yet, in this tradition there stands
the very curious contention that by miracles the reason is con¬
vinced of the authenticity of revelation. For Tillotson, reason
was not an intuitive faculty but a discursive power. He meant
by reason the act of reasoning.
It remained for Locke to work out the details of
Tillotson's position. He held that our assent torevelation is
Moffat, James. The Golden Book of Tillotson.
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faith. * But how are we to be sure that this revelation comes from
God, and how are we to be sure of its direct meaning? First, he
answers, we must be sure we have understood it aright and then
we must understand that there are three kinds of propositions.
There are those propositions which are according to reason, for
example, the existence of one God. This proposition is according
to raason for it is capable, Locke thought, of being demonstrated.
Then, there are propositions that are above reason, for example,
the resurrection, for which there can be no proof. Only a miracle
can persuade us of the truth of such a proposition. Finally, there
are propositions that are contrary to reason, for example, the
existence of more than one God. Such a proposition could never
be credited for I could never have a reason for crediting it. Chil-
lingwort'h, Clarke and Wollaston all stood in this tradition. They
would all agree with Locke that "Reason is natural revelation where¬
by the eternal Father of light and fountain of knowledge communicates
2
a knowledge of himself."
*
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ,
p. 343.
2
Ibid. , Bk. IV, Ch. XIX, 4, p. 360.
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For Locke the purpose of miracles is purely to give
attestation to revelation. Yet he held that not even a miracle
can give attestation to anything contrary to reason to be revela¬
tion. A casual examination of Locke demonstrates the truth
that theological liberalism of the nineteenth century was in real¬
ity rooted in the seventeenth century. This may be observed by
noticing how much Locke and Karnack resemble one another. It
is interesting to remember, however, that rationalism later
threw the miracles out of court.
In his insistence on the evidential value of miracles
Paley was again very true to the traditional Christianity of his
day. However, he goes a bit farther than his predecessors, for
to him the distinctive Christian revelation is so supernatural that
he holds that it could only be given through miracles. * "These
miracles form, no doubt, our assurance that He (Christ) was
2
sent from God." The glories of the world above toward which
we journey are for Paley so unspeakable that they stand in a
category which only a miracle could properly describe.
Evidences of Christianity, p. 3
2
Paley's Sermons, Vol. V, Sermon ii, p. 151.
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Paley's argument concerning the miracles gathers
around the objections advanced by Hume. He takes issue with
Hume's argument of probabilities in which it is contended that
since we are more impressed with the orderliness of the uni¬
verse than we are with the trustworthiness of human testimony,
it is more probable that those reporting the miracles were mis-
1
taken than that the natural order should have been violated.
The curious point in the total picture of Hume's philosophy is that the
very man who contended that for all we can prove, anything may be
the cause of anything, was also the man who argued against the pos¬
sibility of miracles because they violate the unchangeable laws of
nature.
History, Hume argues, teems with accounts of miracles.
Says he, the argument against miracles hinges upon the question of
belief in the truth of testimony. Like all our beliefs, this one rests
upon experience. Our experience is that men have memories which
on the whole are trustworthy. But testimonies may conflict, or
*
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sect. X.
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their authority may be rendered doubtful by the manner of their
delivery. When the event being related is a miracle (and by a
miracle Hume means a violation of the laws of nature), since
the law of nature itself has been established by a long period
of observing an unalterable pattern, the mind is thus presented
with one body of testimony set over against the other. The
stronger testimony belongs to the changeless pattern of the
law of nature. Hume writes:
There is not to be found in all history, any
miracle attested by a sufficient number of
men, of such unquestioned good sense, edu¬
cation, and learning as to secure us against
all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted
integrity as to place them beyond all suspi¬
cion of any design to deceive others; of such
credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind,
as to have a great deal to lose in case of
their being detected in any falsehood; and at
the same time attesting facts, performed in
such a public manner, and in so celebrated
a part of the world, as to render the detec¬
tion thereof unavoidable: all which circum¬
stances are requisite to give us a full assur¬
ance in the testimony of men. *
Hume, David. Works, vol. ii, pp. 94-95.
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Paley undertook to answer Hume by contending that
the Christian revelation affords an adequate testimony, that
the apostles were a 'sufficient number of men' and that they
possessed the proper credentials to validate their testimony.
He reasons as follows:
If twelve men whose probity and good sense
I had long known should seriously and cir¬
cumstantially relate to me an account of a
miracle wrought before their eyes, and in
which it was impossible that they should be
deceived; if the governor of the country,
hearing a rumour of this account, should
call these men into his presence, and offer
them a short proposal either to confess the
imposture or submit to be tied up to a gibbet
if they should refuse with one voice to acknow¬
ledge that there existed any falsehood or im¬
posture in the case; if this threat were com¬
municated to thern separately, yet with no
different effect; if it was at last executed;
if I myself saw them, one after another, con¬
senting to be racked, burnt, or strangled
rather than give up the truth of their ac¬
count,—still, if Mr. Hume's rules be my
guide, I am not to believe them. Nov/, I
undertake to say that there exists not a
sceptic in the world who would not believe
them or who would defend such incredulity.
Paley goes on to show that the spurious miracles of
history do not belong in the category with those associated with
Paley, William. Evidences of Christianity,pp. 8, 9.
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the Christian faith. However, Hume regarded the Apostles as
being uneducated members of the lower orders of mankind and
Palestine as an isolated corner of the Roman world which was
not to be compared with Athens or Rome. Therefore, miracles
reported by these men from this area could not be accepted in
the enlightened world.
Hume's emphasis followed something of the same
pattern established by Shaftesbury who had viciously assailed
the characters and stories of the Bible and warned the poet to
steer clear of them:
The wit of the best poet is not sufficient to
reconcile us to the campaign of a Joshua,
or the Retreat of a Moses, by the assistance
of an Egyptian Loan. Nor will it be possible,
by the Muses Art, to make that Royal Hero
appear amiable in human eyes, who found
such favour in the eye of Heaven. *
Since Paley's day the course of Christian apologetics
has changed rather radically. Professor D. S. Cairns reminds
us today that the miracles of the New Testament do not stand as
sign posts to a deeper reality but that they belong to the very
fabric of the Christian Gospel.2 The pattern of current thought
*
Shaftesbury, Works. Vol. i, p. 358.
2
The Faith that Rebels, p. 25.
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is that the Gospel represents the unique intervention of God
into the affairs of men and is of such inherent worth that it
carries the miracles with it. It is not that because the miracles
are so startling we must believe the stories in which they are
set, but rather that the redeeming act of God in Christ is so
startling that we should expect it to be accompanied with super¬
natural events. This change in thinking concerning the miracles
goes back to the work of Thomas Wolieston who held that the re¬
surrection is of the very essence of the Gospel and not a seal to
prove something greater than itself in the Gospel.*
The importance of Paley's treatment of the miracles
is that to a greater degree than any other writer he related them
to that doctrine, which permeates all of his theology, namely,
the doctrine of rewards and punishments after death. Paley took
his departure from a belief in a benevolent Creator whose purpose
was not only to enable men to share an earthly existence but by
endowing him with the capacity for moral obedience made it pos¬
sible for him through his obedience to enter a second state of
*
A Discourse on the Miracles of the Savior.
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existence infinitely more glorious than the first. Now, Paley
reasons, if this be the purpose of the Creator, would it not be
reasonable to suppose that He would communicate a knowledge
of such a plan to His Creation? If this be one's belief concern¬
ing the plan of God for man, then Paley concludes that it is not
unreasonable to believe that so glorious a purpose would have
been revealed through miracles. Thus Paley relates his doc¬
trine of miracles to his doctrine of revelation and also to his
eschatology.
In the forefront of all his writing and all his preach¬
ing, Paley sets the doctrine of rewards and punishments after
death. * Most of the seventeenth and eighteenth century moral¬
ists could not see how the moral law would hold together without
a final judgment where rewards and punishments v/ould be meted
out. Herbert of Cherbury went so far as to name this among his
2
five common notions. Even Voltaire believed that the doctrines
of an awarding and avenging God are necessary to the maintenance
of the moral order. He wrote, "If God did not exist we would have
1
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,




to create Him but all Nature cries out that He does exist.
Sir Thomas Browne wrote, "Ipsa sui pretium
virtus sibi, that virtue is her own reward is but a cold prin¬
ciple and not able to maintain our variable resolutions in a
2
constant and settled way of goodness." He further declared
that we cannot hope "to be honest without thought of Heaven or
Hell."3
Of course, there were those who were at work try¬
ing to divorce ethics from the doctrine of rewards and punish¬
ments. Shaftesbury declared that to be honest without thought
of heaven and hell is the distinguishing mark of a true lover of
virtue. For him, true Christianity produced a spontaneous
goodness of the heart that was not dependent on rewards or
punishments. This position was further advanced by Holbach,
who thinks of the doctrine of the future life as a mirage which









Religion has become the art of intoxicating
men with enthusiasm, so as to divert their
attention from the evils with which their
rulers load them here on earth... .They
are made to hope that if they agree to being
unhappy in this world, they will be happier
in the next. *
When we deal with Paley's moral philosophy we
shall undertake to show that the glaring weakness of his sys¬
tem lies in the fact that the rewards of eternity were in terms
of quantitative considerations rather than in terms of qualita¬
tive moral and spiritual values. Schleiermacher later pointed
out that true immortality is qualitative harmony with God* and
thus liberated the conception from the grossly materialistic
point of view so prevalent in the previous century.
Perhaps the greatest service that Paley performed
for Christian theology was his refutation of the denial of the
historicity of the Christian religion. How widespread this de¬
nial had come to be in the eighteenth century England may be
seen in the previously quoted statement of Butler in which it
is declared that many were taking it for granted that Chris-
2
tianity was fictitious. It should be observed that Paley's
*
Christianisme De' voile', quoted by Wickwar,
Baron d'Holbach, (1935), p.~T29.
^
The Christian Faith, p. 542.
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problem was a practical one which was forced upon him by the
tide of unbelief, and was not comparable to the undertaking of
what Professor D. M. Baillie has chosen to call the "Jesus
of History Movement" of the nineteenth century. * This school
was concerned with the recovery of the Jesus of History in an
attempt to show that the starting point of Christian theology
can never be in ready-made metaphysical dogmas about Christ,
but rather in the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth with
whom we are confronted in the Gospel story. Paley, on the
other hand, was concerned to show that the metaphysical dog¬
mas of the Church were historically authentic. In fact, the
eighteenth century has been characterized as a time of freez¬
ing dogma into static forms.
It is much to Paley's credit that even before the work
of Ritschl, Harnack and Herrman, he was impressed with the
necessity of getting back to the historical setting of the Gospel.
For his Evidences of Christianity he drew heavily from the re¬
search of Nathaniel Lardner.^ His treatment of the historicity
of Paul, however, is quite original.
*
G°d was in Christ, p. 48.
^
Credibility of Miracles (1755 ed.), Vol. I, p. 23.
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This growing feeling for history was one of the
most important parts of the legacy of the eighteenth century.
There is a feeling as one reads Paley that his interest in the
historical setting of the Gospel led him to embrace the Socin-
ian view of the person of Christ. His admiration for Nathaniel
Lardner's work is much in evidence and it is known that while
reading Lardner's Letter on the Logos, Joseph Priestley be¬
came a Socinian, holding that God is the only proper object of
worship and thus rejecting the Trinitarian doctrine of Christ's
divinity and the Arian doctrine of his pre-existence, Priestley,
who was a non-conformist, could demonstrate more completely
than one related to the Church as was Paley, the ultimate devel¬
opment of the natural theology of the century.
From Paley's notes from his lectures which are now
in the British Museum one writer proves to his own satisfaction
that Paley accepted the Unitarian view. * However, in Paley's
published works he does not attempt formally to explain his
ideas of the person of Christ. Perhaps our best source for
*
The Christian Life and Unitarian Herald, July 11,
August 2, August 22, 1891.
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this information would be his sermons. As clear a passage on
the subject as the writer could find is the following:
That a person of a nature different from all
other men; nay superior, for so he is dis¬
tinctly described to be, to all created beings,
whether men or angels; united with the Deity
as no other person is united; that such a per¬
son should come down from heaven, and suf¬
fer upon earth the pains of an excruciating
death and that these his submissions and suf¬
ferings should avail and produce a great
effect in the procurement of the future sal¬
vation of mankind, cannot but excite wonder. *
Although in some passages Paley appears to identify
the works of the Holy Spirit with the inner musings of mar./ he
also speaks of the third Person of the Trinity as a "real, effi¬
cient, powerful, active Being whose cooperation is essential
3
to the conviction, conversion, and moral welfare of man."
Such statements as these led one writer to declare:
On the whole, then, we think that he (Paley)
was, nothing like a modern Socinian; that
he was, at least something more than an
ancient Arian; but that the precise shade of
his creed cannot be determined by us and
perhaps had not been determined by him¬
self/*
*
Sermons on Several Subjects, Sermon XVIII, p. 666.
^ Ikid» Sermon XXIV, p. 683.
3 Ibid. Sermon XXVII, p. 692.
^
Quarterly Review, Vol. XXVIII, July and October,
1828, pp. 328, 329.
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Still another writer declares that it would be easier to say what
Paley's opinions on this subject were not, than to cay precisely
what they were. * His ideas of the person of Christ are nowhere
formally explained, and are but very slightly unfolded even by
passing intimations. The following is as distinct a passage as
may be found in his sermons;
In the mean time, from the whole of these
declarations of this discussion, we collect
that Jesus Christ, ascended into the heavens,
is at this day, a great efficient Being in the
universe; invested by his Father with a high
authority, which he exercises, and will con¬
tinue to exercise, to the end of the world.
To this may be added one other quotation:
That a great and happy Being should volun¬
tarily enter the world in a mean and low con¬
dition and humble himself to a death upon the
Cross, that is, to be executed as a malefac¬
tor, in order, by whatever means it was
done, to promote the attainment of salvation
to mankind, was the theme they (the Apostles)
dwelt upon with warmest thankfulness.
It appears to the present writer that Paley's emphasis
is not that of the Socinian and that while he was certainly
p. 9.
*
Eclectic Review, Vol. V, January to June, 1809,
2





impressed with the genuine humanity of Jesus he did not
relinquish his hold on the divine Lord who is our Saviour and
Redeemer/ Paley's emphasis on the divinity of Christ is seen
in his treatment of the atoning death of the Redeemer. He
divides the meaning of the atonement into two categories,
namely, the spiritual and the moral. The spiritual consists
in the benefit it procured us in the attainability of final salva¬
tion. The moral ends of the death of Christ consist in the ad¬
ditional motives which it furnishes to a life of virtue and reli¬
gion, as it is a pattern, example, encouragement and incite¬
ment to virtue. He reasons further that the death of Christ
teaches us to practice humility and patience and to crucify the
flesh and the lusts of life."^ To receive the benefits of Christ's
atonement man must repent of the sins for which Christ died.
Paley defines repentance as "a change of the heart from an evil
to a good disposition". . . It is "an actual amendment of life..,.
It is that disposition of mind by which 'he who stole steals no
1
Sermons on Several Subjects, Sermon XXII, p. 67 7.
2
Ibid- Sermon XVIII, p. 666.
3
Paley's Sermons, Vol. V, Sermon iv, pp. 169, 170,
171.
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more,' by which 'the wicked man turneth away from his
wickedness and doeth that which is lawful and right'. . .
•where restitution is practical, repentance cannot be sincere
and effectual without it."'* Paley makes good works a condi¬
tion of salvation, for he thinks that those who say that good
works are necessary to salvation but are not willing that they
should be called conditions of salvation are making a distino-
2
tion too refined for common man to apprehend. "* There ap¬
pears to be a curious inconsistency at this point for in the
same sermon Paley argues that the cause of salvation is not
in anything we do or can do but in the good will and pleasure
of God.
It is to Paley's credit that in his study of history
he did not lose the divinity of Christ in the maze of history.
That is to say, in contending that Christ, the Revealer of God,
is indeed in history, he did not make the mistake of Ritschl
3
who held that Christ was also of history. Nor did he, with
*
Paley's Sermons, Vol. V, Sermon iii, p. 158, 162.
2
The Eclectic Review, Vol. V, Part 1, from January
to June, 1809, p. 9.
3
Mackintosh, H. R. Types of Modern Theology, p. 157
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Harnack, believe that the metaphysical implications of the
Christian creed have their source in the infiltration of Greek
philosophy. * He believed that the Christ of the Creed was
One with the Christ of Galilee.
Although we are being told today by Professor
2 3
Rudolf Bultmann, Dr. Edwin Bevan, and Professor R.H.
4
Lightfoot, that the quest for the historical Jesus is in vain,
and are being frequently reminded of Father Tyrrell's inci¬
sive criticism against the "Liberal Protestant" reconstruc¬
tion of the figure of Jesus when he wrote, "The Christ that
Harnack sees, looking back through nineteen centuries of
Catholic darkness, is only the reflection of a liberal Protes-
5
tant face, seen at the bottom of a deep well," still one feels
that the creed must be anchored in historical fact and that
Paley did well in holding them together.
*
Harnack, A. "What is Christianity? , p. 224.
2 Jesus and the World, English Translation by




History and Interpretation of the Gospels, pp. xiii,
xiv.
5
Christianity at the Cross-Roads, p. 44.
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III
We have seen how Paley has acquired a certain
symbolic significance as an apologist of the Christian reli¬
gion by defending the reasonableness and historicity of the
claims of the Church against the challenge of Deism. We
turn now to show how he dealt v/ith Deism as it challenged
the moral worthiness of the Christian claims. Contrary to
the popular opinion Deism was not primarily a theological
belief in an absentee God, who is utterly transcendent, nor
was it an attempt to establish a rationalistic philosophy. * In
reality, Deism was primarily a moral movement attempting
to separate the ethical from the non-ethical and ultimately
the ethical from the religious in man's thinking. C. C. J.
Webb correctly says that "the accepted meaning of Deism is
belief in a God known from the light of nature apart from
1
The writer is not unmindful of the fact that no
less a writer than W. R. Sorley held that Deism is primarily
the belief in an absentee God, and the author <f the article on
in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics held that
Deism stands for a philosophical rather than a religious view.
On the other hand, Dr. Hayfeldbower, in The Relation of John
Locke to English Deism, points out that with the exception of
Herbert of Cherbury, the Deists scarcely touched philosophy
and McGiffert in his chapter on Rationalism in his Protestant
Thought Before Kant states that the Deists were interested in
religion primarily as a means to virtue.
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revelation."* The light of nature resided, as the forerunner
of Deism, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, had said, in the five
common notions, the third of which is that "virtue conjoined
2
with piety is the principle part of divine worship." Man,
therefore, has no need of a special revelation of the divine
will. In fact, the Deists were interested in the development
of ethics as a science utterly divorced from a special revela¬
tion.
Prior to examining Paley's reaction to the moral
philosophy of the Deists, let us look at the general trends of
moral philosophy in England before Paley began his work.
The dominant trend of Paley's day was in the direction of
natural morality. Beginning with Thomas Kobbes there was
a growing tendency in England to divorce ethics from a re¬
vealed religion. In fact, the strongest endeavor in seven¬
teenth and eighteenth century thought, beginning with the work
of Francis Bacon, was the attempt to separate natural from
3
revealed theology. Out of this endeavor there grew the
*
Studies in The History of Natural Theology, p. 344.
De Veritate.
3
The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, Edited
by John M. Robertson, (1905), p. 89.
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breach between natural and revealed morality.
After the break down of the rigid ecclesiasticism
accomplished by the reformers, a new freedom arose. The
mind of man was liberated so that he might think for himself,
and free philosophical endeavor became a possibility. The
reformers had been practical men who were not interested in
philosophy. Luther, in fact, had said that of itself philosophy
could not rise to any knowledge of God. It is apparent that
while Bacon accepted Luther's contention and himself made a
plea for separation between philosophy and religion, he was
not so much concerned for the claims of faith as he was that
reason should be given the right to function unshackled by dog¬
matic chains. Bacon disposed of the claims of religion by
saying, "As we are obliged to obey the divine law though
our wills murmur against it, so we are obliged to believe
the word of God though our reason is shocked by it."* He
held that man's knowledge is like water. Some comes from
above, some from beneath. The light of nature coming from
below empirically and revelation coming from above provide
us with the totality of our knowledge. Bacon's famous sen¬




but not to inform religion."* Bacon contends that while plain
philosophy can silence the atheist, it cannot give us sufficient
Christian knowledge. On the other hand, he insists that the
Bible is designed to teach religion, and to endeavor to build
natural philosophy out of the first Chapter of Genesis would
be utterly futile.
This new quest for freedom of thought was united
with a widespread campaign for toleration in which the citi¬
zens of England demanded liberty to profess any religion they
should choose and to write books that deviated from the views
of the Church and State.
Thus liberated by Bacon's philosophy, Thomas
Hobbes, who had served as Bacon's secretary, brought his
contribution to the movement by contending that ail morality
and religion are subservient to politics. Hobbes identified
the moral with the positive law. What the State allows is good,
and what it disallows is evil. Laws of nature are immutable
and eternal, but they do not become binding until the community




the State, good and evil have no binding force. While Hobbes
speaks constantly of revelation, he gives it a political signifi¬
cance. His blatant scepticism is revealed by the manner in
which he attacks the theory of revelation. "To say God hath
spoken to man in a dream, is no more tnan to say man dreamed
that God hath spoken to him." "To say one hath seen a vision,
or heard a voice, is to say he hath dreamed between sleeping
2
and waking." Yet Hobbes was absolutely convinced that the
dogmas of the Church were necessary to hold the community
together. Morality thus became the product of arbitrary civil
and ecclesiastical legislation.
The immediate effect of Hobbes' work was to call
forth the enmity of both -moralists and theologians. Theologians
thereby came to be joined with moralists until the whole of the
3
theology of the eighteenth century tooK on a strong moral tone.
The common task of theology and moral philosophy was to refute
the arguments of Hobbes.
*




Stephen, Leslie. English Thought in the Eighteenth
Century, Vol. ii, p. 2.
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One of the strongest opponents of Hobbes was Cud-
worth, the most distinguished of the Cambridge Platonlsts.
He believed that the "essential and eternal distinctions of
good and evil" are independent of mere arbitrary will whether
human or divine. * He thinks of ethical truth as related to the
universal essence of things, which is inseparable from the
Eternal mind and just as immutable as the Eternal mind. He
exalted the natural moral sense of man. To act aright, he
maintained, we need only consult the natural law written on
the heart.
A more satisfactory refutation of Hobbism came
from Bishop Richard Cumberland. Hobbes believed that in a
state of nature, by which he meant man outside the control of
civil government, it would be irrational for a man to obey the
laws of nature, for he could never be assured that others would
obey such laws. Therefore, by his obedience he would be defeat¬
ing the true end which the laws had in mind which for him was
self-preservation. ^ Jrom such reasoning he concludes that
Eternal and immutable Morality, pp. 16, 17.
2
Hobbes, Thomas. De Corpore Politico, Vol. IV.,
p. 225.
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the laws of nature are not laws at all but mere conclusions.
To change the many conflicting wills of individual agents into
one will, an absolute government must be established to which
the individual must yield his undivided allegiance. Over against
this, Cumberland insists that the laws of nature are real and
valid. * He takes issue with Hobbes' view of man in which man
is compared with "wolves", "bears" and "serpents"^ by main¬
taining that if this were true, "It would evidently be impossible
to reduce such beasts of prey, always thirsting after the blood
3
of their fellows, into a civil state." Furthermore he main¬
tained that sympathy was as much a part of human nature as
desire for self-preservation, for if this were not so, society
could not exist. For Cumberland "Universal benevolence is
the spring and source of every act of innocence and fidelity,
of humanity and gratitude, and indeed of all the virtues by
4
which property and commerce are maintained."
*
De legibus naturae, p. 14.
2 .
Hobbes, Thomas. De homine. Vol. 11 (Latin
works, Molesworth's ed.), p. 91.
3
De legibus naturae, p. 295.
4 Ibid., p. 114, 115.
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The point of Cumberland's originality lay in his at¬
tempt to discover an underlying principle from which all the
moral laws could be deduced. This he finds in the general
law of benevolence. He thus became the first exponent of a
theory that long dominated English ethics and which set man
to thinking of the high and lofty possibilities of human nature.
Thenceforth the completely anti-social man whom
Hobbes had depicted as morose, malignant and thoroughly
miserable began to vanish and in his place there arose a new
man capable of boundless good. Cumberland was joined by
Lord Herbert of Cherbury, who, bright, hopeful, and optimis¬
tic, saw man as universally possessing by nature certain com¬
mon notions which constitute the revelation of God in man and
thus needing no further revelation from God. Lord Herbert's
man stands adequately equipped to deliver his own soul.
Locke also places man on an heretofore unparalleled
pedestal. He exalts man not by storing his mind with innate
ideas as had Lord Herbert of Cherbury but follows Tillotson
in holding that reason is not an intuitive faculty but a discursive
ability or capacity. Nothing is in the mind that was not first of
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all in the senses. Man is great not by virtue of the ideas he
possesses but by virtue of his unlimited ability to apprehend
the truth, nor can he want for a clear knowledge of God if he
uses the faculties with which God has provided him. "Reason
is natural Revelation, whereby the Father of Light, and foun¬
tain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of
the truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural
faculties."* Locke insisted that Christianity, properly under¬
stood, by which he meant the original, simple teaching of Jesus
and the Apostles minus the priestly accretions of the centuries,
was not inconsistent with reason. By the light of reason, God
had revealed to ail men that God is good and merciful. The
same spark of reason that makes one a man shows him the
law he is to obey and the way of atoning for his sins when he dis-
2
obeys.
Mankind's need of a Savior came when the use of rea¬
son was forgotten and men allowed Priests to fill their heads
with vice and superstition. It was necessary for Christ to come
to simplify and purify the natural religion which had become so
Ibid. , Book IV, Ch. 19, Sect. 4, p. 360.
^
The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in
the Scriptures. , pp. 8,ff.
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overlaid with superstition. For Locke, Christ came to re¬
establish natural religion and natural morality. The Deists
continually spoke of Christianity as the re-establishment of
religion. For Locke it was enough to acknowledge Jesus as
the Messiah and to practice the moral virtues which he pro¬
claimed and which are in fundamental accord with the dictates
of a reason which is hardly distinguishable from enlightened
common sense.
In the same year that Locke published his Reason¬
ableness of Christianity, 1693, Charles Blount came forth with
his Oracles of Reason. The main burden of this work was to
show that God enjoins no positive duties on man in addition to
natural duties. Man was now found to be capable of more than
merely obeying laws. He could even be like God. For, Blount
declared, our duty is to be like God,not to obey a series of laws.
To act according to natural law was thus coming to be interpreted
as meaning to be like God.
As the concept of Nature expanded, a chair for a pro¬
fessor of the Law of Nature and Nations was established at Heidel¬
berg in 1662, and Samuel Pufendorf was the first to occupy that
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chair. Thus the cry "follow nature" which had been raised
in antiquity by Cynics, Stoics and Epicureans and which later
came to link together the starry heavens above and the moral
law within was once more surging to the front of man's thinking.
The law that preserved the stars from wrong, was once more
becoming the rule of duty.
To be sure the age was not without its adherents to
the older views, Samuel Clarke, the most distinguished scholar
in England for a quarter of a century after Locke, although
* It is noteworthy that Paley takes Pufendorf's
work into consideration in the preface of The Moral and Political
Philosophy.
2
One of the characteristics of Paley's age was that
of speaking of morality under the metaphor of a law. From the
time of Chrysippus the expression, "law of nature," was in coa-/
stant use. By law of nature the Stoic meant that which is K°< Tex
$ U V- ) V , according to the nature of things. To draw a distinc¬
tion between laws rooted in the nature of things and those that were
not, the Stoic fell back on a word which the Sophist^ had often used
interchangeably with w o M- o S i namely, d € CP ? s , the
verbaj. substantive of 7" I Q n , meaning "I place," "I put."
Q € (P ? -S meant for them "A thing laid down." The Stoics
used these words to distinguish between a y o o s 9 4 77KoS ,
a lav/ laid down by man, and a y o m. o5 $ v o*} K oTt a law of
nature. It is the distinction maintained in Latin between the W
, positive law, and the ,
natural law. The term, positive law became general in later thought.
This distinction between positive law and natural law is one of the
most important distinctions throughout the history of Western
thought, for it distinguishes that which belongs to reality from that
which does not.
- 89 -
following the main outlines of the philosophy of Tillotson and
Locke, still maintained that man was basically corrupt. For
Clarke, the need of a revelation from God was seen not so much
in the truth that the facts of religion have been perverted but
rather in the fact that the original light of reason in man has
been corrupted. He speaks of the corruptness of reason far
more than Locke.
Although Clarke was not strictly one of the Cambridge
Platonists, he adopted some of their ethical principles. He ac¬
cepted Cudworth's contention that the moral law is rooted in the
nature of things, and that the fundamental precepts of the moral
law are self-evident and unalterable thus embracing what came to
be known as rational intuitionism. Clarke's fatal blunder came in
his attempt to demonstrate what the self-evident moral intuitions
are. He listed them as follows: reverence, equity, benevolence
and self-preservation. An examination of these terms would show
that they may conflict with one another unless they are rationally
defined.
Deism proper differed from the earlier writers like
Clarke, Tillotson and Locke in that it represented the utter re¬
pudiation of revelation as a means of arriving at a knowledge of
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God and a man's moral duty. Earlier writers like Richard
Hooper had strongly emphasized the law of nature but were
also keenly aware of its inadequacy. When we come to Til-
lotson and Locke, the emphasis upon natural religion is
stronger until there is a gradual fading out of revelation.
Behind the endeavour of the Deists was the desire
to work out a system of ethics for the common man by show¬
ing him that God demanded nothing of him but the performance
of moral duties which are revealed to him by the law of nature.
John Toland, who published his Christianity not
Mysterious in 1696, represents a half-way house between
Locke and full-fledged Deism. He held that revelation is a
means of revealing matters of fact we should not otherwise
have known and is to be accepted on divine authority rather
than because we have discovered the truth of it. Yet he in¬
sisted that there was nothing in Christianity that was contrary
to reason or above reason. "Nothing inconceivable can be con-
2
tained in the Gospel of the Word of God."
*
McGiffert, A. D. Protestant Thought Before Kant
pp. 211, 212.
2
Christianity Not Mysterious, p. 22.
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At this point, perhaps we should be reminded that
Deism proper distinguished between reason and rationalism.
The Deists never interpreted religion in a speculative way.
They scarcely appealed to philosophical proofs. In fact, they
were the declared enemies of philosophy just as they were the
declared enemies of anything belonging to man's inventions.
They believed that the evidence of religion was clear without
resorting to philosophical proof. They speak of reason but
they do not mean reasoning. That is to say, they follow the
Stoic line as against the Aristotelian.
Deism went further and denied that there was such
a thing as revelation apart from the light of nature. In 1730,
Matthew Tindal published Christianity as Old as the Creation,
a book which later came to be known as the Deists' Bible. His
major thesis was that we must not demand in the name of religion
anything that is against morality. True religion is doing good.
The only difference between morality and religion is that moral¬
ity is doing right because it is right. When right comes to be
regarded as the will of God, it is religion. One is regarded as
superstitious if he thinks that God requires of him anything more
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than to do justice, love mercy and serve the public good. While
insisting that he is a Christian Deist, Tindal maintained that to
be a Christian is neither to accept the Bible or the tradition of
the Church but simply to act according to the law of reason. All
that is in the Bible must be judged by reason or by the nature of
things. For him, the supreme mission of Jesus was to purify
the religion of nature.
As the authority of nature grew in the minds of men,
its grand concomitant, the dignity of human personality, was also
enlarged. For as men got back to the pure religion of nature re¬
vealed afresh in Jesus of Nazareth, they became more and more
impressed with an item that had been long overlooked, namely,
his essential humanity. Thomas Chubb in his True Gospel, pub¬
lished in 1738, raised the question of the historicity of Jesus and
concluded with an unusual emphasis upon his humanity. In both
these items he antedated the efforts of the nineteenth century
writers. The true Gospel for Chubb may be summed up in
three points. First, we must conform our lives to the eternal
and unalterable law of reason; then, if we have violated that rule,
we must repent and reform to be forgiven; and, finally, there
will be a last judgment before which ail men must appear and
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receive the rewards and punishments for their deeds.
Coming to the middle of the eighteenth century and
to the work of Thomas Morgan, we find that by this time the
emphasis upon Christianity as the most noteworthy revival of
the religion of nature had deprived the Christ of all his super-
2
natural attributes and had made of him only a prophet.
The brightest exponent of the greatness of natural
man in this period was Lord Shaftesbury. While actually not
a Deist, Shaftesbury shares their version of man. He brings
a devastating attack against Hobbes'view of man by declaring
that "Hobbes in reckoning up the passions and affections wnich
produce society, forgot to mention kindness, friendship, socia-
bleness, love of company, natural affection, or anything of this
3
kind." Shaftesbury is the typical English moralist of the en¬
lightenment. He stands in opposition to all low and gloomy
evaluations of man as the champion of unassisted human nature.
So certain was he that man possessed the ability to direct his
The True Gospel of Jesus Christ Vindicated. .
2
The Moral Philosopher, Vol. I, p. 98.
3
Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions and
Times.
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own life in the ways of righteousness that he became impatient
with all who pictured God as one who provided a dynamic for
right living by holding out rewards and punishments before man.
For Shaftesbury, to be honest without thought of heaven or hell
is the true mark of a real lover of virtue.
There is a curious inconsistency in Shaftesbury's
view of rewards and punishments. As long as they come in
this life they may be the proper motive for moral living and
are viewed as a part of the beautiful order of things but the
moment they are removed from this life and made a part of
the life to come he vehemently denounces them.
Shaftesbury based right and wrong on the fundamental
constitution of human nature itself, not on the will of God. He
could thus maintain that even if one rejected the divine existence,
which he did not do, he was nevertheless bound to maintain moral
conduct. He had drawn from Whichcote the belief that human
nature is not so perverse, but that it retains a 'secret sympathy
with virtue and honesty.' Virtue itself is the foundation of happi¬
ness and sin brings its own misery.
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The praise of nature is reflected in all of Shaftes¬
bury's writings. He even insists on the divine perfection of
nature, by which he means the whole order of Creation.
Professor Willey says:
The divinity of Nature (like the 'good nature'
of man) is affirmed by Shaftesbury both
against the Atheists who think the universe
a distracted chaos of atoms, and against the
orthodox, who hold that we live in a world
which has been permanently ruined by the
fall of Adam. 2
Shaftesbury's obsession with the glories of nature is
splendidly portrayed in the following paragraph:
O Glorious Nature! Supremely fair, and sov¬
ereignly good! All-loving and all-lovely, all-
divine! Whose every single work affords
an ampler scene, and is a nobler spectacle
than all which ever art presented! O mighty
Nature! Wise substitute of Providence! im-
power'd Creator! Thee I invoke, and thee
alone adore. To thee this solitude, this
place, these rural meditations are sacred;
whilst thus inspir'd with Harmony of Thought,
tho unconfin'd by Words, and in loose num¬
bers, I sing of Nature's order in created
beings, and celebrate the beautys which re¬
solve in thee, the source and principle of all
beauty and perfection.
*
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions and Times.
The Eighteenth Century Background, p. 62.
^ Shaftesbury's Works, Vol. ii(1727 ed.), pp. 344, 345.
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For Shaftesbury, true religion should be based upon
nature, not upon revelation. He speaks of those who think they
are extolling religion by exposing the "Corruption of Man's
Heart" and succeed only in setting "moral virtue" as a "rival
to religion."* Human nature he regards as a microcosm of
the greater perfection of the universe. Human virtue, thus is
found in following nature, for he thought it natural to be moral.
One cannot but admire the efforts of the Deists for
they took seriously the task that befell the early decades of the
eighteenth century to re-establish a reasonable balance in the
moral life of England. These men were neither puritan enthus¬
iasts nor libertines, but sober minded and accomplished men of
the world. They felt that uncontrolled enthusiasm in religion and
unbridled vice were equally offensive to good taste and good sense.
Along with Addison and Steele they sought to make vice ridiculous
and to bring to the cause of decency and virtue the powerful allies
of wit and good breeding.
Thus for the eighteenth century the final court of appeal
in matters of belief and conduct came to be reason and its practical
* The Moralists, pt. ii, sect. 2, Works, vol. ii, p. 256.
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corollary, good sense. The philosophical rationalism of Des¬
cartes, the empiricism of Hobbes and Locke, the newly awakened
interest in the natural sciences of which Sir Isaac Newton is typi¬
cal, the reaction against seventeenth century preoccupation with
questions of religion, all conspired to turn men's minds away from
the mysteries of life and to focus their attention on the real and
actual. Most of the literature of the day was given to moralizing,
but its morality was that of enlightened worldliness. In religion
and ethics the deeper springs of life had gone dry. The moral
code was the product of the divinizing of nature. The maxim of
the age became "What is, is right."
Until Wesley and his Methodists began their work in
1740,with a strong appeal to the hearts of the people, the Christian
religion in the eighteenth century pulpits had become so coldly ra¬
tional that the orthodox churchman could hardly be distinguished
from the "free-thinking" Deist with his reasoned "religion of nature."
One historian writes:
Never had religion seemed at a lower ebb.
The progress of free inquiry, the aversion
from theological strife which had been left
by the Civil Wars, the new political and ma¬
terial channels opened to human energy, had
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produced a general indifference to all ques¬
tions of religious speculation or religious life.
The Church, predominant as its influence seemed
at the close of the Revolution, had sunk into poli¬
tical insignificance. . .a large number of prelates
were Whig partizans with no higher aim than that
of promotion.. .a Welsh bishop avowed that he had
seen his diocese but once, and habitually resided
at the lakes of Westmoreland. . .A shrewd if pre¬
judiced observer brands the English clergy of
the day as the most lifeless in Europe, the most
remiss of their labours in private and the least
severe in their lives...'In the higher circles of
society 'everyone laughs,'" said Montesquieu on
his visit to England, "if one talks of religion.". ..
Drunkenness and foul talk were thought no dis¬
credit to Walpole. . . .Purity and fidelity to the
marriage vow were sneered out of fashion; and
Lord Chesterfield in his letters to his son, in¬
structs him in the art of seduction as part of a
polite education. *
Among the masses, rank ignorance prevailed. The
rural peasantry had been reduced to pauperism by the poor laws
and had no moral or religious training whatsoever. Hannah More
said, "We saw but one Bible in the parish of Cheddar and that was
used to prop a flower-pot."
*
Green, John Richard. A Short History of the English
People, pp. 735, 736.
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The introduction of gin increased the drunkenness of
the day until gin shops in London invited every passer-by to get
drunk for a penny, or dead drunk for two pence. *
It is altogether possible that these conditions have
been somewhat exaggerated by historians, for as W, R. Matthews
has said, "Nothing is easier than to draw an indictment against a
2
century." We may, however, know for a certainty that there
was a characteristic grossness among the masses and a depre¬
ciation of idealism among the educated.
In spite of her moral degeneration, England remained
religious at heart and under the zealous leadership of men like
Whitefield and the Wesleys and the equally earnest yet quiet and
sane ministry of men like William Paley she was destined to re¬
gain her moral self-respect.
*
Green, John Richard. A Short History of the English
People, pp. 1735, 1736.
2
Butler, Joseph. Fifteen Sermons and a Dissertation
on the nature of Virtue, Editor's Introduction, p. XI.
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CHAPTER III
AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF PALEY'S ETHICS
Having examined the theological and philosophical
trends of the eighteenth century, we come now to ask what was
Paley's contribution to the stream of eighteenth century ethical
thought? Wherein did his system differ from that of his prede¬
cessors? Was his treatment merely an eclectic system or did
he differ from those writers like John Gay and Abraham Tucker
from whom he drew so heavily? What was the unifying principle
of his ethic? Did he give a satisfactory answer to the question,
How may a man know his moral duty? What positive and endur¬
ing contribution did he make to the field of ethics?
In answering these questions it is necessary to re¬
mind ourselves that Paley was not striving primarily for origi¬
nality, although he does lay claim to being something more than
1
a mere compiler. His writing was based largely upon the notes
Paley, William. The Principles of Moral and Poli¬
tical Philosophy, p. XVI.
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used in his lectures on Moral Philosophy at Cambridge. We
should remember, therefore, that it is addressed principally
to a class of students. In his presentation Paley expressly-
avoided the style of writing which prevailed among eighteenth
century English moralists. He contended that their style was
too ornamental, too full of adornment with no underlying mean¬
ing, and too full of superficial embellishments in the form of
meaningless quotations from classical writers.* This, perhaps,
was a carry-over from John Milton's strong emphasis upon the
necessity of a re-examination of classical writers, which had
resulted in a superficial fad of quoting from them whether or
not the quotation made a positive contribution to the discussion.
Paley was also averse to the fashion of lis time of stringing de¬
tailed propositions together, a good illustration of which may be
found in Dr. Ferguson's Institutes of Moral Philosophy. In con¬
trast to this Paley offers a wealth of relevant discussion and il¬
lustrations to vivify his ethical propositions.
The simplicity of Paley's style may be traced partly
to his aversion to metaphysics and partly to his effort to avoid
* The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,
p. XVI.
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dwelling upon verbal and elementary distinctions which he did not
believe to be vitally linked to the problems of practical morality.
A good example of what he was reacting against may be found in
Dr. Rutherford' Institutes of Natural Law. It is quite apparent
that even the Deists with whom Paley took issue were averse to
metaphysics. They were more interested in what nature teaches
all men, king and peasant alike, than they were in that knowledge
at which one may arrive at the end of a syllogistic process. For
them reason was primarily intuitive, not discursive.
It was to Paley's credit that he, like his fellow utilitar¬
ians, was more interested in the practical application than in the
theory of ethics. * The practical nature of his work is manifested
in his description of ethics which he defines as "that science which
2
teaches men their duty and the reason for it." Standing as he did
in the midst of men who were endeavoring to arrive at a final prin¬
ciple which would clearly teach all men their duty and thus give to
the realm of morals an order resembling that which Newton by his
* Mackenzie, John S. A Manual of Ethics, pp. 276, 279.
2
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I.,
Ch. V, p. 11.
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principle of gravitation had given to the world of nature, Paley
sought to accomplish this by uniting the law of nature with the
precepts of revelation, for he believed it a very regrettable ten¬
dency in moral philosophy that these two should be severed. Paley
insisted that ethics was not a complete science in itself. He argued
with Dr. Johnson that:
When the obligations of morality are taught
let the sanctions of Christianity be never for¬
gotten: by which it will be shown that they give
strength and luster to each other: religion will
appear to be the voice of reason, and morality
the will of God. *
As we move into the heart of Paley's ethics, let us
bear in mind that the purpose of this chapter is to discover the
underlying principles of his ethical system and to determine the
method by which he arrived at them. One of the major debates
among the writers of eighteenth century England centered around
the problem of moral knowledge. How is man to know his moral
duty? In fact, John Gay declared that this was the only




King, William. An Essay on the Origin of Evil,
Preliminary Dissertation Concerning Virtue or Merit by John
Gay, (1732 ed.), p. XXVIII.
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Before examining Paley's answer to this question, perhaps it
will be well to survey some of the typical answers in vogue in
his day. First of ail, there were those who still contended that
Revelation must give the answer to this question. On the other
side were men like Shaftesbury who believed that the defenders
of traditional morality, which was based on the revelation of the
Bible, had deliberately suppressed independent discussion of
morals. He wrote:
So much is the religious part of mankind
alarmed by the freedom of some late pens,
and so great a jealousy is raised everywhere
on this account, that whatsoever an author
may suggest in favour of religion, he will
gain little credit in the cause if he allows the
least advantage to any other principle. *
There was also in vogue in this period a fashionable
cynicism which held that moral codes were either pernicious re¬
straints upon human energies or artful impositions by statesmen
2
upon the common herd. A good example of this is found in the
Maxims of Rochefoucauld and Mandeville's Fable of the Bees.
The real father of such philosophy, however, is Thomas Hobbes,
*
Characteristicks of Men, Manners , Opinions and
Times, (1727 ed.), p. XXVIII*
2
Matthews, W. R. Butler's Fifteen Sermons, Intro¬
duction, p. XII.
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He was a thoroughgoing materialist believing that all that exists
is matter in motion. The soul as an immaterial entity is non¬
existent. Even material phenomena are the "internal" motions
of material particles. In his attempt to show how the laws of
human nature and society may be deduced from the laws of
motion he maintained a consistent devotion to his materialistic
philosophy. This theory led him to undertake an analysis of the
mind in which he dealt primarily with desire and will. For Hobbes,
man is a bundle of desires, the satisfaction of which is provided by
external things. These desires are strictly analogous to physical
forces, and there is no real freedom of choice, for the will be¬
comes identified with the strongest desire. The objects of man's
desires in the state of nature are either pleasure or self-preserva¬
tion. In man's more advanced stage as he develops his reason he
begins to desire a third object, namely, power. This desire is
awakened as man projects himself into the future and realizes his
need for security. At this point Hobbes' illustrious doctrine of
the natural egoism of man emerges. By nature man is not a
social being but is governed by three basic desires, namely, for
pleasure, for preservation, and for power. Hobbes felt that to be
consistent with his position he must demonstrate that the so-called
- 106 -
social affections are no more than egoism in disguise. On pity-
he writes the following:
Pity is the imagination or fiction of future
calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the
sense of another man's calamity. But when it
lighteth on such as we think have not deserved
the same the compassion is greater, because
then there appeareth more probability that the
same may happen to us: for the evil that hap-
peneth to an innocent man may happen to every
man. *
On Charity Hobbes writes in a similar vein:
There is yet another passion sometimes called
love but more properly good will or charity.
There can be no greater argument to a man of
his own power than to find himself able not
only to accomplish his own desires but also to
assist other men in theirs: and this is that
conception wherein consisteth charity. In
which, first is contained that natural affec¬
tion of parents to their children. . .as also
that affection wherewith men seek to assist
those that adhere unto them. But the affec¬
tion wherewith men many times bestow their
benefits an strangers is not to be called charity,
but either contract, whereby they seek to pur¬
chase friendship, or fear, which maketh them
to purchase peace.2
By attempting to show that all affections have their
source in self-interested love of power or pleasure, Hobbes
* Human Nature, IX. , p. 10.
2 Ibid., IX. 17.
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believes he has thus proved that genuinely disinterested affec¬
tions are impossible.
The consequence of such ethical theory is that it makes
it impossible to speak of a common good which transcends and in¬
cludes the true good of every man. Instead of a universal good
there are as many goods as there are individuals. This is the
strong emphasis which Hobbes continually makes:
Every man for his own part, calleth that
which pleaseth him and is delightful to him¬
self, good and that evil which displeaseth
him: insomuch that while every man differ-
eth from another in constitution, they differ
from one another concerning the common
distinction between good and evil. Nor is
there any such thing as absolute goodness,
considered without relation: for even the
goodness which we apprehended in God Al¬
mighty is His goodness to usl*
On the nature of man Hobbes wrote that man stands
in need of society, but because of his fundamental egoism he is
2
unfit for society. Man's natural condition is a state of 'a war of all
against all.' This state is one of "continual fear and danger of violent
3
death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."
*
Human Nature, VII, 3.
2
De Hornine. (Latin Works, Molesworth's edition).




To remedy this Hobbes proposes a "social contract" in which the
individual surrender's to the state. An absolute government must
be established to which the individual agent would yield his indivi¬
dual allegiance giving up everything save the right of defending him¬
self from personal violence. The civil power would change the many
conflicting wills into one will. It would define that which is just and
that which is unjust and would even serve as the judge of all theolo¬
gical doctrines:
It is as if every man should say to every man,
I authorize and give up my right of governing
myself to this man or to this assembly of men,
on this condition, that thou give up thy right to
him and authorize all his actions in like manner.
This done, the multitude so united in one person
is called a commonwealth. .. .This is the genera¬
tion of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak
more reverently) of that mortal God to which we
owe, under the immortal God, our peace and de¬
fence. *
For Hobbes a man's moral duty is what the state says
it is, for morality consists in those general rules, which Hobbes
called "natural laws", which are necessary for the maintenance
of society.
W. R. Matthews calls attention to a point that has




morality is rational and universal, for the general rules of
society must be based upon reason and are always the neces¬
sary supports of that social order which is prerequisite to the
welfare of the individual. This does not, however, alter the
fact that, for the individual, the source of moral obligation is
not reason itself but the commands of the State:
In the state of nature where every man is
his own judge, and differeth from others
concerning the names and appellations of
things, and from those differences arise
quarrels and breach of peace, it was ne¬
cessary there should be a common mea¬
sure of all things (hat might fail in contro¬
versy. As, for example, of what is to be
called right, what good, what virtue. ..
This common measure some say is right
reason, with whom I should consent if
there were any such thing in rerum natura.
But commonly they that call for right rea¬
son to decide any controversy do mean
their own. But this is certain, seeing
right reason is not existent, the reason
of some man or men must supply the
place thereof and that man or men is he
or they that have the sovereign power,
and consequently the civil laws are to all
subjects the measures of their actions,
whereby to determine whether they be
right or wrong, profitable or unprofit¬
able, virtuous or vicious.^
* Butler, Joseph. Fifteen Sermons and a Dissertation
on the Nature of Virtue, Introduction, p. xvi.
2
De Corpore Politico, ii. 10.8.
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Hobbes' cynical view of man's inability to answer for
himself the question of his moral duty was the center of much con¬
troversy among later moralists. Generally speaking there arose
in opposition to his contentions two schools of thought known re¬
spectively as rational intuitionism and aesthetic intuitionism.
Rational intuitionism was the product of the Cambridge
Platonists who reacted against the tendency in Hobbes' philosophy to
make morality an arbitrary matter of convention. They insisted
that moral ideas are as universal and unalterable as the ideas of
the intellect and that morality is rooted in the nature of the universe.
Ralph Cudworth is the leading exponent of this position. Not only
does Cudworth reject the idea that morality depends on the arbitrary
law or convention of the state, but he also denounces the view of Cal¬
vin that morality depends on the arbitrary will of God. He contends
that all knowledge is concerned with nothing else but universal ideas
which are forever the same. He writes:
There is no such thing as arbitrarious Es¬
sence, Mode or Relation that may be made
indifferently anything at pleasure for an ar¬
bitrarious essence is a being without nature
a contradiction and therefore a nonentity.
Wherefore the natures of Justice and Injus¬
tice cannot be arbitrarious things that may
- Ill -
be applicable by will indifferently to any
actions or dispositions whatsoever. For
the modes of all subsistent beings and the
relations of things to one another, are im¬
mutably and necessarily what they are, and
not arbitrary, being not by will but by
nature.*
Another refutation of the philosophy of Hobbes in
vogue in the eighteenth century was that of Antony Ashley
Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury. He is the author of
what came to be known as the "Moral Sense Theory" or
"Aesthetic Intuitionism." Shaftesbury's supreme emphasis
was on his interpretation of the nature of conscience. He be¬
lieved in a special moral faculty in man, which he called the
"moral sense", and which he defined as "a real affection or
love towards equity and right, for its own sake, and on the
account of its own natural beauty and worth. This faculty
enables men to distinguish between individual actions and thoughts
as to their Tightness and wrongness as they occur and is closely
analogous to aesthetic appreciation or the sense of beauty.
Man's moral sense enables him to distinguish between the base
and ignoble just as his sense of beauty enables him to
^
£ternal aa^ Immutable Morality, First Edition, pp. 16, 17.
2
Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit (1699), p. 31.
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discriminate between the unsightly and the beautiful.
For Shaftesbury this moral sense or conscience was
not based upon principles of morality. It was not a rational func¬
tion by which man might apply the laws of morality to his conduct.
On the contrary, it was man's instinctive ability to sense immediately
the Tightness of a virtuous action and the wrongness of a vicious one.
It should be remembered, however, that Shaftesbury did not draw
from the above that the good is primarily a matter of independent
judgment. On the contrary, for him moral distinctions have inde¬
pendent reality, that is to aay, a good act is good whether we appre¬
hend its moral quality or not. Objectively a thing is good if it is in
harmonious relations with the system of which it forms a part, and
human goodness consists in being in harmony with the species to
which the individual belongs. The ultimate criterion is the general
good, hence benevolence is the sum of goodness. Since goodness is
harmonious living, the virtuous man is one who maintains a balance
between the social and altruistic impulses. Furthermore, Shaftes¬
bury contends that even in the present world self-interest and virtue
always coincide:
To be well affected towards the Public Interest
and one's own is not only consistent but insepa¬
rable; moral rectitude or virtue must be the
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advantage and vice the injury and disadvantage
of every creature. *
Both Shaftesbury and his disciple, Hutcheson, had no
conception of a rational or organic union between individual sen¬
timent and social well being except the traditional one of exhibiting
the personal advantages of benevolent conduct, and the disadvan¬
tages that accompany selfishness. Butler was not free from. this.
He thinks that Shaftesbury "has shown beyond all contradiction that
virtue is naturally the interest or happiness and vice the misery of
2
such a creature as man."
For Butler the approval of conscience is thus made the
criterion of morality. But a difficulty arises as to the way in
which we are to regard the authority which conscience is said to
carry along with it. Butler's utterances here commonly imply a
teleological reference to an end implanted in human nature, and to
be discovered by observing that nature—the realization of the end
being obligatory, because it is shown to be the purpose which the
3
author of nature had in view in making man as he is. The author¬
ity of conscience is derived from the purpose which it displays and
*Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions and Times,
(1711), Vol. ii, p. 81; cf. pt. ii., sects. 1 and 2~7
^
Sermons, p. 103.
3 Ibid. , p. 104.
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carries within itself a claim to obedience; however , the justifica¬
tion of this claim depends on a theological basis. Hence, the ques¬
tion of the nature and origin of conscience is at once raised in
order to determine the legitimacy of its claim to be rather than
any other part of our constitution, a divinely-implanted guide.
When Bishop Butler thus undertook to give an answer to
the question of how man knows his moral duty, he appropriated the
method used previously by Hobbes of inquiring into man's constitu¬
tion, and undertaking an analysis thereof. His method, however, is
not that of pure observation, for in the very outset he assumes the
existence of final causes.* He likewise assumes the principle that
if the nature of a creature is adapted to certain purposes, it was in-
2
tended for those purposes , and then proceeds to examine the nature
of man to determine for what purpose it is adapted, believing that
man will reach his highest goal by conforming to that purpose which
is according to his nature. He warns against those erroneous views
of what it means to follow nature, and concludes that the true meaning
of following nature is to act in conformity with human nature taken as
a whole, which involves the recognition of the supremacy of Conscience.
1 /
Butler, Joseph. Fifteen Sermons and a Dissertation
upon the Nature of Virtue, p. 47.
2 Ibid.
^ Ibid. , pp. 50-53.
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Professor C. D. Broad points out that which Butler
fully recognizes but does not endeavour to remedy, namely,
that in one sense nobody can act against his nature. Broad
writes:
I think it would be better to say that virtue
consists in acting in accordance with the
ideal nature of man, and that vice consists
in acting against it. No man's actual nature
is the ideal nature of man. But this raises
no special difficulty. We can form the con¬
ception of a perfect watch although no real
watches are perfect. *
By employing the idea of a system used previously by
Shaftesbury, Butler insisted that the essential thing about man as
a moral being is that lie is a complex whole of various propensities
arranged in a hierarchy. These propensities must be kept in the
proper relation of subordination to one another. That is to say,
human nature is not what Hobbes said it was, namely, a mass of
faculties and impulses. On the contrary it is capable of a system¬
atic unity characterized by harmonious proportion. Furthermore,
that harmony does not consist in a "mere balance" between self-
regarding and benevolent tendencies, as Shaftesbury had taught.
It is to be found in the subordination of the lower elements to those
*
Broad, C. D. Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 57.
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which are in their nature, more authoritative. * The superior
principles in the nature of man are reasonable self-love and con-
2
science.
Sidg.wick calls attention to a very common error with
regard to these two principles, namely, that self-love is natur-
3
ally subordinate to conscience. These, in reality, are co-ordi¬
nate in their authority. Butler writes:
Reasonable self-love and conscience are the
chief or superior principles in the nature of
man: because an action may be suitable to
this nature, though ail other principles be
violated, but becomes unsuitable, if either
4
of those are.
There are, however, passages in Butler's writing
which have three possible interpretations. Namely, that Con-
5 6
science is supreme, that Self-love is supreme and that the
7
two have equal authority. Perhaps we can see in these passages
*
Butler, Joseph. Fifteen Sermons and A Dissertation
on the Nature of Virtue, p. 68.
2
Ibid. , p. 57.
3
Ibid. , p. 182.
4
Ibid. , p. 68.
^ Broad, C. D. Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 57.
6
Butler, Joseph. Fifteen Sermons and A Dissertation
on the Nature of Virtue, Introduction by W. R. Matthews, p. XXII.
^ Ibi id. , p. 68.
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the inconsistency in Butler's theory.
On the nature of Conscience, Butler occupies a half¬
way house between rational and aesthetic intuitionism. Apparently
he agrees with Shaftesbury that there is a special moral faculty,
but he makes it more than feeling or instinct. He calls it a "prin¬
ciple of reflection."* Hence, it partakes of the nature of reason.
Yet he did not identify it with reason as did the theoretical and the
rational intuitionists.
Butler makes duty coincident with our private interest.
This is true for the most part in this world and entirely true in the
next world. He, however, was not guilty of drawing a line of cleav¬
age between this life and that which is to come. He simply views
them as parts of the whole picture of man's existence. He also
was recognizing the superficiality in Shaftesbury's view that virtue and
self-interest are in perfect agreement in this life. Because this is
manifestly untrue, Butler clings to his belief in a moral Governor of
the universe who will in the future life be able to correct any discre¬
pancies in the present.
*
Butler, Joseph. Fifteen Sermons and a Dissertation
on the Nature of Virtue, p. 68.
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It should also be observed that in contrast with Hobbes,
Butler contends that the social order is not artificial but natural.
"It is as manifest that we were Aiade for society, and to promote
the happiness of it; as that we were intended to take care of our
own life, and health, and private good."* He was thus transcend¬
ing the exaggerated individualism of Calvinism and making an ap¬
peal for a proper regard for the wholeness of life. In fact, he
concluded that the Tightness or wrongness of an action, or even
of an intention, can be judged only by viewing it in relation to the
whole system in which it is a factor." We might state his answer
/
to how a man may know the good, in W. R. Matthews summary of
his position: "Anything is good which is in harmonious relations
3
with the system of which it forms a part."
*
Butler's teleological view of human nature is seen in his
insistence that the dictates of conscience are the voice of God and
not the pronouncement of a merely subjective tribunal. He contended
that man is to act conformably to the economy of his nature by
*
Ibid. , p. 40.
Broad, C. D. Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 57.
3
Matthews, W. R. Introduction to Butler's Fifteen Ser¬
mons and a Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue, p. 55.
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allowing reasonable self-love to govern.
The above arguments were in vogue when Paleytook
up his pen and sought to answer the question of how man knows
his moral duty. He began by denying the theory of Shaftesbury and the
intuitionists and by contending that ail the supposed phenomena of the
"moral sense" can be explained on the basis of expediency and that
expediency is the objective principle by which all moral conduct
must be judged. To enforce his belief that some new objective
principle for the judging of moral conduct was necessary Paley
pointed out the inadequacy of the methods by which morality was
judged in his day. Instead of joining issue with the great basic
systems of morality, he chose to deal with the common devices by
which morality was measured in his day. The various devices for
judging moral conduct with which Paley was familiar were: the law
of honor, the law of the land, the Scriptures, and the moral sense.
It is apparent that in distinguishing these different kinds of law, Paley
2
was following Locke rather closely.
*
Matthews, W. R. Introduction to Butler's Fifteen
Sermons and a Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue, p. 55.
2
An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Bk. II,
Ch. XXVIII, p. 201.
- 120 -
By the law of honor, Paley meant what Locke calls the
law of opinion or reputation* or what came later to represent the
2
etiquette of particular trades and particular classes of society.
In one of his sermons Paley writes the following:
1 should call the law of honor a system
of rules well contrived by persons in
the higher stations of life, to facilitate
their intercourse with each other.
Paley contended that this law could not tell a man ail
of his moral duty because it only prescribes and regulates the
duties between equals and thus omits those that relate to the
4
Supreme Being, as well as those which we owe to our inferiors.
He saw that while some impulses of a man's heart may be checked
by certain generally understood conventions and while the approval
of society affords a strong sanction for obeying her customs, even
so, there are times when eccentricity has its place in the moral
life, and a man may be more truly moral by breaking the customs
of his community than by keeping them.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II,
Ch. XXVIII,"pT 202.
2
Mackenzie, John S. A Manual of Ethics, p. 342.
3
The Sermons of V. illiam Paley, Vol. V., Sermon
XLVIII, p. 431.
4
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,
Bk. I, Ch. ii, p. 2
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For example, if he should live in a community where
infanticide is practiced, he would be more truly moral and would
be obeying a higher law if he should repudiate this custom. The
varying customs among different groups also reveal their inade¬
quacy as an ideal for man's conduct. For example, a Chinese is
very little ashamed of being detected as a cheat, but he would be
manifestly disgraced if he did not treat his parents with proper
respect or if he did not keep the tombs of his ancestors in good
repair.
Perhaps the chief weakness in Paley's argument at
this point is due to his meager definition of the law of honor.
This law is not confined to the rules of fashionable life. Rather,
it is rooted in human nature and is felt by all levels of life from
the savage to the monarch. The desire of the approval of one's
fellows is to be found everywhere. At the same time, it must
be allowed that a writer has the right to define his own terms, and
it must be admitted that as Paley defines the law of honor his argu¬
ment against its adequacy is very convincing.
Paley also refused to accept Hobbes' position that
the law of the land must tell a man what is right and what is
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wrong. Paley found the law of the land or the civil law to be
inadequate for settling moral questions because it labors under
two difficulties; first, because the law commands only where it
is able to compel, consequently those duties, which by their
2
nature must be voluntary, lie beyond the reach of its power;
secondly, because the distinction between right and wrong is
3
often too subtle to be stated in a law. Paley saw that civil laws
are neither constant nor universal and while they bind a large
segment of society, they break down as a power for moral recti¬
tude when the circumstances which made these laws necessary
change and when man's character changes. The civil law also
recognizes that there are many duties which are not fit objects
for compulsion. On the other hand, it permits many crimes
which are incapable of definition, for no general, rules can ever
exactly fit a particular case.
Paley thus points out the defects in the system that
would regard human laws as a worthy rule of life. It is possible
that a man might keep the written law entirely and still have the
De Corpore Politico, ii. 10.8
2
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk.




wrong motive. Goodness of motive is essential to virtuous con¬
duct. For instance, if a man simply pays his debts to avoid im¬
prisonment, this would not of itself make him an honest man.
In a charge to Clergymen, Paley cautions them against
those members of their congregations who hold that the law of the
land is an adequate monitor for the moral life:
Amongst the rules which contend with religion
for the government of life, the law of the land
also has not a few who think it very sufficient
to act up to its direction, and to keep within
the limits which it prescribes, and this sort
of character is common in our congregations.
We are not to omit, therefore, to apprise
those who propose to themselves a measure
of conduct totally inadequate to the purpose.
The boundaries which nature has assigned to
human authority, the partial ends to which every
legislator is obliged to confine his views, pre¬
vent human laws, even were they, what they
never are, as perfect as they might be made
from becoming competent rules of life to any¬
one who advances his hopes to the attainment
of God Almighty's favour. In contradistinc¬
tion, then, to these several systems whica
divide a great portion of mankind amongst
them, we preach "faith which worketh by love,"
that principle of afction and restraint which is
found in a Christian alone."*




that the Scriptures alone are sufficient to define man's moral
duty. Even W. R. Sorley made this mistake in his interpreta¬
tion of Paley. * What Paley actually says is that the Scriptures
are final where they speak but are inadequate as a system of
morals because they do not attempt to give a detailed statement
of man's duty but prefer rather to lay down such general rules
as "worshipping God in spirit and in truth; doing as we would be
done by; loving our neighbors as ourselves; forgiving others, as
2
we expect forgiveness from God."
This might appear to be a unique statement for so ortho¬
dox an apologist as Paley. In reality, Paley was going back to an
emphasis that had appeared often in the preaching of Archbishop
3
Tillotson almost a century before. The writers of Scripture, ac¬
cording to Paley, assume that the persons addressed already pos¬
sess a knowledge of the principles of natural justice. Therefore,
they design their teaching not to present new rules of morality but
to enforce the practice of morality by new sanctions and a greater
*
Sorley, W. R. A_History of English Philosophy, p. 201.
2
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,
Ch. iv. , p. 5.
3
Moffatt, James. The Golden Book of Tillotson, pp. 166,
169.
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certainty. Paley is here stating what is most certainly true about
the Scriptures but it is exceedingly difficult to see how he can
contend for this and in subsequent parts of his treatise contend
that man is destitute of a moral sense. Perhaps again Paley has
been misinterpreted. A number of critics take him to task most
severely at this point.* Their mistake, as I shall later point out,
was in interpreting Paley's denial of the innateness of the moral
sense to mean that man was destitute of a conscience.
Paley's critics, who have insisted on taking him liter¬
ally and reading into his statements what he never intended, have
2
said that he placed expediency above the authority of the Scriptures.
It was Paley's intention, however, to apply this principle only
where Scripture is silent, or where it is not specific or where it is
doubtful. For instance. Scripture declares itself against covenant-
breakers. We bow to the decision—but what is a covenant? and
what is it to break one?—this Scripture does not define. Here,
therefore, we want a principle to guide us before we can apply
Scripture. What is the principle? Expediency, says Paley. To
*
Whately, Richard. Paley's Moral Philosophy with
Annotations, p. 23.
2
Gisborne, Thomas. The Principles of Moral Philosophy
Investigated and Applied to the Constitution of Civil Society, Bk. II,
Ch. vi., p. 46.
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take another instance: Scripture declares itself against a lie; we
allow the authority; "but what is truth?" may be asked with Pilate
and surely without any irreverence. What principle is to decide
us in determining the offence against which Scripture has fixed
its canon? —Expediency, again, says Paley. "Resist not evil"
is a positive injunction of Scripture, yet from other passages it is
certain that occasions there may be where resistance is lawful.
By what principle are we to draw the line? By the principle of ex¬
pediency once more says Paley. We may thus conclude that while
it is true that some strong statements such as "the utility of any
moral rule alone it is which constitutes the obligation of it" * would
imply that Paley would exclude every other principle of judging moral
conduct, in reality, this is just an inadvertent expression of a man en¬
amoured by his system and not an adequate explanation of his total
doctrine.
• Paley combines the authority of reason and Scripture in
the following passage from one of his sermons; "To take for our
guidance the rule of reason and the rule of Scripture is the perfec¬
tion of moral excellence."^
*
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,
Bk. II, Ch. vi, p. 46.
2
Paley's Sermons, Sermon XLVIII, p. 426.
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Paley continues his discussion of the inadequacy of
the Scriptures by insisting that to deliver moral disquisitions
was no part of the Savior's design:
To teach morality at all was only a subordinate
part of if, his great business being to supply
what was more wanting than lessons of mor¬
ality, namely, stronger moral sanctions and
clearer assurances of a future judgment. *
The Gospel stands in marked contrast with religious
books that attempt to regulate human conduct by minute direc¬
tions for every case and occurrence that may arise. For ex¬
ample, the Hindoo and Musselman religions attempt this, and
to demonstrate the futility of such efforts, it has been observed
that in the Musselman Code not less than seventy-five thousand
precepts have been promulgated.
Over against this Paley sets the fact that "the Chris¬
tian religion has not ascertained the precise quantity of virtue ne-
2
cessary to salvation. Indeed human language is not an adequate
vehicle for conveying such knowledge, nor is it possible to consti¬
tute a standard of moral attainments accomodated to the almost
*
Evidences °f Christianity, p. 256.
^The Work s of William Paley, Vol. V, p. 168, Sermon
XIX.
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infinite diversity which subsists in the capacities and opportun¬
ities of different men.
Paley might have been closer to the New Testament
if he had suggested as did St. Paul, in his doctrine of justifica¬
tion by faith, that God does not measure a man by the distance a
man has travelled on the journey toward perfection but by the
direction of his life. He asks not whether a man has arrived,
but does he have his face or his back towards the goal?
Not only did Paley find the law of honor, the law of
the land and the law of Scripture incapable of defining man's
moral duty, but he also took violent issue with the moral sense
philosophers, because they had threatened to make religion su¬
perfluous by an unrealistic exaltation of man. It has been ob¬
jected that Paley also painted an unrealistic picture of man's
ability by assigning to him, by his utilitarian theory, the power
to predict even the infinite consequences of his action. * It is
2
true that he claims that "Whatever is expedient is right."
*
Dymond, Jonathan, Essays on the Private and Poli¬
tical Rights and Obligations of Mankind, p. 5.
2
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,
Bk. 2, c. 6, p. 46.
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However, Paley recognizes the limitations of this principle as
he declares that "it is impossible to ascertain every duty by an
immediate reference to public utility."* To compensate for such
a limitation, said he, it is necessary to have certain established
rules, which are absolutely obligatory, by which conduct may be
guaged.
The belief in conscience appears very early in English
philosophy. Even Lord Bacon could write the following: "The
light of nature not only shines upon the human mind through the
medium of a rational faculty, but by an internal instinct accord¬
ing to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of
man's first estate." The denial of an innate moral sense, how¬
ever, placed Paley in a tradition that was by no means new. John
Gay and Abraham Tucker had given much attention to it. It was
substantially the position advanced by Hobbes in the Leviathan and
goes back at least as far as Aristotle's time when there were those
who maintained that the diversities that appear in men's moral
1
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,
Bk. 6, c. 12, p. 499.
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notions militate against the idea that the distinctions of moral right
1
and wrong have any foundation in nature.
It should be noted that Paley does not attempt to give a
thorough treatment of the nature and origin of the moral sense.
He leaves this for those who were more inquisitive than he was
concerned to be about the natural history and constitution of the
2
human species. For a proper evaluation of his position, however,
it is necessary to inquire into the meaning of the moral sense in
Paley's day. Tne ambiguity of the term makes it necessary to
say a word about its meaning. In the first place, it should be
noted that Butler, who gives the idea such prominence in his sys¬
tem, used the terms conscience, moral reason, moral sense or
3
divine reason interchangeably. Butler defines these terms simply
as the "moral approving and disapproving faculty."^ He writes:
* Nic omachean Ethics, Bk. V. , pp. 126, 128.
2
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk.
II. C. V, p. 14.
3
Butler, Joseph. Fifteen Sermons and a Dissertation





This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,
and is made use of as seeming the most full,
and least liable to cavil. And the moral
faculty may be understood to have these two
epithets 8 Q -fM °( C^T 1 KV? and
Cx IT o 8 o JY 1~~M ex 'cr-J?^* upon a
double account, because, upon a survey of
actions, whether before or after they are
done, it determines them to be good or evil;
and also because it determines itself to be
the guide of action and of life, in contradis¬
tinction from all other faculties, or natural
principles of action, in the very same man¬
ner as speculative reason directly and natur¬
ally judges of speculative truth and falsehood;
and at the same time is attended with a con¬
sciousness upon reflection, that the natural
right to judge of them belongs to it.
Butler differed radically with Shaftesbury in his view
of the moral sense. For Shaftesbury, the moral sense was a
cultivated good taste which in a well-developed character passes
into a kind of instinct which guarantees the choice of right and
2
the avoidance of wrong. Both Shaftesbury and his disciple,
Hutcheson, believed that what a cultivated moral sense approves
is that which is beneficial to society as a whole. They urged,




Characteristicks, "An Essay on the Freedom of Wit
and Humour." Part III, Sect. Iv.
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because it is embodied naturally in a cultivated taste. Butler
stood against this view by making conscience the principle of
reflection upon the law of Tightness to which all the other im¬
pulses in human nature must be subordinate.*
The term conscience, is derived from the Latin
/
conscire, to be conscious (of wrong). The Greek <T uV€l t
the German Gewissen, and the old English Inwit, are similar in
meaning. Conscientia used to be employed almost indifferently
for conscience and for consciousness in general. The French
writer, Malebranche, to whom Hume was so deeply indebted,
used the term , conscience, more particularly in the sense of
self-consciousness. Milton used the term to signify conscious¬
ness when in referring to the loss of his eye3 he wrote:
What supports me dost thou ask?
The conscience, Friend, to have lost them overplaid
In liberty's defence, my noble task,
Of which all Europe rings from side to side.
This passage, however, carries with it also the implication of a
moral consciousness. The term took on a definitely moral conno¬
tation with the writings of Butler. Mackenzie calls attention to
the fact that:
*
Matthews, W.R. Fifteen Sermons and a Dissertation
Upon the Nature of Virtue by Joseph Butler, 1949, Sermon II, pp.
56, 57.
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Even in the moral sense of the term there
is some ambiguity. It sometimes means
a feeling of pleasure or pain, and especially
a feeling of pain, accompanying the violation
of a recognized principle of duty. At other
times it means the principle of judgment by
which we pronounce one action or one kind
of action to be right and another wrong. In
the latter sense, again, it may refer to this
principle of judgment as it appears in a parti¬
cular individual or in a body of men. Such
phrases as "the Non-conformist Conscience,'
'the Conscience of Europe' and the like, illus¬
trate this use of the term.
Paley's debate with the moral sense philosophers
raged around the fact that they refused to go behind the mere
facts of moral experience. His thought on the subject was the
legitimate result of a thoroughgoing empiricism derived from
Locke. He held that instead of being born with an adequate
supply of moral maxims, we, in reality, obtain our first notions
of moral good and evil by observing the conduct of others. He
followed Locke and Tucker in thinking of man as a receptive
waxen tablet rather than a bundle of tendencies and predispositions.
As previously stated Paley had no debate with the fact
that man was in possession of a conscience. On the contrary, his
sermons abound in such passages as follow:
* Mackenzie, J.S. A Manual of Ethics, fourth edition,
1900, p. 146.
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A serious man hardly ever passes a day,
never a week, without meeting some warn¬
ing to his conscience.*
The quickening or stirring of conscience
within us is sometimes the first sign of a
renewed and regenerated soul. There have
been disputes concerning this principle of
conscience, its origin, nature, extent, but
all sides agree on one thing, namely, that it
may be dead for a time in the human breast
without any energy or activity whatsoever.
The causes of this torpor and deadness, or
rather the circumstances under which it is
found have been often assigned. In many
cases, I am afraid, it takes place so early
in life that the person can hardly be said to
have ever known what the remonstrances and
admonitions of conscience were This state
of complete depravity in the effect of a totally
neglected education, and of being thrown, ^hen
very young, amongst profligate examples.
Paley's insistence that the moral sense is not innate
but a product of education is seen further when he declares that:
When a mind, perfectly ignorant, uninstructed
and uneducated, falls at first into debauched
and profligate society, then it is possible that
conscience may never spring up—its influence ^
over the heart may never have a commencement.
*The Works of William Paley, Vol. V, Sermon4,
p. 23
^The Sermons of William Paley, p. 115.
3Ibid. , p. 116.
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Hutcheson, who had developed the system of Shaftes¬
bury, had contended from the fact that the majority of men ap¬
prove of virtue immediately and apparently without regard to
their own interest that only the presence of an innate moral
sense could account for this. He held that the moral sense is
"a determination of our minds to receive amiable or disagree¬
able ideas of actions."* It should be said that Hutcheson later
relinquished the view of the moral sense as a feeling of pleasure
or pain and thought of it as a regulator of ail our powers.
John Gay, whose influence on Paley came indirectly
through the works of Abraham Tucker, held that instead of un¬
tying the knot, Hutcheson simply cut it. That is to say, he felt
that Hutcheson had not in reality explained disinterested action
when he naively referred to the operation of an innate moral sense.
Gay undertook to account for man's approval of good by a theory
which later flowered into the associational psychology.
He admitted that men approve virtue immediately and
yet affirmed that such approval was the result of their having in
^
Inquiry *n*° Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and
Virtue, p. 94.
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the past associated pleasure with that which is approved. The
love of money is used by Gay to illustrate the above. He states
that men were not born with the love for money but rather per¬
ceived at first the many advantages money would bring. From
thence they perceive the pleasure of possessing money, thence
they desire and endeavor to obtain it. Then an actual pleasure is
experienced in obtaining it. Thenceforth they desire to preserve
the possession of it. Gay continues:
Hence by dropping the intermediate steps be¬
tween money and happiness, they join money
and happiness immediately together and con¬
tent themselves with the fantastical pleasure
of having it, and make that which was at first
pursued only as a means, to be to them a real
end, and what their real happiness, or misery
consists in. *
This principle of association, which was later to be¬
come prominent in the work of David Hartley, Gay believed to be
sufficient to explain the disinterested practice of virtue. Conclud¬
ing his answer to Hutcheson's doctrine, Gay writes:
It is necessary in order to solve the principle
actions of human life to suppose a moral sense
(or what is signified by that name) and also pub¬
lic affections: but I deny that this moral sense,
* An Essay on the Origin of Evil, p. LLV.
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or these public affections are innate or im¬
planted in us; they are acquired either from
our own observation or the imitation of others.
A closer examination of Paleys argument will re¬
veal how similar his approach was to that of Gay. He intro¬
duces his argument with a story that apparently was very
familiar to the moralists of bis day:
The father of Caius Toranius had been pro¬
scribed by the triumvirate. Caius Toranius,
coming over to the interests of that party,
discovered to the officers who were in pur¬
suit of his father's life, the place where he
concealed himself, and gave them withal a
description, by which they might distinguish
his person when they found him. The old man,
more anxious for the safety and fortunes of
his son than about the little that might remain
of his own life, began immediately to inquire
of the officers who seized him, whether his son
was well, whether he had done his duty to the
satisfaction of his generals? "That son," re¬
plied one of the officers, "so dear to thy af¬
fections, betrayed thee to us; by his informa¬
tion thou art apprehended and diest." The of¬
ficer with this struck a poniard to his heart,
and the unhappy parent fell, not so much af¬
fected by his fate, as by the means to which
he owed it. ^
The question is then raised, if this story were related
to a savage without experience, and without instruction, cut off
1
Ibid. , p. LXII.
2
Paley, William, The Principles of Moral and Political
Philosophy, Bk. I, Ch. v, pp. 6, 7.
in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and, conse¬
quently, under no possible influence of example, authority, edu¬
cation, sympathy or habit, whether such a one upon hearing this
story would feel any degree of disapprobation of Toranius's con¬
duct? Those who believe in the existence of the moral sense say
that he would.
It should be noted here that Paley is using-an impossible
analogy. If such a person should be found, it would hardly be pro¬
per to use him as a case in point from which to deduce that which
is native to a normal man, for the obvious reason, that man upon
coming into the world comes into a society, and that which is de¬
veloped in such a society is a part of his normal equipment. Apart
from such society it is doubtful if he could learn to reason, and the
analogy could, in this instance, be used just as well to argue that
the ability to reason is not the gift of nature to man.
Those who believe in an innate moral sense do so on the
grounds that examples of generosity, gratitude and fidelity are im¬
mediately approved while their opposites are immediately con¬
demned without deliberation and without having any personal in¬
terest in them. They contend that many times we are unable to
state a reason for our approbation. Furthermore, it is affirmed
- 139 -
that this approbation is uniform and universal and t erefore indi¬
cates the operation of the moral sense. Replying to these argu¬
ments Paley follows Locke's pattern of disproving innate ideas
by asking if there are innate moral maxims, how many are there
and what are they?
Paley first of all denies the uniformity of moral appro¬
bations, contending that, "there is scarce a single vice which in some
age or country of the world has not been countenanced by public opin¬
ion."* He cites as an example the fact that in some lands it is con¬
sidered man's chief responsibility to care for his aged parents while
in other lands it is considered an obligation to dispatch them out of
the way. What Paley overlooks is the fact that even in the lands
where the aged parents are destroyed the motive behind it is to
save them from a wretched old age and is, therefore, a benevolent
motive. From this it might be argued that man is universally
prompted to do good whether or not there is agreement on what the
good is.
Secondly, he contends that the general approbation of
some actions can be accounted for without the assistance of the
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,
Ch. V, p. 8.
- 140 -
moral sense. Here Paley goes back to Gay who had shown that
approbations are not innate or implanted in us by way of instinct
but are all deduced from the fact that rational creatures are de¬
pendent upon one another for their happiness. * Rather than an
innate moral sense man has only the ability to determine what is
best for himself and others. Paley accounted for the general ap¬
probation of certain actions by saying that these actions had proved
beneficial in past experience and that after such approbation has
arisen in our minds, the sentiment continues to accompany our
idea of the same conduct although the benefit which incited it no
longer exists.
Taking its rise in this manner the continuity of the cus¬
tom of approving certain actions may be accounted for by the prin¬
ciple of authority, by the principle of imitation and by the habit of
2
approving certain actions inculcated in early youth. As men grow
up there arise fresh accessions of moral strength and vigor from
censure and encouragement, from the reading of books and the
hearing of conversations. Thus moral approval and disapproval of
*
An Essay on the Origin of Evil, p. XXXVI.
2
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,
Ch. V, p. 10.
- 141
certain acts is communicated to all members of society. For
Paley the distinctive faculty in man that separates him from the
brute is not an innate moral sense but the ability to judge what is
best for him and his ability to be trained along moral lines. His
conscience then is the product of the impact made upon him by
his society.
Paley draws upon Hume for the reinforcement of his
argument. Hume writes the following:
From instances of popular tumults, seditions,
factions, panics, and of all passions which are
shared with a multitude, we may learn the in¬
fluence of society in exciting and supporting any
emotion; while the most ungovernable disorders
are raised, we find, by that means, from the
slightest and most frivolous occasions. He
must be more or less than man who kindles
not in the common blaze. What wonder, then,
that moral sentiments are found of such in¬
fluence in life, though springing from princi¬
ples which may appear, at first sight, some¬
what small and delicate. *
Paley sees the principle of imitation as a vital factor
in the determination of moral conduct. In his discussion of imi¬
tation in children, Paley goes further than either Gay or Tucker,
with whom he was in agreement on the principles of association
*
Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 326.
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mentioned above. He states that "if there be anything in them
(children) which deserves the name of instinct it is their pro¬
pensity to imitation."* Children Imitate nothing more readily
than expressions of affection and aversion, of approbation,
hatred, resentment and the like; and when these passions and
expressions are once connected, which they soon will be by the
same association which unite words with their ideas, the passion
will follow the expression and attach upon the object to which the
child has been accustomed to apply the epithet. "In a word,
when almost everything else is learned by imitation, can we
wonder to find the same cause concerned in the generation of
2
our moral sentiments ? "
Paley anticipated Mills' conclusion that the morality
of action is perceived by the same senses by which other qualities
3
of action are perceived; however, it appears that the fallacy in
his argument is that he failed to distinguish between the idea of
conscience, which defines it as the ability to draw a distinction
between right and wrong, and the idea, which says that conscience
*
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,




Mill, J. S. Dissertations and Discussions Political,
Philosophical and Historical, Second Edition, Vol. I, p. 139.
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is the totality of our moral ideas. Professor Adam Sedgwick
wrote, "No one now speaks of an innate knowledge of morality,
an innate moral sense or faculty, defining and determining the
quality of all our moral judgments is all for which we contend."*
If man does not possess as a part of his native equipment the
ability to make a distinction between right and wrong, it is dif¬
ficult to see how he could ever be adequately trained into a moral
being no matter how wide and varied his experiences. On the
other hand, it is very apparent that what a man calls right and
what he calls wrong is the result of his training. Perhaps Paley
would agree that man has by nature the ability to distinguish be¬
tween right and wrong, but this ability he would not call the moral
sense. He would surely understand that without this ability man
could not be morally responsible.
Paley apparently considers it the same thing to disprove
the existence of moral maxims and to disprove an innate moral
faculty, but one would not say that because a man is not born with
certain innate tunes that he has no ear for music. Paley might as
1
Sedgwick, Adam. A Discourse on the Studies of the
University of Cambridge, p. 57.
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well have used his story of the wild boy to disprove the exis¬
tence of human reason on the grounds that the unprejudiced
savage could not have been made to understand immediately
that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are demon¬
strably equal to each other.
In discussing what he considers to be the pernicious
tendencies which he sees in the doctrine of the moral sense,
Paley contends that moral judgments based on innate maxims
are always arbitrary, for there are no maxims that are abso¬
lutely and universally true. Even veracity, which would appear
above all others to be a natural duty, must bend to circumstances,
for it is often justifiably violated in cases in which an enemy, a
thief, or a madman is involved.*
The further objection to the moral instinct is raised by
Paley on the ground that in order to make the instinct intelligible
there must have been implanted together with the instinct a clear
and precise idea of the object upon which it was to attach. The
instinct and the idea of the object are inseparable even in the
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,
Ch. V, p. 11.
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imagination, and, as is true of all correlative ideas, mast
necessarily accompany each other. * In other words, if we be
prompted by nature to the approbation of particular actions, we
must have received also from nature a distinct conception of the
action we are thus prompted to approve. This, Paley contends,
2
we certainly have not received. From this he concludes that
either no such instincts as compose what is commonly called the
moral sense exist, or that they are not different from prejudices
and habits and are, therefore, untrustworthy in moral reasoning.
Says he:
I mean that it is not a safe way of arguing, to
assume certain principles as so many dictates,
impulses, and instincts of nature, and then to
draw conclusions from these principles, as to
the rectitude or wrongness of actions, independ¬
ent of the tendency of such actions, or of any
other consideration whatever."'
In reply to Paley's insistence that ideas and instincts must be
conjoined it might be suggested that the existence of an instinct
does not presuppose in the animal notions of those objects on
which the instinct is to be exerted. For example, a duck in his
1





shell has no notion of water. But perhaps this analogy would not
apply in the realm of rational beings. Furthermore, to Paley's
objection based on the lack of uniformity in the notions of good
and evil, it might be said that the perversion of the moral sense
does not argue against its reality. Moreover, it is not the pre¬
sence of correct moral judgments but rather the presence of any
kind of moral judgment that argues in favor of the moral sense.
The power of discerning the presence of a moral quality in action
is evidence that man is a moral being. Paley's argument would,
therefore, prove the existence in many areas of a defective moral
sense but not the non-existence of a moral sense. Even wrong
actions may be justified on the basis of a good intention. One,for
example, who has been trained to believe that the world is a place
of misery and that the infant is better off not to encounter its trou¬
bles, might be said to have a good motive even in practicing infanti¬
cide. To find such practice would thus not prove that there are in
certain areas parents who do not love their children. Rousseau
argues for the universality of good intentions in the following pas¬
sage:
Cast your eyes over all the nations of the world
and all the histories of nations amid so many
inhuman and absurd superstitions, amid that
prodigious diversity of manners and characters.
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you will find everywhere the same principles
and distinctives of moral good and evil. The
paganism of the ancient world produced indeed,
abominable gods, who, on earth, would have
been shunned or punished as monsters^ and who
offered, as a picture of supreme happiness, only
crimes to commit, or passions to satiate. But
vice, armed with this sacred authority, de¬
scended in vain from the eternal abode. She
found in foe heart of man, a moral instinct to
repel her. The continence of Zenocrates was
admired by those who celebrated the debauch¬
eries of Jupiter. The chaste Lucretia adored
the unchaste Venus. The most intrepid Roman
sacrificed to fear. He invoked the god who de¬
throned his father and died without a murmur by
the hand of his own. The most contemptible di¬
vinities were served by the greatest men. The
holy voice of nature, stronger than that of the
gods, made itself heard, and respected, and
obeyed on earth, and seemed to banish^io the
confines of heaven guilt and the guilty.
The pernicious tendency residing in conduct based on
self-evident maxims Paley illustrates by suggesting that Aristotle,
who believed in an innate moral sense, contended that it was a funda¬
mental and self-evident maxim that nature intended barbarians to be
2
slaves. This view Paley felt would militate against moral progress,
^ Quoted by Francis Wayland, The Elements of Moral
Science (1847), p. 52.
2
Paley was mistaken Aristotle at this point. What Aristotle
actually sa^s in the Politics is that the only person who can be regarded
as ( 6 o o A o S ~~ <f> J <T & i ) a 'slave by nature', is one who though
capable of acting under another's direction is incapable of acting ration¬
ally by himself, and that he has a natural right to freedom as soon as he
becomes capable of being his own master. He may, however, be re¬
tained by force in a state of slavery.
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for such philosophy merely attempts to discover reasons and
excuses for opinions and practices that are already in vogue.
Paley was revolting against the divinizing of the status-quo by
men like Burke and Hume, for he felt that such a movement con¬
tains no dynamic for the eradication of existing evils.
Paley concludes his argument against the moral instincts
by contending that a moral philosophy built upon such instincts would
be inadequate to move a man toward moral behavior. Even if moral
instincts do exist, if a man has only to reckon with the pangs of his
own conscience over the violation of such instincts, then he would
often be found willing to endure the pangs of conscience for what he
considered the greater pleasure of sin. Paley thus recognized that
the moral sense philosophers were asking for a kind of reverence
toward that which is within man which man will hardly grant toward
anything save that which is outside and above himself, namely, God.
It should be remembered that Paley did not consider the
conscience of less importance because it had been acquired. He
did not make the mistake of some moralists who felt that to explain
the origin of the conscience was at the same time to explain it away.
Having thus discussed the inadequacy of the law of honor, the law of
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the land, the Scriptures and the moral sense in the formulation of
moral philosophy, Paley affirms his belief in the necessity of a
more adequate objective standard in ethics by which actions may
be judged. He then proceeds to lay the foundation upon which such
an objective standard may be built.
Paley's more remote heritage in Richard Cumberland
1 2
and his more immediate heritage in John Gay , Abraham Tucker
3
and John Locke are revealed in his definition of virtue which for
him was "the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God
4
and for the sake of everlasting happiness." This definition, which
makes the "good of mankind" the subject, the "will of God"; the rule
and "everlasting happiness" the motive of human virtue, contains all
the essential principles of Paley's system of ethics.
In the school of theological utilitarianism three names
are prominent, Gay, Tucker and Paley. The distinguishing feature
in Paley's definition, which sets it apart from that of John Gay and
King, William. An Essay on the Origin of Evil, Preli¬
minary Essay by John Gay, p. XXXVI.
2
The Light of Nature Pursued, Pt. I, Ch. XXII, Sect. 2
3
Essay on Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. XXI, p. 370.
4
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I.
Ch. VII, p. 27.
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Abraham Tucker, is his emphasis on eschatology. For him as for
Butler life on this earth is a probation. Paley carried the re¬
sults of human conduct into eternity and thus provided for his system
a stronger theological sanction than appears in either of his predeces¬
sors. Tucker used the theological sanction very sparingly and avoided
it altogether except where his system logically demanded it. On the
other hand, Paley's system is permeated with theological references.
He leans heavily upon the doctrines of rewards and punishments in
eternity, while John Gay, whom we have observed to be the father
of theological utilitarianism, makes no use of this idea at all. In
saying this, the writer is not unmindful of the claim that all of the
essential features of Paley's ethics were contained in Gay's Disser¬
tation. * A careful examination of this Dissertation, however, has
not revealed a single reference to rewards and punishments after
death. On the other hand, there is scarcely one of Paley's ser¬
mons that does not mention it. Passages like the following occur
very frequently.
The things of this world are diminished to
nothing, when we place them by the side of
that great event (eternal judgment) which
will arrive to all of us.2
''Hastings, James. Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge,
"Article on Utilitarianism." Vol. XII, p. 560.
2Paley's Sermons, Vol. V, Sermon XXXIV, p. 313.
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All the struggles, all the self-denial, ail
the pains we go through to preserve our
virtue, will meet with a proportionable
reward, a far more exceeding weight of
glory.1
The modern mind is prone to rebel at so bald a statement of re¬
wards and punishments after death. For most writers of the eight¬
eenth century, however, it was not apparent how the moral order
could hold together without this, and for Paley it was not apparent
why happiness in Heaven should be any more disreputable as a
human goal than happiness on earth. Tucker had a more ingen¬
ious eschatology than did Paley. He turns his eschatology into a
form of Universalism which Paley never embraced. Furthermore,
Tucker embraced Cumberland's belief that eternal happiness and per¬
fection are vitally related so that they form an additional incitement to
the individual agent to seize every little opportunity of contributing to¬
wards an advancement of the life of the entire race of humanity.
Tucker also sees with Locke that punishment cannot be absolutely
endless, for this would violate the principle of equity by keeping the
balance perpetually on one side. He reasons that since wickedness is
permitted by Heaven, it must be for some purpose and that God
*
Ibid., Sermon VI, p. 46.
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could not be good if he did not purpose that the wicked in suffer¬
ing for their sins should have some benefit from their sufferings.
In other words, suffering must be remedial. Paley was far too
orthodox to allow his speculations to go so far. According to
Mill, Paley does hold that our place hereafter will be determined
by our degree of moral perfection, but this is not to be construed
to mean that we shall be judged by the balance of our good and evil
deeds, which depend upon opportunity and temptation. Rather shall
We be judged by the intensity and continuity of our will to do good.
That is to say, we shall be judged not by our deeds but by our dis-
2
positions. He steadfastly believed that every step of advance in
the direction of moral perfection will be something gained towards
everlasting welfare. Paley is very close to the emphasis of St.
Paul who made his appeal for sustained Christian service on the
basis of the doctrine of resurrection. Following the discussion of
the resurrection of the dead, St. Paul writes: "Therefore, my be¬
loved brethren, be steadfast, immovable, always abounding in the
work of the Lord, knowing that in the Lord your labor is not in vain."
Light of Nature Pursued, Vol. II, p. 670.
2
Mill, J. S. Dissertations and Discussions, Political




Shaftesbury's argument against basing ethics on rewards
and punishments had been rather strongly felt until even the more
optimistic types of theism were omitting this from their system
in Paley's day and replacing it with an appeal for virtue for virtue's
sake. Shaftesbury was insisting that to be honest without thought of
heaven or hell is precisely the mark of a disinterested lover of vir¬
tue, and at the same time, Holbach was calling the doctrine of the
future life "that mirage which blinds men to the real and remediable
evils of the present life."* Believing that self-interest was the rul¬
ing principle in human nature, Paley was faced with the task of show¬
ing that it was to the agent's Interest to be moral. No argument could
prove this would always be true without the supernatural sanction of
morality. Hence, Paley believed that theological utilitarianism
which held out rewards and punishments after death was the only
natural position for a Christian to embrace.
Furthermore, Paiey believed that utilitarian theories had
often suffered from a practical deficiency, for the motives they had
offered to induce the individual to sacrifice his own pleasure to the
happiness of society had not been sufficient. Paley's belief in a
Systeme De La Nature*
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Righteous Judge of the world who would mete out rewards and
punishments in eternity thus had its advantages over theories
which could only appeal to decidedly uncertain human sanctions.
After arriving at a sanction for his ethic, Paley under¬
takes an analysis of the virtues. In this he neither follows the
primitive Christian pattern nor the medieval attempt to harmon¬
ize the Christian with the Greek ethical traditions. The Greek
moral teaching has Plato as its originator and named four cardinal
virtues~wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. The New
Testament tradition recognized three cardinal graces—faith,
hope and charity. The scholastics worked out an ethical pattern
by combining the four Platonic virtues with the Pauline three and
thus arrived at the seven cardinal Virtues which they set in con¬
trast with the seven deadly Sins. They called the first four the
'natural virtues' and the remaining three the 'supernatural virtues.'
Professor John Baillie calls attention to the fact that:
Such a solution appears as mechanical, and
as lacking in true historical understanding,
as the corresponding distinction between
natural and revealed theology. The Platonic
and Pauline lists are, fundamehtally, not com¬
plementary but rival statements, each claiming
to cover in itself the whole necessary ground;
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so that instead o£ attempting to accept them
both as they stand, we must either work them
into one another or else choose between them. *
A glaring weakness in Paley's system is that, while
standing in the Christian tradition, he utterly overlooks the Paul¬
ine virtues and gives attention first of all to those he received
from Plato and then makes a list of his own, very few of which
are distinctly Christian. The four cardinal virtues which Paley
names are: prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice. Beyond
these cardinal virtues Paley further divides all virtues into three
kinds of duties: first, duties towards God, as piety, reverence,
resignation and gratitude; secondly, duties toward other men, or
relative duties; as justice, charity, fidelity and loyalty; and thirdly,
duties toward ourselves; as chastity, sobriety, temperance, pre-
2
servation of life and care of health.
The motive behind all moral conduct for Paley is human
happiness. He does not, however, confine this to the happiness of
the individual agent, for it is "the tendency of the action to promote
3
or diminish the general happiness," which makes it right or wrong.
*
Our Knowledge of God, p. 128.
2
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 28.
^
• Bk. I, Ch. vii, p. 28.
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He thus unduly simplifies the motive of action making pleasure
the end of action rather than the by-product of the achievement
of another end. Paley does not recognize the fundamental para¬
dox in hedonism that the impulse towards pleasure, if too domi¬
nant will defeat its own aim. He overlooks the fact which Butler
pointed out, that many kinds of pleasure would not exist were it
not preceded by desires for other objects. For example, the ob¬
ject of hunger is the eating of food, not the pleasure of eating it. *
' I { . V ■
Even when the emphasis is placed not on individual but general
happiness, still there remains the fact, as Hutcheson pointed
out, that unless the desire for happiness is preceded by the de¬
sire for the welfare of others, no happiness could result there¬
from. "Pleasure ensues upon the satisfaction of certain wants
and the wants must be prior to the satisfaction." Paley does
not discuss whether it is total or average happiness that is to be
sought nor does he tell us how far we are to consider the interests
of posterity when they seem to be in conflict with those of the pre¬
sent generation.
*
Butler, Joseph. Fifteen Sermons and A Dissertation
on the Nature of Virtue. Sermon I, pp. 36, 37.
2
Mackenzie, J. S. A Manual of Ethics, p. 72.
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Paley's definition of happiness on first sight appears
to be purely quantitative. He writes: "In strictness, any condition
may be denominated happy, in which the amount or aggregate of
pleasure exceeds that of pain, and the degree of happiness depends
upon the quantity of this excess."* Happiness in this passage ap¬
pears to be closely identified with pleasure and in the absolute
sense is defined simply as "the greatest quantity of it (pleasure)
2
ordinarily attainable in human life." Sharing the aversion to
metaphysics common in his day, Paley in no wise attempts to dif¬
ferentiate between the rational and the physical pleasures, for to
him pleasures differ in nothing but in continuance and intensity.
This apparent denial of qualitative distinctions between different
classes of pleasures and pains sounds commonplace enough now,
for it is generally agreed that it is the only consistent view for
hedonism; however, while other English writers like John Gay had
held views from which this position was deduced, Abraham Tucker
was the first to state it, and it would seem that Paley is following
*
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,




Ibid. , p. 15.
4
The Light of Nature Pursued, Ch. XVI, Sect. 1.
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him at this point. Professor Whewell called this opinion brutish
since it recognizes no difference between the pleasures of man
and those of the lowest animals.
Furthermore, it would appear that Paley naively be¬
lieved that the computation of pleasure can be accurately made
simply by observing the apparent cheerfulness, tranquillity and
contentment of men of different tastee, tempers, stations and
pursuits as if to say that the incalculable complexity of the human
soul can be explored by observing a man's outward appearances.
This reasoning is not unlike that of the student whose shoddy reli¬
giosity allowed him to contend that he could tell whether or not a
man possessed the Holy Spirit by the way he smiled.
A more thorough reading of Paley, however, will show
that his definition of pleasure includes a qualitative emphasis and
that Professor Whewell's accusation that he lumped all pleasures
together is somewhat harsh. On the contrary, he expressly denies
that all pleasure is productive of happiness. For him, happiness
consists neither in pleasures of the senses, be they the animal
gratification of the appetite for food or the more refined pleasures
of music, nor in exemption from pain, nor in human greatness, for
the pleasures of sense are fading. The exemption from physical
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pain does not free us from depression of spirits, and the pleasures
of ambition are never fully satisfied. The only pleasures which
are productive of happiness, Paley maintained, are those which
possess the quality of endurance.* That which sets man's plea¬
sure apart from the animals' is the fact that he hae the ability to
know beforehand those pleasures that endure. Hence, at this
point, Paley was very close to Aristotle for whom pleasure was
the satisfaction of the human being as a whole.
Instead of embracing the naive position with which he
has been associated, Paley, in reality contends that since the
capacity and constitution of men are so diverse, it is impossible
to propose a plan of happiness which will succeed for all. He
reasons that we can only hope with our limited means to ascer¬
tain those conditions of life in which men in general find cheerful¬
ness and contentment and although the apparent happiness of man¬
kind is not always a true measure of their real happiness, Paley
2
contends that it remains the best measure that we have.
*
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,
Ch. vi, p. 20.
2
Ibid. , Bk. I, Ch. vi, p. 21.
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Having settled on this hedonistic principle, Paley
reasons that happiness consists in four things. First, it con¬
sists in the exercise of the social affections. * Those persons,
who are surrounded by many objects of affection and endearment
such as wife, children, kindred and friends, usually possess good
spirits. The peevishness of monks and those who live a monastic
life is attributed to the absence of those social affections. In this
corporate social life described above there are opportunities for
acts of bounty and beneficence which are productive of pleasure.
Again, it is observable that "the exercise of our facul¬
ties either of body or mind in the pursuit of some engaging end,"^
is another main source of human happiness. The plentitude of
present gratifications is not adequate to make the possessor happy
unless he have something to look forward to in reserve. This in¬
tolerable vacuity of mind accounts for "the dejection and ennui of
almost all who are either born to so much that they want nothing
more, or who have used up their satisfactions too soon, and drained
1
Ibid-
2 Ibid. , p. 22.
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the sources of them."*
The hope which is most important for our happiness is
not that of idle repining but rather that which is most productive of
engagement and activity. Herein, according to Paley, lies the value
of a belief in a future state:
A man who is in earnest in his endeavors after
the happiness of a future state, has in this respect
an advantage over all the world; for he has con¬
stantly before his eyes an object of supreme im¬
portance, productive of perpetual engagement and
activity, and of which the pursuit (which can be
said of no pursuit besides) lasts him to his life's
end. Yet even he must have many ends, besides
the far end; but then they will conduct to that, be
subordinate, and in some way or other capable of
being referred to that and derive their satisfaction,
or an addition of happiness from that.^
Significant engagement in projects such as public works,
charities, etc. , is a bulwark against the inroads of peevishness
and irascibility, for Paley saw that when business engages the
mind, man is usually happy, and that it is the intolerable idleness
of mind that makes him so often miserable.
In the third place, Paley observes that happiness is de¬




the secret of human happiness in a great measure consists is,
to set the habits in such a manner, that every change may be a
«
change for the better."* He is not as rigid in his doctrine as was
Aristotle who made the main issue in the moral life the establish¬
ment of good habits and then attributed to them such control over
human conduct that moral freedom was virtually destroyed. On
the contrary, Paley contended that the habits that are most advan¬
tageous are those which allow a deviation from them, for, said he,
rigidity, or conformity often produces boredom and thus defeats
man's true end which is happiness. For example, the socialite
who habitually resorts in crowds receives no exhilaration from
them as does the man who has learned to live alone and only occa¬
sionally enters the crowd. Solitude comes to the one clothed with
melancholy; to the other, it brings liberty and quiet. On the same
principle, Paley reasons that in circumstances of fortune it is not
the income which a man possesses but the increase of income that
2
affords the pleasure.
Although Paley argues in favor of keeping one's habits
flexible, he, nevertheless, places great emphasis on the value of
*
Ibid. , p. 24.
^
Ibid. , p. 26, Bk. I, Ch. vi.
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habits in the regulation of human conduct. Contrary to the opinion
of many of his critics, Paley had not insisted upon the adequacy of
the hedonistic calculus for determining the course of conduct. * In
fact, neither Paley nor his predecessor, Tucker, taught that we
are to determine the morality of a particular action by computing
its probable effects in the individual case. On the contrary, among
the utilitarians it was Tucker who first anticipated the criticism
which was to be so often brought against Paley by his critics.^ Be¬
cause Tucker and Paley recognized man's inability to compute ade¬
quately the consequences of his conduct they both insisted that we
must act on general principles of expediency, not merely because
we are intellectually finite beings, but because we are largely crea¬
tures of habit. The utilitarian theme was later brought into disrepute
by the emphasis of Bentham who seemed to hold that we must com¬
pute our individual acts by this utilitarian principle instead of acting
by general "rules" of utility.
Although not an hedonist himself, Hutcheson has assumed
without question the possibility of computing with sufficient exactness
1
Ibid• » P* 29.
2
Zlif Light of Nature Pursued, Ch. XXII, SS. 11, 12.
3
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legis -
lation, pp. Iff.
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the effects of different kinds of actions, as regards their tendency
for the general happiness, or unhappiness and of thus determining
their 'objective' goodness or badness. As a matter of fact, only
Hartley and Berkeley had even recognized a difficulty involved in
the hedonistic calculus until Tucker did his work. Moreover, their
suggestion of the difficulty was very general.
Tucker's blazing honesty caused him not only to recog¬
nize the difficulty involved in his theory but even to give it an over¬
emphasis. The following passage is a case in point:
Our tastes, varying as much as our faces, make
us very bad judges of one another's enjoyments. . .
Nor do we judge much better of our own pleasure,
for want of being well aware of their aptness to
cloy upon repetition, and to change their relish
perpetually according to our disposition of mind
or body, or the circumstances we happen to stand
in: neither can we trust even experience itself in
this case for because a thing has pleased us once,
we cannot always be sure it will do so again...
But if we make mistakes in estimating pleasures
singly, we commit more in computing the value
of a series of them taken collectively. .. .There¬
fore, we are forced to take our pleasures in the
lump, and estimate them upon view; as a man
who guesses at a flock of sheep by the grannd
they cover, without being able to count them,
and who will do it very imperfectly, until he has
gotten an expertness by long and careful practice.
For absent enjoyments, whether past or future,
being not actually existent, we cannot hold them
as it were in our hand to weigh them, but must
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judge by the representative idea we have of
them in our imagination; and we ordinarily
determine their value by the degrejS of desire
we feel in ourselves toward them.
The value of the above passage is that it shows that
while Tucker was a thoroughgoing hedonist, he anticipated nearly
all of the objections that were later to be raised by the anti■"hedonists
except the very important one which Spencer used in his early criti¬
cism of the Expediency Philosophy in Social Statistics, namely, that
hedonistic values vary with the development of moral character.
The objections to Paley1 s principle of measuring conduct
by its tendency to promote or diminish the general happiness may
be summed up in three major points, namely, the inability of man
to calculate accurately the consequences of his actions, the conten¬
tion that happiness is not the sole determinant of man's action, and
the fact that there is nothing distinctly Christian about this principle.
It might be added that these were the criticisms levelled against
Paley in his own day. Kant's most devastating contention that such
a principle deals only with questions of prudence and does not pene¬
trate the field of morals at all came later and will be considered ki
the final chapter of this thesis.
The Light of Nature Pursued, Ch. XXII, SS 11, 12.
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Let us now examine the first objection to Paley's
principle, namely, that man is unable to calculate accurately
the consequences of his conduct. It is said that the endless chain
of causes and effects may be known only to omniscience and not by
the limited faculties of man. * In answer to this, it should be re¬
membered that Paley, along with the other early Utilitarians did
not make of their system a mere calculating theory in this ob¬
viously impracticable sense. Furthermore, while Paley did not
believe that man had the ability to calculate the infinite consequences
of his actions, he recognized at the same time that the very possi¬
bility of free moral actions is based upon our ability to foresee their
consequences in a general way.^
However imperfect our foresight may be, it remains a
strong determinant of our conduct. It is not perfect, but neither is
anything else in our constitution. Again, it should be remembered
that the individual agent does not stand alone to predict the conse¬
quences of his actions, for he has not only his past experience to
guide him but the accumulated wisdom of the ages. Hence, the un¬
certainty of the consequences of his actions is not as great as it
*
Gisborne, Thomas. The Principles ofMoral Philosophy
Investigated and Applied to the Constitution of Civil Society, p. 53.
2
Mill, J. S. Dissertations and Discussions, Political,
Philosophical, and Historical, Second Edition, Vol. I, p. 141.
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might appear at first thought.
The second objection to Palcy's principle, namely, that
happiness should not be the sole pre-determinant of man's conduct,
is the most damaging of ail. No one denieE that happiness is desir¬
able and to be sought. Nor can we deny that in a moral universe in
some very real sense goodness and happiness are correlatives, as
the seed and the fruit, but what we are not prepared to accept is
that happiness is the sole pre-determinant of action. Life is far
too complex for its springs of action to be thus simplified. Nor is
it true that any one principle has yet been found that of itself offers
to man an adequate guide. From a rational standpoint Paley's argu¬
ment moves in a circle. He reasons from the goodness of God that
He must desire every man's happiness, and when he is asked why
we are to seek happiness, he answers because it is the will of God.
The strong point in such argument is that it starts with an absolute
and as Karl Barth is telling us today, man cannot live without an
absolute. This is not to say that Barth would agree with Paley.
His criticism of Paley would be the same that he brings against
all natural theology, namely, that it fails to preserve the gulf be¬
tween God and man, and when man arrives at a principle by which
he may determine the will of God, he simply indicates that he has
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taken God into his possession. This, for Barth, destroys the
true meaning of revelation and robs God of his majesty. We
shall discuss this further in the final chapter of this thesis.
The final objection to Paley's principle revolves
around the fact that it is not distinctly Christian. It is seen
that while Paley identifies rules of expediency with the will of
God, he at the same time concludes that no such rules are ab¬
solutely binding. He contends that:
Moral philosophy cannot pronounce that any
rule of morality is so rigid as to bend to no
exceptions; nor on the other hand, can she
comprise these exceptions within any previous
description. She confesses that the obligation
of every law depends upon its ultimate utility;
that this utility having a finite and determinate
value, situations may be feined, and conse¬
quently may possibly arise, in which the gene¬
ral tendency is outweighed by the enormity of
the particular mischief; and of course, when
ultimate utility, and consequently the will of
God, render it as much an act of duty to break
the rule as it is on other occasions to observe
it.1
But perhaps Paley is concerned here only to say that what appeared
at one time to be the will of God for a man and on this authority was
formulated as a rule of conduct may be altered under different cir¬
cumstances.
*
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. VI,
Ch. xii, p. 498.
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It is further argued that the Deists, who did not believe
in a special revelation, might be guided by Paley's principle as
well as the orthodox Christian. Warburton affirms that Boyle,
Collins, Tindal, Bolingbroke, and all the other writers against
Revelation, except Hobbes, labored to show the Gospel system
to be in the highest degree unreasonable. * A reference to Leland's
account of deistical writers will show that by the term, "unreason¬
able", Warburton probably meant inexpedient. If, then, expediency
is to be the supreme guide of Christian and non-Christian alike,
what part is Christianity to play in determining man's moral con¬
duct? Paley would answer by saying that Christianity affords the
necessary sanction by offering rewards and punishments in eternity.
We must bear in mind that Paley was not so much concerned with
the discovery of ethical knowledge as he was with the provision of
a strong sanction.
A direct appeal to Scripture has also been made to show
that in no part of the Scripture are we directed to frame our conduct
2
in obedience to the rule of expediency. Gisborne argues that there
are two kinds of rules in the Scripture, absolute and precise rules
* Warburton, William. Alliance Between Church and State.
(ilth edition), p. 78, note.
2
Gisborne, Thomas. The Principles of Moral Philosophy
Investigated and Applied to the Constitution of Civil Society, pp. 50, 51.
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prohibiting idolatry, perjury, etc., and equally obligatory, general
Indeterminate rules, as reverence for parents. In the case of the
first, no latitude is given for the exercise of human discretion while
in the second, we are left to judge of the manner in which they are
to be discharged. Yet there is no intimation in Scripture that ex¬
pediency is to be the basis of our judgment. Moreover, it is con¬
tended that Revelation permits no doctrine that would be subversive
to the spirit and obligation of her precepts. .At the same time it is
said that to allow every man to govern himself by expediency would
take the government out of the hands of God and allow man to decide
when God's laws are to be obeyed. It must be admitted that these
criticisms may be justifiably brought against a thoroughgoing system
of Utilitarianism, However, they manifest a decided misunderstand¬
ing of Paley's system. In the first place, let it be observed again
that Paley is interested in applying the principle of expediency only
where there is no clear word of God in the Scriptures. Not for a
moment would Paley allow a man, as Gisborne contends that he
does, to question the authority of God's written law and thus take to
himself the authority to decide when he would or would not obey God's
law. In the second place, it must readily be admitted that there is
nothing distinctly Christian about Paley's principle of utility. This
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also will be further discussed in the final chapter.
It was precisely because Paley recognized the limita¬
tions of the hedonistic calculus that he makes a strong appeal for
the cultivation of proper habits. He contends that men rarely
pause to deliberate on the moral implications of their conduct. On
the contrary, action i3 determined immediately by an impulse which
is the effect and energy of pre-established habits. In life's rapid
opportunities there is little leisure for reflection. The value of
good habits is seen in the fact that men who have to pause to deli¬
berate when temptation confronts them usually reason themselves
into error by what they consider at the time to be a plausible argu¬
ment.* So strong does Paley believe the influeiice of certain habits
to be that he virtually embraces a form of determinism which would
leave a man so passive that he would not be free to choose his direc¬
tion and would therefore all but be relieved of personal responsibility.
At this point, Paley is close to the thoroughgoing determinism of
Tucker. We might ask if a man's conduct is determined by his
habits, would it not be true that his teachers and his general envir¬
onment rather than himself would be responsible for his conduct?
^
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,
Ch. vii, p. 29.
2
The Bight of Nature Pursued, Ch. V, pt. *.
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Paley would answer that man's responsibility lies "in the form¬
ing and contracting of these habits."* He writes:
There are habits, not only of drinking, swear¬
ing and lying, and of some other things, which
are commonly acknowledged to be habits, and
called so; but of every modification of action,
speech and thought. Man is a bundle of habits.
There are habits of industry, attention, vigi¬
lance, advertency; of a prompt obedience to
the judgement occurring, or of yielding to the
first impulse of passion; of extending our views
to the future, or of resting upon the present, of
apprehending, methodizing, reasoning; of indo¬
lence and dilatoriness; of vanity, self-conceit,
melancholy, partiality; of fretfulness, suspi¬
cion, captiousness, censoriousness; of pride,
ambition, covetousness; of over-reaching;
intriguing, projecting; in a word, there is
not a quality of function, either of body or
mind, which does not feel the influence of
this great law of animated nature.2
From the above consideration, paley deduces a rule of
life which he believes to be of considerable importance, namely,
that many things are to be done and abstained from, solely for the
sake of habit. For Paley the proper course of moral development
is for one to begin by considering the good of mankind as the sub¬
ject, the will of God as the rule, and everlasting happiness as the
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,




motive and end of all virtue. When one becomes conformed to these
principles, he performs many an act of virtue without having either
the good of mankind, the will of God or everlasting happiness in his
thoughts. Paley insists, however, that this can come about only as
the result of having been consciously guided in the past by the desire
to do the will of God, or to attain everlasting happiness or to contri¬
bute to the good of mankind, and that when these motives have soli¬
dified into a pattern of conduct, only then may they be forgotten.
The final factor in the production of happiness in Paley's
system is health, which is simply defined as "freedom from bodily
distempers." And also as "that tranquillity, firmness and alacrity
of mind, which we call good spirit." In this sense, health is of all
things most needful and no price is too great to pay for it. It is an
2
"enjoyment which the Deity has annexed to life."
The next principle with which Paley was concerned was
that of moral obligation. He presented this problem in the form of
a question, namely, why am I obliged to keep my word? He then
3
borrows the traditional answers cited by Gay. His first answer is
*
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Preliminary Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental
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that of the Cambridge Platonist, Richard Cudworth, namely, I
am obliged because it is right; next he cites the Stoic answer,
because it is agreeable to the fitness of things or because it is
conformable to reason and nature; then the answer advanced by
William Wollaston, because it is conformable to truth; the answer
of Richard Cumberland, because it promotes the public good, and
finally, the answer of John Locke, John Gay and Abraham Tucker,
because it is required by the will of God. After citing these an¬
swers, Paley draws two conclusions. The first is that these
answers all ultimately coincide:
The fitness of things, means their fitness to
produce happiness; the nature of things, means
that actual constitution of the world, by which
some things, as such and such actions, for ex¬
ample, produce happiness, and others misery;
reason is the principle by which we discover or
judge of this constitution; truth is this judgment
expressed or drawn out into propositions. So
that it necessarily comes to pass, that what
promotes the public happiness or happiness
upon the whole, is agreeable to the fitness of
things, to nature, to reason and to truth, and
such is the divine character, that what promotes
the general happiness is required by the will of
God, and what has all the above properties,
must needs be right; for right means no more
than conformity to the rule we go by, whatever
that rule be. *
* Tke Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk.II.
Ch. i, pp. 36, 37.
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The above, Paley believes, accounts for the fact that
from whatever different principles moralists may begin their in¬
quiry their conclusions ultimately coincide.
Paley's second conclusion is that not one of the tradi¬
tional answers to the question of obligation is adequate, for upon
receiving those answers to the question, why am I obliged to keep
my word, a second question immediately occurs, namely, "Why
am I obliged to do what is right, to act agreeably to the fitness of
things, to conform to reason, nature, or truth, to promote the pub¬
lic good, or to obey the will of God?"* From this it appears ne¬
cessary to inquire first into the meaning of obligation and then to
cite reasons for such obligation.
Paley gives obligation the following meaning: "A man is
said to be obliged when he is urged by a violent motive resulting
2
from the command of another." Strong emphasis is placed on
the fact that the motive must be violent. For example, if one
who has been my benefactor on a small scale should be a candi¬
date for office and solicit my vote, I may out of a motive of grati¬
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do so. On the other hand, if my father, or master, any great
benefactor or one on whom my fortune depends, solicits my
vote, I would, because of the violent motive, be obliged to
give it to him , and the only reason I need offer for such is that
my father, master, or benefactor obliged me.
The second element thatRaley finds necessary in obli¬
gation is that it must result from the command of another. It
must come from without and from above rather than being self-
imposed. He reasons that if I offer a man a gratuity for the per¬
formance of some service, he could not be said to be obliged to
accept my offer. On the other hand, if such a man be commanded
by a magistrate he is obliged to comply.
"Wherever the motive is violent enough and coupled
with the idea of command, authority, law or the will of the super¬
ior, there, I take it, we always reckon ourselves to be obliged."*
Hence, Paley concludes that we can be obliged by nothing except
that by which we ourselves are to gain or lose something, for
nothing else can constitute a violent motive to us. This is almost
1
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk.
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verbally the position which Butler advanced. Note the following
passage from one of his sermons:
When we sit down in a cool hour we can
neither justify to ourselves this or any other
pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be
for our happiness, or at least not contrary
to it. *
Paley went so far as to aold that we should not be obliged to obey
the laws, or the magistrate, unless rewards or punisnments, plea¬
sure or pain, somehow or other depended upon our obedience.
Neither should we be obliged to do what is right, to practice virtue,
or to obey the commands of God unless we should gain by so doing
or lose by not so doing.
It is very curious indeed that while Paley held that the
individual's happiness must be subordinated to that of the public
in general, his theory of obligation would make it impossible for
him to make a sacrifice of his own happiness. He would agree
with Butler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson that self-renunciation
could never be the result of calm deliberation. Paley would,
therefore, pass under the judgment which Schleiermacher made
on such theory when he wrote that the English school "with all
1
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their talk about virtue are really given up to pleasure."
Paley then answers the question why am I obliged to
keep my word, by saying because I am urged to do so by a violent
motive, namely, "the expectation of being after this life rewarded
if I do, or punished if I do not, resulting from the command of
2
another, namely, of God." Beyond this, Paley sees no further
question that can be asked. He, therefore, concludes that he has
given a final answer to the question of moral obligation with the
result that "private happiness is our motive and the will of God
3
our rule" in all our behavior.
The chief weakness in such a position is that Paley re¬
duces duty to meaning virtually the same thing as prudence. Fur¬
thermore, Paley fails to appreciate the fact that the distinction be¬
tween prudence and duty was recognized even by those who did not
recognize a divine command and who did not believe in a world to
come. For example, Aristotle, who in his Ethics speaks of death
as the "boundary beyond which there is neither good nor evil," and
*
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by Cicero in his De Officiis, who makes a distinction between the
(Honestum) virtuous, and the (Utile) expedient and who derides
the idea of fearing the wrath of Jupiter and gives no evidence
that he believed in a personal existence after death. If, as Paley
believed, the idea of virtue or duty is deducible only from. the
thought of rewards and punishments in the world to come, it is
very strange indeed that we find these ideas in systems of ethics
that made little or no use of this doctrine.
Paley expressly states that "he who would establish a
system of morality independent of a future state, must look out
for a different idea of moral obligation."* This position, however,
is highly inconsistent with his account of how the idea of duty comes
into being. That is to say, if the idea of duty is deducible only from
the belief in a future state of rewards and punishments, then where
such doctrine is not embraced it would be impossible for the idea of
duty to come into being. Furthermore, where there is no idea of
duty, there could be no moral obligation. By denying the doctrine
of an innate moral sense and making the idea of duty dependent upon




who is ignorant of such future state from responsibility for his con¬
duct, for as St. Paul wrote, "where there is no knowledge there is
no transgression."* Neither could Paley say "Where there is no
2
law every man is a law unto himself."
Moreover, Paley's statement, that the difference between
an act of prudence and an act of duty is that, in the one case, we
consider what we shall gain in this life, and in the other what we
shall lose in the next life, is like saying that sin does not lead to
suffering because it is sin, but it is sin because it leads to suffer¬
ing. At this point, Whately properly observes that this distinction
between prudence and duty is no distinction at all, for whatever is
done wholly and solely from motives of personal expediency, from
calculations of individual loss or gain is always accounted a matter
3
of prudence and not a virtue. This asks only what are the acts by
which I will profit most? We need, however, in the face of such
criticism again to remember that Paley was more interested in
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in giving a principle by which moral acts could be defined, for it
was the breakdown of strong and virile religion which he saw as
the cause of the moral delinquency of his day.
Paley's theory of rewards and punishments is the only
consistent answer that may be given if one is to shew that the in¬
dividual rather than society is to profit by his virtue. For those
embracing the eschatological sanction in ethics there remains only
one question, namely, "What actions will be rewarded, and what
will be punished?" Paley's answer is, those actions which are in
harmony with the will of God will be rewarded and those out of
harnr.ony with the will of God will be punished.
The question then arises, how are we to ascertain the
will of God? In his answer, Paley might be called a rational re¬
volutionist. This is seen in the two methods which Paley proposes
for ascertaining the will of God. The first is by the declarations of
Scripture. The second is from the light of nature, or what we can
learn of God's design from his works. * Paley believed with Locke
that the works of nature everywhere sufficiently evidence a Deity
^
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and that "a rational creature who will but seriously reflect on
them cannot miss the discovery of a Deity. Paley affirms his
belief in the complementary nature of natural and revealed reli¬
gion. Both branches of religion, he contends, have the same ob¬
ject, namely, the discovery of the will of God, and are divinely
ordained for that purpose.
Paley undertakes to answer Hume's complaint against
2
the scheme of uniting ethics with Christian theology by observ¬
ing that Hume's own treatise, which is manifestly devoid of theolo¬
gical references, provides no adequate motives to withhold men
from the gratification of lust, revenge and avarice, or to prevent
these passions from arising.
For Paley, wherever the Scripture speaks specifically
about a moral problem?, no further inquiry needs to be made.
However, he does not believe the Scriptures to be a mechanical
book of rules; therefore, our knowledge of the will of God will
come most often from the light of nature. Following Gay and
Tucker he reasons that God, who is absolutely good, must will
*
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the happiness of his creatures. Therefore, those actions which
promote happiness must be agreeable to him. Thus Paley arrives
at the fundamental principle of his entire system and to support
such principle he offers the following conclusions concerning the
Divine benevolence; when God created human beings one of three
things might have constituted his intention, either he desired
their happiness or he desired their misery or he was indifferent
and unconcerned about both. The fact that he did not desire the
misery of the race is demonstrated by the presence in the human
constitution of senses which bring us more delight than pain. If
God were some demoniacal power who desired the misery of his
creation, "He, for example, might have made everything we tasted
bitter, everything we saw loathsome, everything we touched a sting,
every smell a stench, and every sound a discord."* If, on the other
hand, God were not concerned about either our happiness or our
misery, we must attribute to a very fortunate accident the fact
that our senses have the capacity to receive pleasure and that so
many external objects are capable of exciting it. Inasmuch as it is
inconceivable that such should be the product of an accident, Paley
*
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concludes that we are left with the remaining proposition, namely,
that God, when He created the race, desired its happiness and made
provisions for it.
This is the cosmological argument which was a part of
the common stock of eighteenth century moralists and upon which
1
Paley leaned so heavily in his theological writings. He believed
that the predominant tendency of the design was accurate proof of
the disposition of the designer and found that all things with which
he was acquainted were beneficial in design.
Paley finds the benevolence of the Deity more manifestly
demonstrated in the pleasures of very young children than in any¬
thing else, for while the pleasures of adulthood may be considered
in a sense as the product of their own development and education,
the overwhelming joys of childhood may not be so construed. See¬
ing the hand of God in the joys of childhood, Paiey again concludes
that God must desire and ordain the happiness of his creatures.
Having established this conclusion, Paiey proceeds to the rule built
upon it, namely, "that the method of coming at the will of God con-
^
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cerning any action, by the light of nature is to inquire into the
tendency of that action, to promote or diminish the general happi-
1
ness."
Paley concludes that since actions are to be estimated
by their tendency to promote or diminish happiness, it follows
that "whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral
2
rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it." Actions in the
abstract are to be denominated right or wrong according to their
tendency, and the agent is virtuous or vicious, according to his
design. For example, in answering the question, whether it be
right or wrong to minister to the needs of a common beggar, it
would first be necessary to ascertain whether such would tend to
promote public advantage or inconvenience. In answering the
question, whether a man who ministers to beggars is to be ad¬
judged virtuous, we must first inquire into his design. If his
liberality arose from charity, he would be esteemed a virtuous
man, if it arose from ostentation, he would not be worthy of such
* The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk.
Ch. V, p. 46.
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esteem. From such reasoning we may conclude that Paley went
deeper into the springs of moral conduct than would the thorough¬
going utilitarian and that much of the criticism directed against
the selfishness involved in this theory was unjust.
It is also apparent that Paley was more aware of the
complexity of moral conduct that some of his critics have be¬
lieved, for he undertakes to break down this complexity by divid¬
ing the consequences of conduct into two categories, namely, the
particular and general. He held that in estimating the consequences
of a certain action it is never sufficient to observe merely the parti¬
cular consequences. For on this procedure it would not be difficult
to reason that the possessor of a great estate, who employs his power
and influence for the oppression of all about him and whose estate
would devolve by his death to a successor of opposite character,
might be justifiably murdered. It is very apparent that such a crime
would be useful in this particular case, however, there is a general
consequence involved, which is far more relevant, namely, the vio¬
lation of the necessary general rule, that no man should be put to
death for his crimes, except by public authority. Paley writes:
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The particular bad consequence of
an action, is the mischief which
that single action directly and im¬
mediately occasions. The general
bad consequence is, the violation
of some necessary or useful gene¬
ral rule.*
Such an act as the one described above could
not, in the final sense, be said to be useful, for the
general consequence of it is evil. Paley further pro¬
vides for man's inability to predict the consequences of
his actions by binding him to the observance of general
rules. He contends that because the general effects of
actions are far more consequential than particular effects,
man is, therefore, under heavier obligation to obey the
general rules of society. This is seen in the following:
General rules are necessary in
every moral government; and by
moral government I mean any dis¬
pensation whose object is to in¬
fluence the conduct of reasonable
creatures.
* Ibid. , p. 47.
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For if, of two actions, perfectly similar,
one be punished and the other be rewarded
or forgiven, which is the consequence of
rejecting general rules, the subjects of
such a dispensation would no longer know,
either what to expect or how to act. Re¬
wards and punishments would cease to be
such—would become accidents. Like the
stroke of a thunderbolt, or the discovery of
a mine, like a blank or a benefit ticket in a
lottery, they would occasion pain or plea¬
sure when they happened; but following in
no known order, from any particular
course of action, they could have no pre¬
vious influence or effect upon conduct. *
The very idea of rewards and punishments which con¬
stitutes the sanction of Paley's Ethics, he believes to be insepa¬
rably related to the existence of general rules so that the same
reasons that prompt us to believe in the doctrine of future re¬
wards and punishments at the hand of God would prompt us to be¬
lieve that the distribution of such rewards and punishments must
be made according to general rules.
For Paley the general consequence of an action may be
determined by asking, what would be the consequence if the same
sort of action were generally permitted? Paley's appreciation of
the organic unity of society is seen in his contention that the
Ch. vii, p. 49.
*
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measure of a man's guilt must always be in proportion to the
whole mischief that would result if every man should act accord¬
ingly:
Whatever is expedient is right. But then it
must be expedient upon the whole, at the long
run, in all its effects collateral and remote as
well as in those which are immediate and direct;
as it is obvious, that, in computing consequences,
it makes no difference in what way, or at what
distance they ensue. *
Paley undertakes to impress his argument upon his
readers by a series of analogies. He reasons that the particular
consequence of counterfeiting a guinea would be tne loss of a
guinea to the person who receives it: the general consequences
(by which he means the consequence that would follow if the prac¬
tice were generally permitted) would be the abolishment of the use
of money. Again the particular consequence of breaking into an
unoccupied house would be the loss of a pair of silver candlesticks:
the general consequence would be that nobody could leave his house
unguarded. It is on the basis of the general consequence of a crime
»
that Paley deems it just to give one thief the same punishment for




By this line of reasoning Paley demonstrates the
logic behind the proposition that we are "not to do evil that good
may come," for however great the particular good consequence
may prove to be, it could not compensate for the evil that would
be rampant if everyone should decide to disregard the rule that
forbade it.
Continuing his discussion of moral obligation, Paley
makes "right" and "obligation" reciprocal. Wherever there is a
right in one person, there is a corresponding obligation upon
others. * That is to say, that one man's "right" to his estate
means that others must abstain from it. Since moral obligation
depends, as we have seen, upon the will of God, "right", which
is correlative to it, must depend upon the same. "Right", there-
fore, signifies "the being consistent with the will of God," *
Paley was rather close to the Cambridge Platonists
when he saw that right and wrong were not arbitrary considera¬






will. This is simply another way of saying that God always
acts rightly, and that it is inconceivable that he should act
wrongly. By establishing the two principles, that God wills
the happiness of his creatures, and that the will of God is the
treasure of right and wrong, Paley finds it possible to draw
certain general conclusions which he regards as rules. From
these rules we come to learn the specific actions that are right
and wrong.
We have seen in this chapter how Paley arrived at his
belief in the necessity of an objective standard in the treatment
of ethics, that this standard must be formulated in terms of the
will of God, which may be ascertained from the tendency of any
action to promote or diminish human happiness, and which is




THE APPLICATION OF PALEY'S ETHICS
Notwithstanding the weaknesses of his theory, Paley
built a strong superstructure of ethics upon it. In fact, it is dif¬
ficult to find fault with the way in which he applies his theory.
Inasmuch as his chief concern was with practical applications
rather than with expounding a theory, our judgment of his work
should be primarily concerned with his exposition. Above all
else Paley was an expositor, and we must not forget that exposi¬
tion is as much a part of the science of ethics as is theory, W.R
Sorley reminds us that "ethics has not only to determine the end
but to apply it to practice, so as to decide as to what is right or
wrong in particular actions and virtuous or vicious in character.1
In this chapter we shall be interested in Paley's con¬
sistency or inconsistency in the handling of his principles and
his success or failure in deducing from these his concrete rules
of morality.
The practical nature of the science of ethics in the
mind of Paley is seen in his definition of ethics as "that science
* The Ethics of Naturalism, p. 9.
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which teaches men their duty and the reasons of it." From this
Paley proceeds to divide man's duty into three categories, namely,
our duties to others, called relative duties, our duties to ourselves,
and our duties to God.
The relative duties are further divided into three cate¬
gories, namely, the determinate, the indeterminate, and the con¬
stitutional duties. The determinate duties deal with the handling
of property, the making of promises, the making of contracts,
truth-speaking, oaths, subscription to articles of religion, and
the making of wills. Under the relative duties which are inde¬
terminate Paley discusses charity, slavery, resentment, anger,
revenge, duelling, litigation, gratitude, and slander. Under the
relative duties which result from the constitution of the sexes the
following are discussed: marriage, fornication, seduction, adultery,
incest, polygamy, divorce, the duty of parents, the rights of parents,
and the duty of children.
The second general category, which Paley calls duties
I ' r" ' ' • '
to ourselves, includes a discussion of the rights of self-defence,
^
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drunkenness, and suicide. Then in the final category, called
our duties to God, Paley places prayer, the use of Sabbatical
institutions, and reverencing the Deity.
Let us now examine these general categories by ex¬
amining Paley's treatment of exemplary duties under each cate¬
gory.
I
Look first at those relative duties which he calls de¬
terminate. In this category we confront first of all a discussion
of the use of the institution of property. This was one of the live
issues in Paley's day. So important was his contribution to this
subject that from the analogy with which he introduced his discus¬
sion of this problem he acquired the name "Pigeon" Paley. Here
is his picture of the oppression of the masses of his day:
If you should see a flock of pigeons in a field
of corn and if (instead of each picking where
and what it liked, taking just as much as it
wanted and no more) you should see ninety-
nine of them gathering all they got into a heap;
reserving nothing for themselves but the chaff
and the refuse; keeping this heap for one, and
that the weakest, perhaps worst pigeon of the
flock; sitting round and looking on all the win¬
ter, whilst this one was devouring, throwing
about, and wasting it; and if a pigeon, more
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hardy and hungry than the rest, touched a
grain of the hoard, all the others instantly
flying upon it and tearing it to pieces: if
you should see this, you would see nothing
more than what is every day practiced and
established among men. *
Paley takes the above analogy and applies it to the
masses of his day who were being denied the proceeds of their
labor which they had rightfully earned. He laments the fact
that the labor of the ninety and nine was being spent solely
for the comfort of the few privileged land owners. Such an
open tirade against the policies of the reigning party of the day
was bound to call forth their wrath, and was sufficient to bar
the way against the ecclesiastical promotion which Paley richly
deserved. When we bear in mind the relationship of the posses¬
sion of property to suffrage during the reign of George III, we
begin to see how delicate was the problem with which Paley was
dealing. Of the eight millions of people, only a hundred and sixty
2
thousand were electors at all. Walpole and Newcastle had made
bribery and borough-jobbing the base of their power and George III
*
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seized it in his turn as a base of the power he proposed to give
to the crown. He used the royal revenue to buy seats and to buy
votes. By scrutinizing the voting-list of the two houses George
III distributed rewards and punishments as members voted ac¬
cording to his will or no. "Promotion in the civil service, pre¬
ferment in the Church, and rank in the army was reserved for
"the King's friends."* In the light of this those who have con¬
sidered Paley as a quiet conformist need to observe his courage
when upon receiving a warning from Bishop Law that if he included
his analogy concerning the pigeons that it might exclude him from
a Bishopric, Paley sternly replied "Bishop or no Bishop it shall
• ,.2
go in."
Furthermore, Paley struck at the very roots of the
political corruption of his day with his vigorous protest against
bribe ry. Concerning the oath against bribery in the election of
members of Parliament he wrote the following:
The several contrivances to evade this oath,
such as the electors accepting money under




Paley, Edmund. The Life of Dr. Paley, p. cclvi.
- 19? -
note or other security for it, which is can¬
celled after the election; receiving money
from a stranger, or a person in disguise,
or out of a drawer, or purse, left open for
the purpose; or promises of money to be
paid after the election; or stipulating for a
place, living, or other private advantages
of any kind; if they escape the legal penal¬
ties of perjury, incur the moral guilt: for
they are manifestly within the mischief and
design of the statute which imposes the oath,
and within the terms indeed of the oath itself;
for the word "indirectly" is inserted on pur¬
pose to comprehend such cases as these.
There is no doubt but that Paley's work stirred the
public opinion against the corruption of that day until the second
Pitt was able to lead such reforms as virtually to obliterate the
bribery of the members ofparliament.
There appears to be a rather curious inconsistency in
Paley's insistence on the one hand on a rigid conformity to the oath
by members of Parliament,, while on the other hand he appeals for
a rather loose interpretation of the Articles of Faith for Clergymen.
In fact, he has been credited with the statement that "a man's con¬
science is no worse for a little ink." In all fairness to Paley, how¬
ever, it should be remembered that he was not in this case appealing
*
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for the right of the Clergy to be indifferent toward the Articles
of Faith. On the contrary, he was appealing for the right to look
behind the Articles themselves to the purpose for which they were
instituted. This purpose, he insists, cannot be discovered in the
bald statement of the Articles themselves but must be traced back
to the intention of the thirteenth Elizabethan legislature, which was
the imposer of the Articles. * Paley contended that the intention of
this legislature was not that each clergyman should believe every
separate proposition in the Articles. Instead of this, it was their
purpose to exclude from office all abettors of Popery, Anabaptists,
who were at that time a powerful party on the Continent, the Puritans,
who were hostile to the episcopal constitution, and in general the
members of such leading sects, or foreign establishments, as
threatened to overthrow the Church of England. Paley insisted
that any one finding himself within the above descriptions ought not
to subscribe to the Articles. He, however, emphatically stated
that for Protestant Churches to renounce with all their might the
infallibility of the Popes and at the same time insist on the infalli¬
bility of the thirty-nine Articles was highly inconsistent. Further-
1
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more, said Paley, subscription to these Articles does not bind a
man against altering his opinion. *
Paley's critics have seen in his vacillation concerning
the belief of each separate article of religion and in his later rea¬
soning that one has justifiable grounds for lying to a murderer or a
robber, ample proof of the moral unworthiness of the utilitarian
2
theory. Compared with the strong statement of Kant concerning
truth-speaking as an absolute obligation, Paley's argument loses
its lustre. However, J. S. Mill denies that the principle of utility
leads to the conclusions that Paley drew. For, says Mill, thorough¬
going utilitarianism would demand that in estimating the consequences
of actions for the purpose of measuring their morality not only must
the outward interests of all persons involved be considered but also
"3
their inward interests, namely, the consequences to their characters."
The complexity c£ this consideration is far greater than Paley allowed
for. He did not consider the effects that taking such liberty with the
truth would have upon the character of the agent himself and also upon
*
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the others involved. Nor did he consider the total effect that the
dulling of moral judgments of man would have upon society. That
is not to say, however, that Paley was totally unaware of the in¬
ternal principles at work in true morality, for in his sermon on
honesty he states that the final judgment of a man's character must
be decided by asking the question, is he honest upon principle or
honest out of policy? That is to say, his honesty is a virtue only
when he is honest from principle. Says Paley, the "test of honesty
as a principle is when a transaction is of a nature to be perfectly
secret, when the truth of it is known only to ourselves, to act then
with complete fidelity is to have honesty as a principle."*
Coming back to Paley's views on property, his utilitar¬
ianism is clearly seen when he raises the question whether or not
private ownership of property will stand the test of expediency
when its excessive possession causes so much poverty among the
masses who do not and cannot possess it. To this question he brings
the following answer: there must be some very great advantages in
maintaining the right of private possession of property to counteract
the misery suffered by those who possess none. Paley sees the
following advantage in this institution: the fact that the cultivation
*
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of the land can best be encouraged by keeping the masses depend¬
ent for their livelihood on such employment. Again, the production
of the earth is preserved to maturity by men who possess the land
and refuse to open their orchards to the passerby who would pluck
the fruit prematurely. Furthermore, the possession of property
improves the conveniency of living in two ways: it stimulates the
division of mankind into distinct professions, which is impossible
unless a man can exchange the productions of his own art for what
he wants from others, and the possibility of exchange implies the
possession of property. When a man is his own tailor, carpenter,
cook, and huntsman, he, in all probability, will never be an expert
in any of these callings. Consequently, life under such circum¬
stances could never advance to the stage of convenience known in
a highly cultivated society. Hence, Paley concludes that for all the
disadvantage involved in the private possession of property, they
are far outweighed by the advantages and that while inequality of
property, in the degree in which it exists in most countries of
Europe, abstractly considered, is an evil, it is an evil which
flows from these rules concerning the acquisition and disposal of
property by which men are incited to industry, and by which the
object of their industry is rendered secure and valuable.
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In an age when France was in the convulsion of a re¬
volution Paley's cautious good sense enabled him to remind
Englishmen of their love of order and law, their distaste for
violent changes, and their reverence for the past. In his Reasons
for Contentment Addressed to the Labouring ■Part of the British
Public, which he considered the best thing ever to come from his
pen, Paley urged the laboring men of Britain to believe that nothing
good would be finally gained in a division of the great estates. He
again brought his utilitarian principle to the front and argued that:
Either. . .large fortunes are not a public evil,
or, if they be in any degree an evil, it is to be
borne with, for the sake of those fixed and gene¬
ral rules concerning property, in the preserva¬
tion and steadiness of which all are interested. *
Paley proceeds from this point to show that the condition
of the laboring man is just as blessed as that of the nobility by enu¬
merating the following advantages which he possesses: the con¬
stant train of employment, the want of which is one of the greatest
plagues to the human soul, the advantage in providing for children.
"With health of body, innocency of mind, and habits of industry, a
*
Paley's Works, Vol. VIII, 1809, "Reasons for Content¬
ment", p. 183.
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poor man's child has nothing to be afraid of." On the other
hand the nobleman's child is accustomed to ease and the parent
is faced with the task of assuring him of an income which will
guarantee him the pleasure of continuing in that ease. Further¬
more, the poor have a greater relish for their pleasures than do
the rich whose desires are dead and whose sensibilities are worn
and tired. When once the habit is formed, Paley argues that the
luxurious receive no greater pleasures from their dainties than
the peasant does from his homely fare. He warns the poor against
envying the rich man's ease, for that which is most frequently con¬
strued as ease is inactivity. Nothing, says he, is farther from
ease than inactivity. Rest is ease, but no man can rest nntil first
he has worked. Rest is cessation from labor. It cannot therefore
be enjoyed or even known except by those who have known fatigue.
In his appeal for contentment Paley writes:
To learn the art of contentment is only to learn
what happiness actually consists in. Sensual
pleasures add little to its substance. Ease, if
by that be meant exemption from labour, con¬
tributes nothing. One, however, constant spring
of satisfaction, and almost infallible support of
1
Ibid. , p. 188.
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cheerfulness and spirits, is the exercise of
domestic affections, the presence of objects
of tenderness and endearment in our families,
our kindred, our friends. Now have the poor
anything to complain of here? . .. .The poor
man has his wife and children about him;
and what has the rich more? He has the
same enjoyment of their society, the same
solicitude for their welfare, the same plea¬
sure in their good qualities, improvement
and success if I were disposed to envy
anyone, the subject of my envy would be, a
healthy young man, in full possession of his
strength and faculties, going forth in a morn¬
ing to work for his wife and children or bring¬
ing them home his wages at night. ^
After this strong appeal for contentment, Paiey con¬
tinues with this reminder. The only change to be desired is that
gradual and progressive improvement of our circumstances which
is the natural fruit of successful industry; when each year is sorr e-
2
thing better than the last. His concluding word is to warn the
masses against seeking to seize the rich by force through the
medium of public uproar, for such would be to "not only venture
out to sea in a storm, but to venture for nothing.
1






On the surface the above argument might appear to
make Paley the champion of the privileged classes of his day. It
should be remembered, however, that Paley was a vigorous de¬
fender of the rights of the poor. He worked tirelessly for the ad¬
vancement of the Sunday Schools, that every poor child in the King¬
dom might have a chance to learn to read. Not only did Paley advo¬
cate this, but he prepared a manual for teaching reading in the Sun¬
day Schools. *
He inveighed against the popular opinion that it was not
for the advantage or safety of the state that the children of the poor
should receive any kind of education, or be even taught to read,
contending that:
It is in the highest degree both dishonorable to
human reason, and disparaging to the institutions
of social life, ii^ in fact, insinuates that the bulk
of mankind can only be governed by the suppres¬
sion and debasement of their intellectual faculties,
and it likewise insinuates that the institutions of
civil life rest for their support upon the ignorance
of the greatest part of those who live under them.^
Paley then passionately declared, "I should be glad to see the day
1
Paley's Works, Vol. VIII. "The Young Christian In
structed in Reading and in the Principles of Religion," p. 201.
2
Paley's Sermons, Vol. VI, Charge viii, p. 62.
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vvhen every child in the Kingdom was taught to read."*
In the second division of relative duties Paley places
indeterminate duties. The most outstanding phase of this part
of his work was his treatment of the question of slavery. As in¬
dicated in the biographical section of this thesis Paley was a
strong crusader against slavery.
In the year 1792, the residents of Carlisle met for the
purpose of petitioning Parliament for the abolition of the slave
trade. Mr. Paley had been made acquainted with the cruelties
involved in this pernicious traffic by a relation who had made a
fortune in the West Indies as a planter. He now found that neither
his humanitarian feelings nor his common sense of morality would
allow him to remain silent on the subject.
In April, 1789, the newspapers carried a short treatise
by Mr. Paley entitled "Arguments Against the unjust pretentions of
slave dealers and holders, to be indemnified by pecuniary allow¬
ances, at the public expense, in case the slave trade should be




slavery. This was designed to reach them for use in the first
great discussion in the House of Commons on the abolition of
the slave trade. The resolutions drawn up at Carlisle became
the basis of the petition afterwards presented to the House of
Commons, which presented a clear and comprehensive view of
the leading arguments which eventually led to the abolition of
slavery.
It is much to Mr. Paley's honor that he suggested a
plan for promoting the civilization of Africa, and for making
some restitution to that devastated continent, for the malicious
injustice and oppression which it had so long suffered. His pro¬
position was that from the United States of America several little
colonies of free negroes should be exported and allowed to settle
in different parts of Africa that they might serve as patterns of
more civilized life to the natives in these localities.
In his Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,
Paiey defines slavery as "an obligation to labour for the benefit
of the master without the contract or consent of the servant."*
*
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,
Bk. Ill, Part ii, Ch. 3, p. 149.
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This obligation may arise according to the law of nature from
three causes; from crimes, from captivity and from debt. When,
slavery is the punishment of the offenders crime, says Paley, the
confcinuence of the slavery ought to be in strict proportion to the crime
and when it is the result of captivity in war or the refusal to pay a
private debt, it should cease as soon as the demand of the injured
nation, or private creditor, is satisfied.
Having enumerated what he considers the only justifiable
causes of slavery Paley concluded that the slave trade upon the
coast of Africa was not to be excused on any of the above principles.
The fact was that when the slaves were brought to market in Africa
no questions were asked about the origin or justice of the vender's
title. It was, therefore, very evident that the title was not always
founded on the commitment of some crime, the injury of some tribe
nor even the refusal to pay a private debt.
A defective title, however, was the least of the crimes
with which the slave traffic was chargeable. Paley saw as the
greater crime the fact that the natives, were being incited to war
and mutual depredation for the sake of supplying their contracts, or
furnishing the market with slaves. Here the wickedness begins:
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The slaves torn away from parents, wives,
children, from their friends and companions,
their fields and flocks, their home and country,
are transported to the European settlements in
America, with no more accomodation on ship¬
board, than what is provided for brutes. This
is the second stage of cruelty; from which the
miserable exiles are delivered, only to be
placed, and that for life, in subjection to a
dominion and system of laws, the most mer¬
ciless and tyrannical that ever were tolerated
upon the face of the earth. *
Paley deals with each of the defences projected by the
slave-traffic as follows: to the argument that slavery was an eco¬
nomic necessity in America, that is, that the land could not be cul¬
tivated by hired servants without putting an impossible price on the
produce of the land, he replies that the necessity for which the slave
owner contends amounts to no more than saying that a pound of sugar
which now sells for sixpence could not be afforded should it be ad¬
vanced to sixpence-halfpenny. To the contention that slavery was a
part of the civil constitution of most countries when Christianity ap¬
peared yet no passage is to be found in the Christian Scriptures by
which it is condemned or prohibited, Paley replied that Christianity
in seeking admission into all nations of the world abstained from in¬




not follow from the silence of Scripture concerning them, that all
the civil institutions which then prevailed were right.
Moreover, the discharging of slaves from all obligation
to obey their masters would have turned loose one half of mankind
upon the other. The basis of the appeal for adherents to the Chris¬
tian religion would have been lowered. Slaves would have been
tempted to embrace it from ulterior motives, and masters would
have been repelled from it and the most calamitous of all contests,
a bellum servile, would have ensued, to the everlasting reproach if
not to the utter annihilation of the Christian religion.
To Paiey's sound remarks may be added the fact that the
Apostles while exhorting slaves to patience, never vindicated the in¬
stitution choosing rather to dwell on the duty of taking care not to
bring an ill-name on their religion. They are rather to suffer a
wrong than to raise a prejudice against Christianity. * The Apostles
considered it the Christian duty of a slave to forego any rights he
may possess if such is necessary for the furtherance of the Gospel.
Paley's proposal concerning emancipation was that it




the mild diffusion of the light and influence of Christianity. How-
beit he called his own government to imrrediate action and warned
Britain that it was questionable:
Whether a legislature, which had so long lent
its assistance to the support of an institution
replete with human misery, was fit to be
trusted with an empire the most extensive
ever obtained in any age or quarter of the
world. *
Under his definition of relative duties Paley places in
t ie third division those duties which result from the constitution of
tne sexes and proceeds to discuss the public use of marriage insti¬
tutions, fornication, seduction, adultery, incest, polygamy, divorce,
marriage, the duty of parents, the rights of parents and the duty of
children.
Paley's utilitarianism is very apparent in his treatment
of the m arriage institution. Marriage promotes the comfort and se¬
curity of the feu ale sex, makes possible the production of the great¬
est number of healthy children, kcilitat.es the best form of govern¬
ment by distributing the community into separate families and by
appointing over each the authority of a master of the family, secures
t.he state by promoting the good behavior of its citizens, and cncoura-es
1
Ibid♦ , p. 150.
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industry to provide for the needs of the family. Paley gives as a
reason for insisting upon abstinence from any conduct which tends
in its general consequence to obstruct marriage the fact tuat what¬
ever prom otes the happiness of the majority is binding upon the
1
whole.
Paley argues against fornication on the ground that pro¬
miscuous concubinage discourages marriage, by abating the chief
attraction of it. Says he, the male of the species will not undertake
the incumbrance, expense, and restraint of married life, if they can
gratify their passions at a cheaper price. Paley believed that since
sexual passion is natural, it was intended to be gratified, but that
the circumstances under which it may be gratified must be deter¬
mined by the utilitarian principles and by the Scriptures. He con¬
demns the practice of keeping a mistress even under circumstances
of mutual fidelity and answers those who say that such a relationship
is the same as marriage by raising the question, why, then, do they
not marry? Furthermore, the relationship is not the same for the
children, born in such a union. Moreover:
It is immoral because it is pernicious that men
and women should cohabit, without undertaking
certain irrevocable obligations, and mutually
conferring certain civil rights; if, therefore,
*
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,
Bk. Ill, pt. iii. , ch. 1, p. 185.
- 213 -
the law has annexed these rights and obliga¬
tions to certain forms, so that they cannot
be secured or undertaken by any other means,
which is the case here, (for whatever the par¬
ties tray promise to each other, nothing but
the marriage ceremony can make their pro¬
mise irrevocable), it becomes in the same de¬
gree immoral that men and women should co¬
habit without interposition of these forms. *
Every incentive to fornication must be viewed as an
accessory to tne crime. Among such accessories he lists
wanton songs, pictures and books which incite tem ptation.
Seduction is condemned on the ground that it destroys
the greater happiness of the victim by diminishing her prospects
of marriage. Marriage is that from which a woman expects her
chief happiness. Without it she is bereft of security. If she is to
support herself through employment, her very employment is de¬
pendent upon her character and reputation. If through seduction
she has lost these, she has left one alternative, either to starve
or to have recourse to prostitution for food and raiment.
More detrim ental than the economic aspect is that the
loss of chastity destroys her moral principle. This destruction
takes place whether the unlawful intercourse is discovered or not.
Ibid. , Bk. Ill, part iii, Ch. 2, pp. 188, 189.
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To calculate the enormity of the crime of seduction
Paley proposes that a father or a brother should announce for
what consideration they would suffer this injury to a daughter or
a sister. His conclusion would most often be that the total loss of
his property would not create as much suffering on his part as would
the loss of chastity on the part of his daughter or sister.
Again the public at large loses the benefit of the women's
service in her proper place and destination as a wife and parent.
Weighing ail the consequences Paley concludes that "not one half of
the crimes for which men suffer death by the laws of England, are
so flagitious as this."1 He laments the fact that in the light of the
above the only punishment for this offense is a pecuniary satisfac¬
tion to the injured family for the loss of the daughter's service dur¬
ing her pregnancy or nurturing.
Adultery receives the same treatment at the hands of
Paley. Here a new sufferer is introduced, the injured husband who
receives the most painful and incurable wound to his affections that
human nature knows. Not only does adultery receive the condemna¬
tion of Paley, but he contends that "all behavior which is designed,
1
Ibid. , p. 192.
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or which knowingly tends, to captivate the affection of a married
woman, is a barbarous intrusion upon the peace and virtue of a
family, though it fall short of adultery.
In his discussion of divorce Paley first of all discusses
the congruity of the right of the husband to put away his wife with the
law of nature. He finds such a practice incongruous with the law of
nature because such makes it impossible for parents to fulfill their
duties to their children. Furthermore it is incompatible with the
right which the mother possesses, as well as the father, to the grati¬
tude of her children and the comfort of their society; of both of which
she is deprived when she is dismissed from her husband's family.
Paley then traces the effects of divorce upon the general
happiness of married life and concludes that a lawgiver, whose views
are directed by views of general utility, would make the marriage
contract indissoluble because it preserves the peace and concord be¬
tween married persons and gives them an incentive to contribute to
their mutual well being realizing that neither can find their own com¬
fort without promoting the pleasure of the other.
Furthermore, new objects of desire would be continually
sought after, if men could at will be released from their marital
obligations. Expediency would demand that the real and permanent
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happiness of one half of the species should not be surrendered
to the caprice and voluptuousness of the other half.
Following his custom of combining expediency with
the teachings of Scripture, Paley shows that while the law of
Moses, for reasons of local expediency, permitted the Jewish
husband to put away his wife, Christ revoked this permission
and promulgated a law which was thenceforward to confine di¬
vorces to the single cause of adultery in the wife. ^ Paley held
rigidly to the plain meaning of Christ's teaching. He held that
when it was necessary for their mutual happiness that a husband
and wife should separate, they may separate by common consent,
nevertheless they are not to have the right of re-marriage.
II
In the second major category Paley places the duties to
ourselves including self-defence, the consideration of drunkenness
and suicide. The latter two duties are included because they are
offences against the care of our faculties and preservation of our




Concerning the rights of self-defence Paley reasons that
the law of nature immediately justifies taking the life of an assailant
when one's life is threatened. This is true because the laws of society
have not restrained the intended murderer nor can society make resti¬
tution of the life about to be taken. Homicide is justifiable to prevent
the commission of a crime, which when committed, would be punish¬
able with death, and in suppressing riots and in apprehending male¬
factors .
As seen in the biographical section of this thesis, Paley
was an ardent crusader for temperance even going so far as to seek
the revoking of the licenses of many grog shops in his day. He ar¬
gued against the mischief of drunkenness on the grounds that it
weakens those inhibitions upon which our controlled behavior de¬
pends, and leads into excessive anger, and sins of lewdness; it dis¬
qualifies men for their duties by disordering their faculties, it is
attended with expenses which most cannot afford, it brings great
anxiety to the family of the drunkard, and shortens life. Not least
among the consequences of drunkenness is the corruption of the
drunkard's companions. While one may be free from family re¬
sponsibilities and able by virtue of a strong constitution to withstand
the devastation of constant drinking, in all probability there will be
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those in his society who have family responsibilities and whose
constitutions cannot withstand the ravages of liquor. Further¬
more, Paley reminds us of the endless chain of consequences
which follow the influence of a drunkard upon another and he in
turn upon another.
To his argument Paley brings the argument of St. Paul.
"Be not drunk with wine, wherein is excess."* "Let us walk honestly
2
as in the day, not in rioting and drunkenness." "Be not deceived;
neither fornicators, nor drunkards, . . . .shall inherit the kingdom of
God."3
Furthermore, Paley sees that the guilt of drunkenness
will be in proportion to the probability of criminal conduct which it
incites. By virtue of this rule, those vices which are the acknow¬
ledged effects of drunkenness, are virtually as criminal as if com¬
mitted when one has all his faculties and senses about him. A per¬
son then incurs a part of the guilt of these crimes when he brings






I Corinthians vi. 9, 10.
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Upon the subject of suicide Paley marsnalls all his dia¬
lectical skill to show the general consequences of such a practice.
For the sake of argument he reduces the problem to this: May
every man who pleases to destroy his life, innocently do so? *
Most often men come to the decision to destroy themselves from
the conclusion that they have become useless to mankind and forget
that melancholy minds are prone to think themselves useless, when
they really are not so. Suppose, said Paley, what the general con¬
sequence would be if a law were promulgated allowing each private
person to destroy every man he met, whose longer continuance in
the world he judged to be useless. The general consequences would
assuredly be a permission to commit murder at pleasure. More¬
over, no man can declare himself to be permanently useless, for he
may always regain some measure of usefulness.
Again, those contemplating suicide are called upon to con¬
sider whether the general sorrow for their death would not exceed
that which they should suffer by continuing to live. Any considera¬
tion that would increase the toleration of suicide would result in the
loss of many lives to the community and inasmuch as mankind must
*
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. IV.
Ch. iii, p. 245.
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live in continual alarm for the fate of their friends and dearest re¬
lations, the unspeakable suffering that would result from this could
not be justified on utilitarian grounds.
Paley's eschatological emphasis comes to the front here
as he reminds those who contemplate suicide that by remaining in
this world and exercising those virtues which remain within their
power, the opportunity to improve their condition in a future state
is maintained.
Finally there are many passages of Scripture from which
we may deduce the will of God concerning suicide. In the Bible
human life is spoken of as a term assigned or prescribed to us.
"Let us run with patience the race that is set before us."* "That I
2
may finish my course with joy." • The belief that we are at liberty
to determine the duration of our lives is thus inconsistent with the
implication of Scripture which considers life as a "race that is set





The final major category of duties deals with our duties
towards God including the duty of prayer, public worship, Sabbath
observance and reverencing the Deity. Paley realizes that in one
sense every duty is a duty to God since it is his will which makes it
a duty. In this category he places those duties of which God is the
object as well as the author. The moralist can only deal with the
visible expressions of devotion to God. Paley divides these external
duties into worship and reverence. The distinction between these two
is that one consists in action and the other in forbearance. For example:
When we go to Church on the Lord's day, led
thither by a sense of duty towards God, we
perform an act of worship: when we rest in
a journey upon that day, from the same motive,
we discharge a duty of reverence. *
Paley deduces the duty of prayer from the light of nature
by showing that it is the universal method of man to obtain the object
of his desire by entreaty. Says he, what is universal must be natural,
and the impulse which God has planted in the human heart to obtain
what we want from others by entreaty must lead us to intreat him as
our supreme Governor for our desires.
1
Ibid. , Bk. V, Chap. 1, pp. 253, 254.
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Prayer is necessary in the Christian life as a constant
reminder of man's dependency upon God. Yet Paley makes the
duty of prayer primarily dependent upon its efficacy, for, says he:
I confess myself unable to conceive how any man
can pray, or be obliged to pray, who expects no¬
thing from his prayer; but who is persuaded, at the
time he utters his request, that it cannot possibly
produce the smallest impression upon the Being to
whom it is addressed, or advantage to himself.
Now the efficacy of prayer imparts that we ob¬
tain something in consequence of praying which
we should not have received without prayer.*
To the objection to prayer which says that God's good¬
ness and wisdom is such that if what we request in prayer be fit
for us, we shall have it without praying and if it be not agreeable
to his goodness and wisdom we cannot obtain it by praying, Paley
replies that it is agreeable to the perfect wisdom and goodness of
God to give us through prayer what he could not give us without
prayer. It is God's will to change his will through prayer. Paley
did not think of the immutability of God as the immobility of God
but rather as his moral self-consistency.
The question then arises what virtue is there in prayer
which would make the granting of a favor consistent with God's
1 Ibid., Bk. V, Ch. ii, pp. 254, 255.
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wisdom, which would not have been so without it? Paley's reply
reflects his utilitarian principle.
The granting of a favor as a result of prayer, says he,
would have a stronger possibility of producing good effects upon
the recipient. That which is received without asking is often re¬
ceived without gratitude. Furthermore, the wisdom of the Deity
is reflected in answered prayer by virtue of the fact that by with¬
holding his favors until they are asked for, he encourages devotion
in his rational creation by sustaining in them a sense of their de¬
pendence upon him. Again, prayer has a natural tendency to bring
the petttioner within the rules which God has prescribed to the dis¬
pensation of his favors.
Even the inconstancy of answered prayer Paley interprets
in the light of expediency for, says he, if prayer were allowed to dis¬
turb the order of second causes appointed in the universe too much,
it would be extremely detrimental to human well-being. For example,
few would be willing to work if they could receive their wants through
prayer. Moreover, no man would care for his health if prayer would
immediately check the course of disease and restore his health.
Therefore, there is of necessity the right possessed by God to withhold
an answer to prayer, and even then God is discouraging carelessness
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and disorderliness in the race which restraint is necessary to
the happiness of humanity.
Against those who argue for the irrationality of praying
for particular favors by name or of interceding for others or for
whole nations as if to say that the happiness of others or whole
nations could be dependent upon our prayers, Paiey answers by
saying:
The happiness and misery of great numbers we
see oftentimes at the disposal of one man's choice ,
or liable to be much affected by his conduct; what
greater difficulty is there in supposing, that the
prayers of an individual may avert a calamity from
multitudes, or be accepted to the benefit of whole
communities.
Having argued from the light of nature the probability of
answered prayer, Paley then turns to the revelation of Scripture
for the positive affirmation of the propriety cf prayer. He then
lists specific passages which enjoin prayer in general, for example,
2
"Ask and it shall be given you, seek and ye shall find." Examples
of prayer for particular objects are also given, for example, "For
this thing (to wit, some bodily infirmity, which he calls a 'thorn
1
Ibid• » Bk- v' Chap, ii, pp. 260, 261.
2 Matthew VII. 7.
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given him in the flesh') I besought the Lord thrice, that it might
depart from me."* He calls attention to the directions to pray
for natural or public blessings, for example, "Pray for the peace
of Jerusalem."^ Examples of intercession are mentioned as "Peter
therefore was kept in prison, but prayer was made, without ceasing,
3
of the Church unto God for him." Finally, a list of declarations and
examples authorizing the repetition of unsuccessful prayers is given,
for example, "And he left them and went away again, and prayed for
4the third time, saying the same words."
Paley makes a strong appeal for a rigid observance of
the Sabbath on the grounds of public utility. Because of the relaxa¬
tion afforded to the laboring part of humanity and the consequent hap¬
piness of so great a part of humanity, it is every man's duty to uphold
the observance of the Sabbath. The benefits of Sabbath observance are
extended by Paley even to the brutes as they find respite from their toil.
The light of nature reveals the necessity of one day's rest out of seven
but only the Revelation of God can tell us which day to observe.
*








At this point Paley takes up the question concerning the
day which is to be observed, that is, whether it should be the sev¬
enth day of the week, the Jewish Sabbath, or the first day of the
week, the Christian's Lord's day. He argues that it was not until
the wilderness sojourn of the Israelites that an express command
of God was given concerning the Sabbath. This, says he, emphasizes
the fact that the Sabbath was distinctly a Jewish institution. Paley
does not believe that the statement in the second chapter of Genesis
concerning the sanctifying of the Sabbath day meant that God sanctified
it as a universal institution at the dawn of creation, rather did he take
the fact of his resting on the seventh day as the basis for sanctifying
the day for his people in the wilderness. The passage in Ezekiel XX:
10, 11, 12, speaks of the Sabbath as being given to Israel. Paley be¬
lieves this to be a reference to the historic event in the wilderness.
If, then, the divine command was not given at the creation but rather
in the wilderness, it does not apply to all men but only to the Jews.
Furthermore, Paley shows that Exodus XXXI. 16, 17, speaks of the
Sabbath as a sign between God and his people.
Coming to the relation of the Christian to the Sabbath,
Paiey shows that the observance of the Sabbath was not one of the
articles enjoined by the Apostles in the fifteenth chapter of Acts,
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upon them "which from among the Gentiles were turned unto God."
In Colossians II. 16, 17, Paul considers the Sabbath as a part of
the Jewish ritual. The supreme question at this point should be:
Did the founder of the Christian religion deliver any new command
on this subject? The answer to this Paley finds in the fact that the
practice of holding religious assemblies on the first day of the week
was so early and universal in the Christian Church that it carries
with it considerable proof of having originated from some precept
of Christ or his Apostles, though none such is now extant.
It was upon the first day of the week that the disciples
were assembled, when Christ appeared to them for the first time
after his resurrection. * The second meeting with the disciples
2
was also on the first day of the week. The same custom is found
3
prevailing in a Church far from Jerusalem.
By the time John wrote the Revelation the first day of
the week had obtained the name of the Lord's Day. Paley did not
contend for the carrying over of the Jewish prescription for the ob¬
servance of the Sabbath into the Lord's day but only for the observance
of worship on that day. In fact he states that:





A cessation upon that day of labour, beyond the
time of attendance upon public worship, is not
intimated in any passage in the New Testament;
nor did Christ or his Apostles deliver, that we
know of, any command to their disciples for a
discontinuance, upon that day, of the common
offices of their professions.
Paley continues by insisting that it would have been
highly improbable that Christ would have enjoined upon the Jews
to whom he addressed his Gospel another day of rest when they
already were observing one. Moreover, it is held that there is
not sufficient proof that Christ intended to retain the duties of the
Jewish Sabbath by shifting them to the first day of the week. Paley
further contends that, while it is not improbable, still there re¬
mains no evidence in Scripture that the first day of the week was
distinguished in commemoration of our Lord's resurrection.
The law of Christianity is that the assembling upon the
first day of the week for the purpose of public worship and religious
instruction is of divine appointment. Further resting from employ¬
ment is to be based on the law of nature and is binding upon the con¬
science because of the benefits it bestows upon the people.
^
The principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk.
Ch. vi, p. 291.
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The final duty discussed in this category is that of
reverencing the Deity. Paley pleads for a rigid observance of
the third commandment, namely, "Thou shalt not take the name
of the Lord thy God in vain." By vain is meant that which is use¬
less and it is useless when it is not likely to serve a good purpose.
For example, when the name of the deity is used in anger, in mirth,
or to express courage, it is used in vain. Christ's command against
swearing is a reaffirmation of the third commandment as well as an
enlargement upon it. * Included under this should be mockery and
ridicule of the Scriptures, for such is inconsistent with a religious
frame of mind. A mind intent upon the attainment of heaven, says
Paley, must reject with indignation every attempt to entertain with
jests about heaven, for nothing but the most frivolous dissipation of
thought can make even the inconsiderate forget the supreme impor¬
tance of everything which relates to the future existence:
Whilst the infidel mocks at the superstitions of
the vulgar, insults over their credulous fears,
their childish errors, and fantastic rites, it does
not occur to him to observe that the most prepos¬
terous device by which the weakest devotee ever
believed he was securing the happiness of a future
life, is more rational than unconcern about it.
Upon this subject, nothing is so absurd as indif¬




^ The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,
Bk. V, Chapt. IX, p. 298,
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CHAPTER V
AN EVALUATION OF PA LEY'S ETHICS
IN CONTRAST WITH
CURRENT CHRISTIAN ETHICS
Thus far in this thesis the writer has endeavored to set
forth the principles of Paley's ethics in the light of his eighteenth
century environment and to give a positive exposition of the prac¬
tical application of his ethics. The next project will be to offer a
critical evaluation of Paley's ethics in the light of current trends.
Much that has been written against the utilitarian theory and psy¬
chological hedonism in general would, of course, apply to Paley.
The most devastating criticism which has been brought
against all the utilitarian theories is the contention of Kant that
there is an absolute distinction between matters of prudence and
matters of ethics. That is to say, simply to ask what action will
bring the most happiness ? raises only the question of prudence
and does not touch the problem of morals. However, Kant is
much closer to utilitarianism than is ordinarily thought. In fact,
he insists that anyone who denies that he is in search of happiness
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is falsifying. Yet he denies that it is possible to calculate the
relevance of any action to happiness. Therefore, it becomes
necessary to act according to moral law. The way to make a
happy world is to do one's duty and to act only in a way that one
could wish all others to act. Kant insisted that "there is nothing
in the world, or even out of it that can be called good without
qualification, except a good will."* Paley is not far from Kant
at this point. According to J. S. Mill, Paley held that we shall
be judged by the intensity and continuity of our will to do good.
That is to say, we shall be judged not by our deeds but by our
dispositions. ^
As to Kant's objection that man is unable to predict
the consequences of his action, let it be insisted that a part of
man's moral responsibility is based upon his ability to see the
consequences of his actions. A most convincing statement of
man's ability at this point is made by SchSffle . He reasons
that we are at least able to see as far as the next stage in the
scenes of historical progress, and this is thought to lead to the
*
Metaphysics of Morals. Section I.
2
Dissertations and Discussions, Political and Historical.
Vol. I, p. 153.
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conclusion that we should make this next stage of development
our end; further than it, we cannot see, and, therefore, need not
concern ourselves with a further end. If this is to mean that we
s
^
have no ultimate end for conduct, Schaffle consoles us with the
thought that we shall at least never be without a proximate end—
and one which is always changing with the course of events. *
It is very apparent that the most commendable thing
about utilitarianism is that it lends itsdf most directly to practical
application by describing a definite end to be aimed at in life, namely
the greatest happiness of the greatest number. From this principle
it is quite a simple matter to deduce rules upon which human con¬
duct may be based.
Adam Smith went so far as to say that the regard for
general rules "is the only principle by which the bulk of mankind
are capable of directing their actions." If this be true, it is not
difficult to explain the readiness with which the eighteenth and nine¬
teenth centuries responded to utilitarianism. In the subsequent de¬
velopment of moral philosophy it has become more and more appa¬
rent that no one principle can be adequate for the governing of the
1 "
Bau und Leben des socialen Korpus, ii, p. 68.
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infinite complexity of moral conduct. Perhaps, however, we
should not judge Paley by later Monistic Moralists. For it was
the chief concern of moralists of Paley's day to find a simple
method by which man might know his moral duty. In fact, John
Gay said that this was the only problem confronting the moralists
of his day.
It has been charged that Paley had no originality. This
is largely true, but perhaps there is a sense in which originality
is not thinking differently from others but ratherthinking for one¬
self. In this sense Paley was original. He was strongly influenced
by his contemporaries. Yet he carefully weighed his material and
made it his own. The hedonistic calculus was a part of his eight¬
eenth century heritage. Butler, in referring to virtuous conduct,
had said, "When we sit down in a cool hour we can neither justify
to ourselves this or any other pursuit, 1 till we are convinced that it
will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." Shaftes¬
bury and Hutcheson insisted that it is not necessary to reflect upon
the principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number,"
*
An excellent treatment of the inadequacy of any one
single principle for the guidance of the moral life may be found in
Dr. Simmel's Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft.
2
Sermons, Sermon IV, p. 88.
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since it is naturally embodied in any cultivated taste. Sorley re¬
minds us that even though these eighteenth century moralists were
opposed to the selfish theory of human action, they never spoke of
any sacrifice of private happiness. * In the light of this environ¬
ment Paley's statement that, "We can be obliged by nothing but
2
what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by," is not so
obnoxious.
Now,if pleasure is the object of action, then the utili¬
tarian theory is the only valid one, and any argument against utili¬
tarianism would logically begin with an attempt to show either that
pleasure is not the end of action, or that it is not the sole end, or
that it is not the chief end. Against the belief that pleasure is the
goal which man pursues in action is the paradox of hedonism which
insists that the quest of happiness is self-destructive, for the way
to get happiness is to forget about it and aim at something else.
Again, it should be remembered that pleasure is not an entity .hav¬
ing an existence by itself independently of the object in which plea¬
sure is felt. Consequently pleasure could never be the immediate
goal of action.
*
£*kics of Naturalism. Ch. IV, p. 19.
7
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. ii,
Ch. ii. "
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It should be said to Paley's credit that in an age wuen
reason was being emphasized so much that all of man's other powers
were forgotten, that he recognized that man was not motivated solely
by reason but that pleasure and pain are strong determinants of ac¬
tion. However, he failed to appreciate the fact to which Professor
Sorley calls our attention, namely, that man is motivated "directly
by pleasure and pain, and not by a mere estimate of pleasure and
pain, but by pleasure and pain themselves."* Estimates of future
pleasure and pain become motives for action not by being merely
recognized (intellectually) but felt (emotionally), that is, by them¬
selves becoming pleasurable or painful.
It is obviously true that anything that satisfies the ulti¬
mate demands of our nature will be accompanied by pleasure and
may be described as pleasure. This pleasure, however, must have
some objective content which is something other than itself. The ob¬
ject producing pleasure may be any of a number of things as the
pleasure of others or the fulfilment of duty. These things are ob¬
jects which bring pleasure, but they are not pleasures in themselves.
Moreover, to say that the most happiness of the most people
is to be the goal of human action is the same as saying that the general
* The Ethics of Naturalism, p. 34.
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happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons. The fallacy
involved in this proposition is known in logic as "the fallacy of
composition." As Professor Mackenzie pointed out, this fallacy
infers that:
Because my pleasures are a good to me, yours
to you, his to him, and so on, therefore, my
pleasures .plus your pleasures, plus his plea¬
sures, are a good to me, plus you, plus him.
It is forgotten that neither the pleasures nor the
persons are capable of being made into an aggre¬
gate. *
If all human minds were capable of being rolled into
one so as to form an aggregate, the above argument might hold
true. But "the aggregate of all persons" is nobody. Therefore,
nothing could be good to a nonentity. In other words, a good must
be good to somebody.
Paley was most assuredly in error when he insisted on
a purely quantitative estimate of pleasure. He writes:
In strictness, any condition may be denominated
happy, in which the amount or aggregate of plea¬
sure exceeds that of pain, and the degree of happi¬
ness depends upon the quantity of the excess.^
The fallacy here is that a sum of pleasures can no more
be called pleasure than a sum of men can be called a man, for
* Manual of Ethics, p. 219.
2
The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,
Ch. VI, p. 147"
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pleasures can no more be added to one another than men can be
added to one another. A particular pleasure may be desired but
not a sum of pleasures, for such is a nonentity.
The hedonism which identifies pleasure with our desires
overlooks the fact that it is not our desires that we seek to satisfy
but ourselves and that which would satisfy our desires depends upon
the kind of person behind the desire. The nature of the highest hap¬
piness, then, would depend not on its quantity but on its belonging to
the highest kind of character. In other words, it depends on the na¬
ture of the self and the spiritual environment in which he lives. The
highest happiness then would be attained by living in the best spiri¬
tual environment and by satisfying the desires that belong to that
environment.
Furthermore, happiness is not found in the simple gratifi¬
cation of one single desire or of the greatest possible sum of desires.
On the contrary, the real meaning of happiness is found in the system¬
atizing of desire. Happiness at its highest is the feeling which accom¬
panies the harmonious adjustment of the various essential elements in
our lives or for the Christian man his essential unity with his fellows
and with God. Therefore, while happiness is not the end of moral con¬
duct it is an essential and inseparable element in its attainment.
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It should be remembered that Paley did not consistently
hold to his quantitative theory of pleasure, for in insisting that not
all pleasure is productive of happiness, he was introducing a deter¬
mining factor which is above pleasure. One pleasure is more desir¬
able than another, not because of its nature as pleasure, but because
of some other quality it possesses. That is to say, pleasures must
be rationally defined in order to determine those which are enduring,
for only enduring pleasures are productive of happiness.
II
The chief concern of this chapter is not with the meta¬
physical implications of Paley's theory. On the contrary, since
Paley was primarily an apologist of the Christian religion and was
chiefly concerned with providing a theological sanction for ethics,
we shall confine our efforts to answering two questions; namely,
has the modern church made any significant advances beyond Paley
in the field of ethics; and was there anything in Paley's system that
the modern church needs to recapture? For the sake of simplifica¬
tion this discussion shall be arranged under four live issues in the
field of ethics in Paley's day and in our own; namely, the relation
of religion to ethics, the place of revelation in ethics, the place of
reason in ethics, and finally, the place of eschatology in ethics.
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In the intervening period between Paley and the twentieth
century, moral philosophers have emphasized their belief that the
theological answer is too simple and easy to provide the final clue
to man's moral problems. Obsessed with the theory of evolution
the nineteenth century gave its allegiance to relativistic theories
of ethics, and the breach between theology and ethics became
strongly pronounced. Today, however, there is a movement
away from relativism toward an authoritarian ethic. There are re¬
markable parallels between Paley's insistence upon the necessity of
building the science of ethics on a theological foundation and the
thought of men like Barth, Brunner and Niebuhr. In Paley's defi¬
nition of virtue as, "The doing good to mankind in obedience to the
will of God. . . he was reacting against the eighteenth century
humanistic rationalism which contended that morality may be based
upon an innate moral sense. This was the position of Shaftesbury
and Hutcheson who had a profound influence on Kant and caused him
to be strongly prejudiced against a "theological ethic."
In the Christian Church today there is a marked effort to
bring ethics back to her only proper foundation, namely, a religion
*
Pr»*ciples of Moral and Political Philosophy, Bk. I,
Ch. vii, p. 27.
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which has as its center a revelation of the will of God. The fact
that revelation is the keystone of modern Christian ethics is seen
in Earth's definition of ethics:
Ethics, so-called, I regard as the doctrine of
God's command and do not consider it right to
treat it otherwise than as an integral part of
dogmatics, or to produce a dogmatics which
does not include it. *
Barth continues: "What is at stake in Christianity is the
2
rule of God and nothing else." Barth contends that in the realm of
morals we must begin with God and to recognize the one and only
God means to make all human systems of ethics relative. Further¬
more, Barth supports this relativity of all human systems of ethics
by citing Jesus' reply to the rich young ruler. "Why askest thou me
3
concerning the good? One is good." That is to say, only one pos¬
sesses absolute goodness; goodness which is never on trial. There¬
fore, any objective ethical test cannot but lie beyond the world of
space and time. Barth writes: "Our demonstrated existence in this
world is measured upon a standard which is not at all a part of exis-
4
tence as we know it or conceive it."
*
Tke Doctrine of the Word of God, Trans. G. T. Thom¬
son, p. XIV.
2
The Resurrection of the Dead, p. 103.
^ Matthew 19:17.




Barth demonstrates the emptiness of all relative systems
by contending that: "When the knowledge of God becomes manifest,
they (all relative systems of ethics) no longer possess ultimate
credibility." *
Barth sees the relativism of all our codes and all our in¬
terpretations of life becoming evident in the modern revolt against
"authority for its own sake." The "family for its own sake;" "art
for its own sake;" work for its own sake;" even "religion for its own
sake," are all rightly being rejected. These idols, says Barth, can-
2
not stand alone. In his concern to show the dependence of ethics
upon a revelation from God, Barth argues that neither the unaided
conscience nor the so-called religious consciousness can give us
truth. On the contrary, truth can exist only in the moment of God's
speaking to us, which determines our very existence. Starting with
this conception of ethics Barth proceeds to show first that man is in¬
capable of apprehending ethical truth or of fulfilling its requirements;
and second, that hoth ethical truth, and ethical achievement are wholly
dependent upon God's speaking to us.
The Knowledge of God and the Service of God, Trans.
J.L.M. Haire and Ian Henderson, pp.18, 19.
2
The Word of God and the Word of Man, Trans. Douglas
Horton, pp. 292, 293.
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This emphasis is continued in the ethics of Emil Brunner.
Insisting that there is but one true approach to morality and that all
other approaches are ambiguous, Brunner starts with "a Divine
1
Being" who must be the source of morality. He discredits the
practical approach to morality which looks for its authority to the
agreement among men on moral issues and writes:
There is scarcely one moral commandment
which is everywhere accepted as final, on the
contrary, the moral codes of the various peoples
and civilizations completely contradict one another,
not merely in points of detail but in principle.^
Brunner is very close to Paley in his insistence that
"to try to discover an original moral common sense behind these
3
influences of the various religions is simply a wild-goose chase."
He insists that even conscience is not the voice of God but a sinister
4
force driving us to despair. Brunner concludes that man's endeavor
to build human moral systems has culminated in the insoluble anti¬
thesis of religion versus ethics, freedom versus necessity, content
versus formalism, individuality versus universality, and endaemonism
5
versus rigorism.
* The Divine Imperative, p. 28.
'
Ibid., pp. 32, 33.
3 Ibid' ' P- 33»
4 Ibid, .pp. 155ff.
5
Ibid. , pp. 5Sff.
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For Brunner the good is the sum of ail the moral pre¬
dicates which are not independent entities. On the contrary, ethics
is the dependent child of theology and never its parent nor indep&adant
partner. Even the law of nature is the command of God. * His mean¬
ing is seen more clearly in his declaration that:
Here there is no intrinsic good. What God
does and wills is good; and all that opposes
the will of God is bad. The good has its
basis and its existence solely in the will of
God. . . . , ^ the will of God only is good, and
it is to be done because He wills it.^
Another follower in this train is Reinhold Niebuhr. Con¬
cerning the ethic of Jesus, Niebuhr writes:
It is concerned with the absolute demand of
God upon human life and not with the exped¬
ients required to keep the peace within a
given society. If calls for an absolute obe¬
dience to the will of God without considera¬
tion of the consequences of moral action which
must be the concern of any prudential ethic.^
Niebuhr also insists on the thoroughgoing relativity of ail human
ethical insight and activity. He contends that the structure of
human nature is such that any system of human ethics must
*
Jugtice and the Social Order, Trans. Mary Hottinger.
2 "
The Divine Imperative, p. 53.
3
Ibid. , p. 58.
^ An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 63.
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necessarily be relative. He sees the fundamental fallacy of ra¬
tionalism in the fact that it regards man primarily as essentially
an intellect which can by his unaided powers grasp all time and
eternity. At the same time romanticism labors under the illusion
that man is altogether a product of irrational forces. Niebuhr sees
the failure of both rationalism and romanticism as due to "the lack
of a principle of interpretation which can do justice to both the height
of human self-transcendence and the organic unity between the spirit
of man and his physical life."^ Although man has his rootage in this
finite world, still on every side his nature aspires toward infinity
until "the limits of the self lie finally outside the self."^
Thus Niebuhr reasons that since man is ever in the ten¬
sion between what he is and what the reality which transcends him
tells him he ought to be, it is inevitable that evidences of the rela¬
tivity of his ethics should be manifested on all sides.
Especially is this relativity in evidence in the sphere of
relations between social groups. Niebuhr believes with Karl Mann¬
heim that the ethical thought of all groups constitutes mere ideologies
*
The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, Chap, ii and v.
2




Ibid., p. 196, 197.
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relative to social conditioning. * Man is always prejudiced in his
judgment of other parties:
No party to the conflict has a perspective
high enough to judge the merits of the oppo¬
nents position. Every appeal to moral stand¬
ards thus degenerates into a moral justifica¬
tion of the self against the enemy. ^
For example, Niebuhr argues that in the dispute between
the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine there is no human basis for a
solution:
The participants cannot find a common ground
of rational morality from which to arbitrate
the issues because the moral judgments which
each brings to them are formed by the very
historical forces which are in conflict.-*
Niebuhr sees the same tragic relativity characterizing
efforts to judge international conflicts. For even the so-called
neutrals are incapable of disinterested action:
There is, in short, no position in an interna¬
tional conflict from which impartial judgments
are possible. Every judgment is colored by in¬
terest and every claim to impartiality fails in
the end to obscure the partial and particular in¬
terest which prompted or corrupted it. Thus
the international situation is a perfect picture
of human finitude. .. .
1
Ibid. • PP- !96, 197.
^
An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 126.
3 Ibid. , p. 127.
4 Ibid., p. 130.
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Going from the group to the individual, Niebuhr reasons
that the individual is less biased in his judgment than the group but
only in degree, not in kind, for: "We always judge ourselves by our
own standards and weigh ourselves in balances which gives us a spe¬
cial advantage."* This finiteness of perspective and bias which
characterizes all human judgments manifests the hopeless relativity
of human ethics, however, the deepest expression of this relativity
Niebuhr finds in the fact that any attempt to escape relativity i3 sin¬
ful and only intensifies it. Furthermore, Niebuhr argues that the
very essence of sin is seen in man's effort to exalt his relative
ideas into absolutes or to pretend that he is God. He writes: "That
sin has its source not in temporality but in man's willful refusal to
acknowledge the finite and determinate character of his existence."
All of man's attempts at morality are themselves tainted:
Thus the moral urge to establish order in life
is mixed with the ambition to make oneself the
center of that order; and devotion to every
transcendent value is corrupted by the effort





The Nature and Destiny of Man, p. 177.
3
An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 85.
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Moreover, Niebuhr contends that any attempt to ele¬
vate moral ideals is futile, for : "The higher the aspirations rise
the more do sinful pretensions accompany them."* Thus he sees
the international situation not only as a "picture of human finitude",
but also as "a tragic revelation of the consequences of sinful dis-
2
honesty which accompany every effort to transcend it."
On the positive side of Niebuhr's ethic he contends that
since man's relative nature is always reaching beyond itself, if
the relativity of human ethics is to be transcended, it must come
through the contacts between man and that which is beyond him.
While Niebuhr believes that these contacts can only be described
in myths rather than in the language of science, he nevertheless
believes that they do take place in the revelation of God to man.
Christian ethics is utterly dependent upon tliese revelations of God
to man. Niebuhr writes:
It does not establish a connection with hori¬
zontal points of a political or social ethics or
with the diagonals which a prudential individual
ethic draws between the moral ideal and the
facts of a given situation. It has only a vertical
dimension between the loving will of God and the
will of man. ^
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid. , p. 130.
2 Ibid. , p. 39.
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In saying that Barth, Brunner and Niebuhr are like
Paley in seeing the final meaning of morality in the will of God,
we do not mean that they were in agreement as to how the will
of God is known. On the contrary, they would utterly repudiate
Paley's philosophical method of discerning the will of God through
principles of expediency. When man presumes to thus describe
the will of God he is, according to Barth .usurping the throne of
God, for only God can manifest the will of God. 1 Brunner writes
concerning the hedonistic calculus that while it is true that God
wills our true happiness, we must not forget that, "He wills it
in such a way that no one else knows what His will is."^ Fur¬
thermore, Niebuhr insists that: "No pattern of human reason but
only the will of God can be the principle of the form and order to
3which human life must be conformed." Niebuhr repudiates Paley's
method of reasoning from the goodness of God that He must desire
the happiness of all men by contending that while God is a good God,
4
He is, nevertheless, completely free. We are not, therefore, to
suggest that even the goodness of God is the basis of morality, for
*
Knowledge of God and the Service of God, p. 20.
^ The Divine Imperative, p. 120.
3 The Nature and Destiny of Man, pp. 28, 29.
4 Ibid. , p. 142.
- 249 -
should we so do, we would be exalting a human relative category
to an absolute status. Niebuhr emphatically insists thaL it is God's
free self which is final and not merely something we can see in God.
Moreover, Niebuhr refuses to give any further definition of good it¬
self because to do so would be to subject himceif to his own condem¬
nation of the sin of making absolutes of the human thought patterns
of a particular time and place. Therefore, the only account of good
which he is willing to give is to identify it with the will of God who
meets us at the limit of our experience.
This insistence of Paley and of the modern school of neo-
orthodoxy on an ethic based on religion is thoroughly in accord with
the Christian tradition. Moreover, it is in complete harmony with
the Hebraic psychology within which Christianity was formulated.
Professor John Macmurray reminds us that the filing that distin¬
guishes Hebrew culture from all others is that:
Art and science, politics, law, morality and
philosophy, or rather what corresponds to
these autonomous spheres of activity in other
cultures, remain, as in primitive society, as¬
pects of religion. Religion, thus, never be¬
comes a particular sphere of human activity,
but remains the synthesis of all. *
* The Clue to History, p. 28.
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Christianity is not a dualistic view which severs ethics
from religion, for it recognizes no ultimate separation between
the service of God and social behavior. "Thou shalt love the Lord
thy God"; "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." These are the
two basic commandments, and they stand together.
The close connection between religion and ethics within
the framework of Christianity is revealed in the characteristic man¬
ner in which Paul writes his epistles. The first part deals with his
theology or his reflection upon religious themes while the second
part contains his ethical precepts and admonitions. A similar re¬
sult is found in the Gospels where the evangelist follows a duality
of structure. A narrative of events which contains the historical
facts of theology will be given followed by certain ethical precepts.
In other words, the ethical teaching of the New Testament is con¬
tained in a context which consists of a report of historical facts and
an explanation of their religious significance.
In the Old Testament there was a relationship between
"haggada", the declaration or exposition of religious truth and
"halakha", regulations for conduct. Likewise in the primitive
Christian religion there was the distinction between the "kerygma",
the proclamation of "the good news," and the "didache", the teaching.
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A convert to Christianity first of all responded to the "kerygma"
and placed himself under the judgment and mercy of God revealed
in Christ. He thus became a member of the Christian community,
the church, and began to live a new life. He was then instructed
in the ethical principles and obligations of the Christian life which
are described by the Greek term, "didache ", or teaching.
Thus the order of approach in Christianity was first the
proclamation of the Gospel and then the beginning of instruction in
morals. This approach to ethics was set in marked contrast to that
of contemporary Greek moralists who from the time of Aristotle
had determined to establish a self-contained and self-justifying
system of ethic. Christianity, however, presented ethics not as
self-contained nor as self-justifying but as arising out of a re¬
sponse to the Gospel.
In what is Paul's earliest extant epistle, and perhaps
the earliest document of Christianity, the First Epistle to the
Thessalonians, Paul addresses a congregation of newly converted
Christians in the city now called Salonica in Macedonia. Fearing
that these new converts from paganism might not fully appreciate
the moral demands of the Gospel, Paul, after reviewing his theology
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in the first three chapters, proceeds to give to them what he
calls "orders." The term which he uses was employed in mili¬
tary circles to describe army orders. This throws great light
on Paul's attitude toward Christian liberty. He certainly does not
think of the Christian attitude as anarchism. His "orders" to the
Christians of Thessalonica are extremely practical. They are told
to observe decent self-control in sexual relations, to respect the
rights of others, to be honest and industrious, etc.
Dr. C. H. Dodd has observed that these "orders" to which
the Apostle refers belong to a regular course of ethical instruction
for converts, the technical term for which was "catechesis". * Paul
also speaks of this body of instructions as "traditions". Dr. Dodd
understands Paul's claim, that he received this tradition from
others ( I Corinthians 15:1-3), to mean that there was already in
existence a traditional body of ethical teaching given to converts
2from paganism to Christianity. In writing to the Roman church,
a church which he had not yet visited, Paul assumes that this body
of ethical teaching has already been given them. He thanks God
that the Roman Christians obey what he refers to as "the pattern
of teaching" which they had received (Romans 6:17-18.)
*




Moreover, the style and form as well as content of
such ethical exhortations as are found written by Paul in First
Thessalonians (5:14-18), by the writer of Hebrews in Hebrews
(13:1-3), and by Peter in his First Epistle (3:8-9), give evidence
that these writers were influenced by the familiar form of ethical
instruction or "catechesis" which existed in the earliest days of
the Christian church.
In addition to this Paul also claims to have a body of
ethical instruction which he has received from the Lord and
which is absolutely authoritative (1 Corinthians 7:8-12, 25, 40).
He called upon his converts to "fulfill the law of Christ" (Galatians
6:2). Thus believing himself to have received authority from
Christ, he gave "orders" to his converts, and unequivocally de¬
manded obedience. It should be remembered, however, that Paul
taught that these commands are addressed to those who have the
resources of supernatural grace for their fulfilment. The law of
Christ is based upon the revelation of the nature of the eternal
God, and it affirms the principles upon which His world is built
and which men cannot ignore without subjecting themselves to
dire.si peril. Thus we conclude that ethics is dependent upon
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religion and that all moral obligation flows out of the moral nature
of God as revealed in Christ. This does not mean, however, that
an action is construed to be wrong because it is against an arbitrary
will of God, but because it is against His intention for human life
and therefore, it is against our highest welfare. By obeying the will
of God man finds the highest fulfilment of that for which he was made.
To refuse to act according to God's will is for man to find at death
that he has not lived at all. *
ii
The second item before us is the relation of revelation to
ethics. How much Paley emphasized the central role of revelation
in ethics has already been observed. We have also seen the central
role of revelation in the system of Christian ethics that is fast mov¬
ing to the front in current Christian circles. It must be remembered,
however, that what Paley meant by revelation and what Barth, Brunner,
and Niebuhr mean by it are vastly different. When Paley speaks of
revelation he means the Bible as the Word of God. He regarded the
Bible as the record of the dealings of an immutable God with people
whose temperaments and circumstances were often like our own.
Macmurray, John. The Clue to History, p. 68.
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When, therefore, we wish to ascertain the will of God, we have
only to go with seeking minds to the Bible and find how God dealt
with men under similar circumstances in other days.
Over against this neo-orthodoxy* is insisting that the
Word of God is not to be identified with the Bible. The W'ord of
God for Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr cannot be divorced from
God himself. For the Word of God to come to man is nothing
less than for God himself to come. God's Word may come through
the Bible or through preaching, but it is never to be identified with
these. The Bible is the result of revelation. It is not the static
vehicle which contains God's revelation, for God's revelation is
never static. It is always dynamic and immediate. It is not some¬
thing that hangs suspended in the stratosphere as a set of principles
from which we, through the process of ratiocination can discern the
will of God. It is rather, God breaking right through with this mes¬
sage to this man in this moment.
It is significant that this view has spread very widely
outside the school of neo-orthodoxy. For example. Dr. William
*
The writer understands that Barth, Brunner and espe¬
cially Niebuhr have repudiated the idea that they belong to a school
of thought. However, since many reviewers in America are choos¬
ing to classify them together under the category of "neo-orthodoxy,"
for the sake of convenience he chooses to follow this pattern.
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Temple says: "What is offered to man's apprehension in any spe¬
cific revelation is not truth concerning God but the living God Him¬
self. "* Principal John Baillie writes:
Revelation consists neither in the dictation of
writings nor in the communication of informa¬
tion, but in personal communion—the self-dis¬
closure of a personality. So also in the sphere
of morals what has been revealed to us is not a
code of rules which we must obey but a person
to whom we are constrained to respond.
Coming back to Barth we find him contending that: "What
God utters is never in any way known and true in abstraction from
3
God Himself." God manifests His word in three forms, namely,
preaching, Scripture, and revelation. Of these three Barth re¬
gards revelation itself as being ultimate while preaching and Scrip¬
ture are mere forms of witness to the revelation itself. Further¬
more, revelation can never be formulated into a code or system or
4
displayed in scriptural quotation. On the contrary, revelation is
always personal, living and purposive. It always has been and must
forever remain God's mystery which when manifested leaves no resi¬
due that in itself may be called the'Word of God." For Barth contends
^
Nature, Man and God, P. 322.
2
Our Knowledge of God, p. 37.
^ The Problem of Ethics Today, p. 155.
4 Ibid. , p. 159.
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that if God did not retain the manifestation of Himself in His own
hands He would cease to be God. * The Word of God cannot be
known by the exercise of the intellect but only through divine
grace acknowledged by faith which is itself the gift of a God who
bestows it upon whom He pleases. Moreover, the Word of God is
not a gift to mankind in general but is given "to this and that parti-
2
cular man." The only element of hope that Earth holds out in his
ethics is seen in his contention that the other side of our despair is
the breaking through of the Word of God upon us. This comes when
we realize our impotence and look up to see the Light of God dawning
3
upon us. This light does not come as a revelation of the particular
acts which God approves but as a certain kind of existence which God
demands. Neither does the light of God prescribe rules or details
of our duty. Instead of this God demands that we choose our way in
the light of the new existence which He approves for us.
Brunner also follows in this tradition. He insists that the
Bible represents a witness to the revelation of God which is not to
be slavishly followed. While the commandments are helpful guides,
*
The Knowledge of God and the Service of God, p. 20.
The Doctrine of the Word of God, p. 181.
^ The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. I67ff.
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they do not of themselves constitute the Divine Imperative. This
Divine Imperative must be unincumbered by any form of human
control in order that it may come afresh to the particular person.
Throughout his argument Brunner sternly warns against any human
attempt to reduce the consistency of God to a principle, for this con¬
sistency itself can never be known save through the special revela¬
tion of God. Brunner stedfastly rejects any system of morality which
would allow a moral code to usurp the throne of God. It is absolutely
unthinkable to him that God should conform to a standard of good out¬
side Himself. Brunner takes his stand firmly within the Old Testa¬
ment tradition as he writes:
An idea like that in the religion of Zarathustra
that God became Lord because he chose the Good,
the idea of a law which is even higher than God
Himself is unthinkable in the Old Testament.
Brunner combines his doctrine of revelation with his doc¬
trine of man and insists that there is in man no nature apart from re¬
velation. "Man has Spirit," he writes, only in that he is addressed by
God. . .therefore, the human self is nothing which exists in its own
2
right, no property of man, but a relation to a divine thou. "The
^ The Divine Imperative, page 53.
2
God and Man, English Translation, p. 155.
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humanity of man rests in nothing else than the divine Word addressed
to him . " *
For Niebuhr there are two kinds of revelation: private or
2
general revelation, and public or specific revelations in history.
The basis for our acceptance of special revelation is to be found
in general revelation, however, we cannot fully understand general
revelation apart from a special revelation in which God gives direc¬
tion and force to conscience. In the special revelation of the Bible,
Niebuhr says:
A universal human experience, the sense of
being commanded, placed under obligation and
judged is interpreted as a relation between God
and man in which it is God who makes demands
1
and judgments upon man.
Apart from such an interpretation of conscience through historical
revelation, "conscience becomes falsifie.d, because it is explained
merely as man facing the court of social approval or disapproval or
4
as facing his own 'best self."
These current conceptions of revelation are far more
dynamic and vital than was that of Paley. However, it was commend-
1
Ibid. , p. 160.
2
The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, pages 125 ff.
3 Ibid. , p. 129.
4
Ibid. , p. 130.
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able in Paley that in the face of the deistic opposition to all spe¬
cial revelation from God that he maintained his respect for the
Book which contained the old, old story of God's dealings with men.
Although, at times it appears that he is guilty of Biblioiatry, we
must admit that even that is better than the total abandoning of the
Bible. For if we are to be delivered from ethical relativism, we
must begin with God. This is only made possible as God comes to
us and as we have some word from God upon which our moral pre¬
cepts may be founded. As Professor Pitirim Sorokin of Harvard
has said: "It is only because they are derived from God that "the
moral values of Christian ethics are absolute,"
It has been objected that Paley's authority is an external
force of a non-moral kind since it cannot be reasoned that the mere
power of a supreme being could be accepted as sufficient ground for
voluntary obedience to him. For such obedience would thereby be¬
come a "must", not an "ought." But this is a misinterpretation of
Paley. He reasons from the absolute goodness of God that he must
desire man's welfare and happiness. For him God's will is not an
arbitrary fiat but the expression of absolute goodness.
*
The Crisis of Our Age, p. 139.
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Thereforee he grounded the basis of obligation to strive for the
good in the nature of the good itself.
iii
The third phase of this chapter is to deal with the re¬
lation of reason to ethics. In common with the blithe spirit of
eighteenth century England Paley saw man as the creation of a
God who desired above all else man's happiness and had made
the whole created order to serve this purpose. To be the reci¬
pient of God's bounty all that was necessary for man to do was
for him to obey a rational interpretation of Scripture, and if this
did not provide sufficient light, to reason from the standpoint of
expediency concerning what course of action would bring the most
happiness to the most people. Paley thus made reason and reve¬
lation to work hand in hand in the determining of the will of God.
Since the work of Immanuel Kant, morality has become
in many circles the by-product of logic. This trend developed until
the liberalism of the early part of the twentieth century said that
man is essentially good because he is rational, and his rationality
is divine; so divine that all reason-defying paradoxes of the Christian
faith, may be smoothly by-passed as not belonging to the essence of
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Christianity. Man was made the center and measure of all things,
and it was held that the most distinctive emphasis in the teaching
of Jesus was His emphasis upon the essential dignity of human
personality which said that that which elevates and enriches human
personality is right, and that which debases and destroys human
personality is wrong. *
The current neo-orthodoxy is calling us away from the
blind impasse of optimistic liberalism with its deified man and
humanized god to a new realism about man and to a God who sits
regnant above the human scene, a God who, to use Kierkegaard's
phrase, possesses an "infinite qualitative difference." To neo-
orthodoxy God is "ganz anders", wholly different and, therefore,
cannot be defined in a rational formula. Niebuhr sees the pre¬
eminent sin of the twentieth century as man's pretension to have
achieved a degree of knowledge which is beyond the limit of finite
life. This he calls the "ideological taint" in which all human know¬
ledge is involved and which is always something more than mere
human Ignorance. It is always partly an effort to hide that ignorance
by pretension. Niebuhr concludes that: "No pattern of human rea-
*
Fosdick, Harry Emerson. A Guide to Understanding
the Bible, p. 70.
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son but only the will of God can be the principle of the form and
order to.which human life must be conformed"*
Furthermore, Niebuhr refuses to give any further de¬
finition of good itself because to do so would be to subject himself
to his own condemnation of the sin of making absolutes of the human
thought patterns of a particular time and place.
For Barth God is altogether incomprehensible to us.
Our insight can never penetrate beyond his revelation nor can it
fully grasp that revelation. Consequently the ultimate meaning of
right and wrong for us can never mean anything more than the sov¬
ereign incomprehensible approval of God. Logic cannot serve to
disentangle us from the relativistic ethical situation, for logic it¬
self is dependent upon ethics. For Barth, knowledge is: "that con¬
firmation of human acquaintance with an object whereby its trueness
becomes a determining factor in the existence of the man who knows.
If knowledge is real for us, it must change us in our very existence,
therefore, logic, which is the science of knowledge, is dependent upon
ethics:
It is only when the logical question about things as
they are is merged in the ethical question, about
*
The Doctrine of the Word of God, p. 226.
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things as they might be, about the good, that
it becomes ultimate.*
Barth continues:
Absolutely nothing, therefore, can come of
submitting the question about the good to the
question about the truth in the logical sense-
as if it were not the very ground upon which
the latter substantiates itself.^
Throughout the ethics of neo-orthodoxy there runs the
common strain of scepticism, agnosticism and irrationalism
which utterly contradicts the optimism and rationalism of Paley.
For all the tremendous contribution of these writers, we at times
yearn for the sweet reasonableness of the eighteenth century. Per¬
haps this is an evidence of the truth in Niebuhr's contention thai man
is not willing to own his finiteness. However, we would still believe
that it is a grave error to belittle the rational factor in morality, for
morality must be able to commend itself to man who is not solely in¬
tellect but who, nevertheless, has an intellect. Furthermore, if
man's reason is as corrupt as these writers suppose, it is difficult
to see how it can be used to prove that this is the case.
*
The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 137.
2
The Problem of Ethics Today, p. 137.
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Perhaps Earth's refusal to assign to reason its proper
place accounts for the fact that while his thought has affected the
church most profoundly, it has done so only from a negative stand¬
point; and has not challenged the thought Outside the church at all.
The reason for this is very apparent. Barth has been more inter¬
ested in establishing the absolute uniqueness of the Christian theo¬
logy and ethic than in propagating it throughout the world. He has
repudiated Christian apologetics but has also rejected the philoso¬
phical defense of the Christian world view as not only baseless or
unconvincing, but as out of harmony with the Christian doctrine of
revelation. He emphatically repudiates the belief that Christian
truth is grounded in human reason.
Emil Brunner joins Barth in this conclusion as he says
that: "Revealed knowledge is poles apart from rational knowledge.
These two forms of knowledge are as far from each other as heaven
is from earth. " *
Niebuhr does not go as far in the revolt against reason as
does Barth and Brunner, and yet his use of paradox often appears to
* Revelation and Reason, p. 16.
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be a convenient device for admitting the futility of attempting a
rational explanation of man's moral predicament. For example,
along with his neo-Calvinistic conception, of sin Niebuhr places
an equally confusing conception of human freedom in the following:
Man is thus in the position of being unable to
comprehend himself in his full stature of free¬
dom without a principle of comprehension which
is beyond his comprehension... the ultimate
proof of the freedom of the human spirit is its
own recognition that its will is not free to choose
between good and evil.. ..
Man is most free in the discovery that he is not
free...Man's self-love and self-centeredness
is inevitable, but not in such a way as to fit into
the category of natural necessity. It is within
and by his freedom that man sins. The final
paradox is that the discovery of the inevitability
of sin is man's highest assertion of freedom. *
This theology of paradox impresses the unsophisticated
intellect as a gratuitous mystification; a twisted jungle of inconsis¬
tent opinions that get us nowhere. Instead of letting their yea be yea
and their nay be nay, the neo-orthodox theologians feel that they
must prove man's depravity by demonstrating to him his inability
to wade through a maze of theological jargon. It would, of course,
be grossly unfair to accuse these men of deliberately propagating
theological irrationalism. On the contrary, even Karl
*
The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, pp. 125, 258,
260, 263.
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Barth declares that "Christian faith is not irrational, not anti-
rational, not super-rational, but rational in the proper sense.
At the same time he repudiates altogether the idea of a rational
justification of faith.
Perhaps this confusion has arisen over a misunder¬
standing of the nature and range of reason, and is due to the main¬
tenance of the traditional dualism of faith and reason which refuses
to see the broader view which instead of sharply differentiating be¬
tween reason and the other essential phases of mental life sees
reason as pervading life as a whole. The view of the function of
reason which has become increasingly common in philosophical
and theological circles since the time of Kant, Hegel and Schleier-
macher is that it is practical as well as theoretical; it is concerned
with values and norms as well as bare facts; and it has to do with
ultimate reality as well as phenomena. In this sense reason is oper¬
ative in religion, morality, and art as truly as it is in mathematics
and natural science. "It is, then, proper to speak of a religious




in Outline, p. 23.
^
Knudson, A.C.. Basic Issues in Christian Thought, p. 43
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In contrast with this modern revolt against the use of
reason in theology and ethics stands Paley's firm confidence in
man as a creature capable of receiving the revelation of God as
it is recorded in the Bible. Furthermore, Paley never doubted
that God, in making man a responsible being had endowed him with
the ability to decide for himself what the will of God for his own
life is. That is to say, Paley believed in a revelation from God
which man is capable of receiving. He did not,like Barth,think of
revelation as an experience in which man is neutral and inactive.
Barth believes that even man's religious impulse, his reaching out
after God has no independent spiritual significance. It "differs
from the need of sleep only in degree."* Faith, however, is dif¬
ferent from the religious impulse. Says Barth it is a divine response
within us to a miraculous divine revelation and stands apart from all
natural human activities.
Paley believed that morality is best promoted through
clear definitions of right and wrong. This does not mean that he
was not aware of the infinite complexity of the moral demands made
upon life. It simply means that Paley knew that man's conduct can only
be properly judged in the light of his ability and that unless one can
* Riknerbrief, p. 219.
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discern for himself the highest good, which for him was equated
with the will of God, he could not be held morally responsible for
doing the good.
Instead of the "ganz anders" of Barth, for Paley God
was the "wholly good" who wished the happiness of his creation.
So thoroughly convinced was he of God's goodness that he felt him¬
self justified in identifying anything which contributes most to the
happiness of the most people with the will of God. Naive as this
may be to the sophisticated mind, it has far more practical value
for the ethics of the common man than does the baffling system
gr owing out of the theology of paradox. The paralyzing agnosticism
and pessimism of the neo-orthodox ethic is seen in Niebuhr's con¬
tention that it is characteristic of high religion that, "it excludes
no action, not even the best, from the feeling of guilt. In his doc¬
trine of the sinfulness of even our best efforts Niebuhr cuts the nerve
of morality. Perhaps it is wholesome to insist that the goal is never
attained, but to say that our best is still only a guilty compromise
is to encourage even the best man to ask, "What's the use?" In
connection with our best possible action there may be a normal and
rational feeling of imperfection but not of true guilt. Instead of see¬
ing only the bad in man Paley saw the good and recognized that in
1
~^n Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 82.
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formulating a doctrine of man it must be remembered that there is
a problem of good as well as a problem of evil.
The theological foundation of the ethics of Barth, Brunner
and Niebuhr is fundamentally weak in that it stresses the fall of man
more than the incarnation, the cross of victory, the open tomb of
triumph and the extension of the incarnation through the union of the
believer with Christ. This is not to deny the reality of the fall, for
as Pascal said, "this is the mystery without which man becomes a
mystery to himself." Yet rather than holding before man the dark
Old Testament picture of the fall as the primary item in theology,
it appears to be closer to the New Testament to insist that the in¬
carnation itself argues the fact of man's capacity to receive God.
This is not to deny that the incarnation is a miracle of divine grace
nor that the incarnation was a unique event in human history. But
it is to say that the incarnation posed no problem for God that was
not cared for in man's creation when God made man in His own
image with the capacity for fellowship with God.
Furthermore, by insisting upon the primacy of the incar¬
nation, the cross and the resurrection the scene is changed from the
darkness of the fail to the portrayal of the fact that God by His grace
has now entered the field on the side of man and that in the conquering
cross and the open tomb Fie offers man victory over sin and death in a
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fellowship of faith that overcomes the world. As the Apostle put
it: "As in Adam all die even so in Christ shall all be made alive."*
Barth would call this theology of the divine immanence
the arch heresy of the modern church and in so doing maintains
the traditional view which Borden P. Bowne characterizes as an
emphasis on "the undivineness of the natural and the un-naturalness
of the divine.
In certain passages Brunner also seems to stand against
any emphasis upon the immanence of God. For example, he writes:
Believing God is the antithesis of experienc¬
ing God... .our faith stands opposed to all
experience just as it stands opposed to death
and the Devil. 3
Christian faith for this school is so superempirical and
superhuman that Barth tells us that we do not know when we have it;
4




The Immanence of God, Preface.
3




Over against this one finds the following statement
by John Oman most refreshing:
The present vehement insistence that religion
should only be a crisis of decision about our
dealings with a transcendent God,.. .and that
all concern with human affairs is a descent
from the empyrean into the quagmires and
mists of time, seems to be a mere denial...
that "the earth is the Lord's and the fulness
thereof.... "*
The school of neo-orthodoxy has turned from under¬
standing to cling to mystery. They reject knowledge to trust in
a misguided concept of faith. Our Lord did not identify faith with
a blind plunge into the dark but with the courage to venture accord¬
ing to the understanding. His question was "Why are ye so fearful?
How is that ye have no faith?" Modern dualism makes faith the op¬
posite of understanding—an irrational assertion of something that
we cannot understand. Professor John Macmurray calls this inter¬
pretation, "Moral cowardice masquerading as faith,. ."a will to
3
believe in mystery which is in itself the manifestation of fear."
*
Concerning the Ministry, pp. 104, 105.
2
The Clue to History, p. 99.
^ Ibid. , p. 100,
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The final concern of this chapter will be with the re¬
lationship of eschatology to ethics. As often stated throughout this
thesis Paley's chief concern was with providing a theological sanc¬
tion for utilitarianism. He believed that the only way of bringing
egoistic conduct into harmony with utilitarianism was by emphasiz¬
ing that God has ordained the general happiness as the rule of human
conduct and that He will reward or punish in another life those who
obey or disobey that rule.
A review of the sermons of Paley will discredit the claim
that he was crudely materialistic in his concept of eternity. He
writes, "Heaven is infinitely greater than mere compensation,
which natural religion might lead us to expect."* In another ser¬
mon he states:
1 can easily believe that many of the opinions and
notions we now erroneously entertain, especially
concerning the place, condition, nature, occupa¬
tion, and happiness of departed saints, may here¬
after appear to us as wild, as odd, as unlikely and
ill founded, as our childish fancies appear to us
now.
Furthermore, Paley does not make the fear of eternal
punishment the basis of morality. He expressly states that, "There
*
Sermons and Tracts, Sermon XXII, p. 201.
2 Ibid. , Sermon XXV, p. 335.
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is great uncertainty in what is done under the impression of some
fright. . .when the thoughts are. . .disturbed and the spirit is sunk
and overwhelmed.Again he states, "Salvation comprehends
much more than being saved from punishment. . ..'
The recognition that the resurrection of Christ was in
the forefront of Apostolic preaching and the belief in its practical
corollary thai all men shall rise again from the dead, "they that
have done good to the resurrection of life and they that have done
evil to the resurrection of damnation" led Paley to conclude with
the Apostles that we should ask since this is true, what manner of
men ought we to be? He observes that whenever a set speech of the
Apostles' at a new place is recorded, that is, whenever he first
opens the great message of Christianity to strangers, the great
argument is the resurrection. For example, Paul declares that he
delivered unto the Corinthians "first of all" the message of the death
and resurrection of Jesus (1 Corinthians 15:Iff.). Based upon the
resurrection of Jesus is His promise of victory over death to the
believer. Concerning the promise of Christ of the resurrection
(John 4:28-29), Paley writes:
iIbid., Sermon X, p. 236.
'"Ibid., Sermon XXYI, p. 248.
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These words are so important that if Jesus
Christ had never delivered any other, if he
had come into the world and pronounced only
this simple declaration, and proved the truth
and certainty of it by the miracles which he
wrought, he would have left enough to have
guided his followers to everlasting happiness;
he would have done more towards making man¬
kind virtuous and happy than all the teachers
and all the wisdom that ever appeared upon the
earth had done before him*
Paley believed in the enduring value of human person¬
ality and realized that to take away the eternal hope would mean
that there would be no Gospel left. "If we in this life only have
hope in Christ we are of all men most miserable." (I Corinthians
15:19.)
There is also a strong eschatological sanction running
throughout the ethics of neo-orthodoxy. However, it is a sanction
related to what has come to be called "axiologicai eschatology", the
belief that every generation is directly under God's judgment (as
opposed to "teleological eschatdogy", which puts the judgment at
some future time.) Niebuhr, however, goes beyond the present
scene and looks for the fulfilment of our hopes in a kingdom beyond
this world. In his discussion of the resurrection of the body, Niebuhr
*
Sermons and Tracts, Sermon XXIX, pp. 28-29.
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takes it as a symbol which means that the body and the natural
basis of life are integral components of the personality, not
something to be repudiated in the interests of a purely spiritual
life. When, therefore, life reaches its goal, these too will have
a share in its fulfillment. He does not, however, expect the re¬
suscitation of the body which has been committed to the grave.
Niebuhr insists that while we must take the symbols seriously ,
we should not take them literally. He firmly holds to the belief
that our unfulfilled hopes may be realized in eternity, in a King¬
dom of God which lies beyond our success and failure, into which
the one is built and the other is redeemed. He seas the end of his¬
tory in the final judgment and our final satisfaction in the city
which hath foundations where beyond these voices there is peace. *
Karl Barth sees the resurrection of Jesus as the comple¬
tion of the victory of God. He warns:
We must not transmute the resurrection into a
spiritual event. We must listen to it and let it
tell us the story how there was an empty grave,
that new life beyond death did become visible...
To those who know this, the break between the old
world and the new is proclaimed. They have still
a tiny stretch to run, till it becomes visible that
God in Jesus Christ has accomplished all for them. ^
An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 247.
2
Dogmatics in Outline, p. 123.
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Barth does not agree with Paiey's conception of God
as a judge. He sees that the Biblical meaning of the judge is not
primarily one who rewards some and punishes others. Rather is
he the one who creates order and restores what has been destroyed.
At the same time Barth insists that these visions of the last judgment
are not meaningless. They signify that God knows everything that
exists and happens. As we ponder this we may well be terrified,
for "that which is not of God's grace and right cannot exist.
There can be no question but that the doctrine of life be¬
yond the grave is a basic part of the Christian religion. In describ¬
ing this Professor A.E. Taylor writes:
For the Israelite until long after the return from
the captivity, as for the ordinary Greek, all the
real interests of men, including even the interest
of worshipping Yahweh and keeping His laws, belong
to this side of the 'great divide.' What lies on the
other side is an existence so dreary and meaning¬
less that a man does best to keep it at arm's length
so long as he may, and to avert his thoughts from
it. In the great tradition of Christianity.. .the point
of view is completely reversed. Practical emphasis
falls always not on this life, but on that which awaits
man on the other side of bodily death. It is there
that we are tgjld to look for our real home and our
true destiny.
*
Dogmatics in Outline, p. 123.
2
Ibid. , p. 135.
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Since this is the characteristic view of a Christian,
we are not to condemn Paley for emphasizing it so strongly in
his ethic. Of course, there is the familiar humanistic objection
that the Christian belief in a future life has unduly diverted at-
<
tention from this life.
Moralists in general object to basing ethics in this
world on rewards in another world on the grounds that this tends
to lead us to the attitude that this life is unimportant. The prag-
matist says the future is too nebulous: what we need is to get busy
and make a better world inlhe present. As Paiey presented his
sanction it is quite obvious that an infinite amount of happiness in
eternity could outweigh any amount of earthly misery. There is no
doubt but that an extreme transcendentalism which defines religion
solely in terms of another life reflects the inability to believe in
God and this world at the same time and is therefore spiritually
deficient. However, the belief in a future life of bliss does not
logically imply that the values of this life are to be neglected, and
in practice it is the exception rather than the rule that it leads to
the neglect of this world. In fa.ct, Paley emphatically insists that
while keeping his eye on a more abiding city the Christian must at
the same time earnestly intercede for the peace and welfare of this
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world. * Moreover, it must be recognized that some of the world's
most ardent toilers have been those who were sustained by a blessed
hope. For example, the writer has the privilege of teaching h a
theological seminary where many students are trained for foreign
mission service. After ten years of intensive preparation in medi¬
cal and theological training, one of the most capable and charming
young ladies ever to enroll in our seminary was appointed by our
foreign mission board to go to Joinkrama, Nigeria in the delta re¬
gion of British West Africa which has been called "the back side of
nowhere." There life is unspeakably hard. The rain falls three
hundred and sixty days out of three hundred and sixty-five. There
is no electricity, no running water in the houses. The river is the
place where the natives bury their dead, wash their clothes, bathe,
and then drink the water. One out of every seven has leprosy. Small
pox is rampant. The mission appointee, Miss Aletha Fuller, gave
this testimony: "There is only one doctor in all the area of Join¬
krama and when I get there I will be the only nurse." Then she
asked, "Do I think of it as a sacrifice? No, for I want to give the
best years of my life in service for Christ and to God whose grace
*
Sermons, Sermon XI, p. 142.
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has always and shall always be sufficient." Then she said in closing:
"If I may see a host of black faces up yonder it will be worth all
the effort."
In reply to the critic who says that a belief in a future
life makes one indifferent toward service in this life it might be
noted that the man who says this life is ail, therefore, make the
most of it, usually means make the most of it for yourself.
One of the most amazing achievements of the Apostolic
era is the fact that in this period when the sense of impending catas¬
trophe was so strong and everything in the world seemed temporary
and so much emphasis was being placed upon the thought that only
things which would survive the passing of heaven and earth were
worthy of attention, that the church should produce anything like a
code of social ethics. We should expect that in the face of the ex¬
pectation of the end of the world with the immediate return of the
Lord the Apostles would be utterly indifferent to human affairs. But
notice the emphasis in the First Epistle of Peter:
But the end of all things is at hand; be ye there¬
fore sober, and watch unto prayer. And above
all things have fervent charity among yourselves,
for charity shall cover the multitude of sins.
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Use hospitality one to another without
grudging. As every man hath received the
gift, even so minister the same one to
another, as good stewards of the mani¬
fold grace of God. (I Peter 4:7-10.)
Paul writes :"The night is far spent, the day is at
hand. Let us therefore, cast off the works of darkness and let
us put on the armour of light." (Romans 13:12) "The world",
writes John, "is passing away, and the world's desire, but he
who does God's will abides forever." (I John 2:17.)
Now we do not criticize Paley for his belief in life after
death nor for his belief in rewards and punishments after death,
nor can we say that working for rewards in eternity is not a part
of the Gospel. In answer to the objection that this is a very selfish
view we might answer that surely our Lord knew what He was talking
about when he said: "Lay up for yourselves treasures in Heaven
where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt and where thieves do not
break through nor steal,and also: "for great is your reward in
2
Heaven."
It is conceivable, however, that if this motive should be¬
come too dominant it might destroy the very essence of the Christian
* Matthew 6:20.
Matthew 5:12b.
faith. For example, if one is simply interested in the prudential
earning of rewards, he might soon forget that he is a debtor to
divine grace. If he seeks what God has to give more than God
Himself, he becomes an idol worshipper. The witch of Alexandria,
walking the streets armed with a pitcher of water and a flaming
torch, and crying "Would that I could quench hell with this water
and burn heaven with this torch, so that men would love God for
Himself alone," was mistress of a white magic, not of a black art. *
The Christian is explicitly taught to seek not his own glory here or
hereafter but the glory of God.
The doctrines of heaven and hell are facts that belong
to the Christian religion, but this does not mean that they are essen¬
tially related to the highest motives for ethics. Rewards and punish¬
ments may belong to a certain stage of moral development in a child.
Perhaps it would help in the forming of good habits, but as the child
matures morally, the need for rewards and punishments should dis¬
appear. Our Lord had something to say against those who followed
Him for the loaves and fishes. Instead of thinking in terms of
external rewards perhaps it would be better to regard eternal life
as John regarded it as the present gift of God to the man who through
*
Buttrick, G.A. The Parables of Jesus, p. 163.
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faith enters the fellowship of Christ. This means that what the
man of faith shall be in eternity he is rapidly becoming today.
John construes the goal of the Christian life in terms of char¬
acter. "Beloved it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we
know that when he shall appear we shall be like him; for we shall
see him as he is. And every man that hath this hope in him puri-
fieth himself, even as he is pure." (I John 3:2-3). A remarkable
silence surrounds the Apostles description of the believer's final
destiny. It is somewhat akin to the wholesome agnosticism of
Richard Baxter who wrote:
Our knowledge of that life is small.
The eye of faith is dim,
But 'tis enough that Christ knows all
And I shall be with him.
Moreover, if a man could be scientifically certain of rewards for
his good deeds in eternity would this not cut the nerve of faith by
removing the element of venture therefrom? Furthermore, it is
declared that the motive behind Christian service is to be love.
Only one new commandment did Jesus give His disciples, namely,
this: "A new commandment give I unto you that ye love one another
as I have loved you." (John 13:34.)
It would thus appear that Paley might have improved his
ethic by making it more distinctly Christian. Instead of making
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heaven and hell pure appeals to a selfish, self-regard he might
have viewed them as the normal result of a life that delights in or
refuses the fellowship of God here. The Christian is to find delight
in the fellowship of his Lord more than in anything his Lord might
give him:
He and I in that bright homeland
One great joy will share.
Mine to be forever with him,
His that I am there.
Paley might also have emphasized that religion brings
blessedness in our present life and that the only assurance that a
man may have that he will enjoy the fellowship of God beyond the
grave is the assurance that he shares that fellowship now. This
fellowship is a fellowship of love which the Apostle Paul found so
rich and deathless here that he could declare, "I am persuaded that
neither death nor life.. .shall be able to separate us from the love of
God which is in Christ Jesus, our Lord. (Romans 8:38-39). As John
Oman puts it:
We should not be reconciled to God because we
believe in another life, but we should believe in
another life because, being reconciled to God,
we find a meaning in life which is ever expand¬
ing and a purpose death cannot end.. .Thus we
rightly and religiously believe in another life,
because we are serving the purpose of a love
for which this life is too small.
Grace and Personality, p. 306.
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Oman reasons further that the ethical meaning of love
is to treat every man as an end in himself and to respect him for
what he ought to become. Then he concludes:
Yet how are we to continue to say what he
ought to be, when, if the whole story end
at the grave, we know it is what he never
will be? *
Oman concludes his argument for eternal life by holding
that although the moral order is valid though it is not fully realized
in time, yet it does not follow that it would still be valid even if it
were never to be realized. He contends that instead of a castle in
the air, morality is either life's ultimate meaning or it is nothing.
The ultimate meaning of this moral order is love, but it would be
absurd to say that a moral order with love at its heart could finally
issue in death. He sees love as self-abnegation, not self-regard.
This, however, does not mean that love is self-destruction or self-
disregard. It is, therefore, only because love is itself our best
self-realization, that it has the right to avert attention from our¬
selves to the fulfillment of its own behests; and it can be so only
if the world is so constituted that deliverance from self means to




This gives a due place to self-love, while de¬
livering us from a utilitarian morality, which
makes self-love the measure and end of morals.
Utilitarianism says, conscience is only self-
love wisely judging what really pleases us; a
true morality says, right self-love is only con¬
science wholly determined by God's will of love,
which serves what is worthy of God's image in
us and blesses us because it is in accord with
the true order in which God lias placed us. *
Let us conclude by saying that while he gave imper¬
fect expression to the central features of his ethic, still do we
believe that Paley did well in insisting that religion is the founda¬
tion of morals, that belief in revelation is essential to Christian
ethics, that reason must have its part in the apprehension of re¬
velation and that the eschatological goal must be included in any
complete statement of Christian ethics. For his contribution
along these lines we must at least be grateful enough to disagree
with Shelley who said: "He would rather be damned with Plato and
Sophocles than to go to heaven with Paley and Malthus."
1 Ibid., p. 312.
2 Quoted by Tsanoff, Radoslav AThe Moral Ideals of
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